Towards Presidential Rule in Ukraine : Hybrid Regime Dynamics under Semi-Presidentialism

This article sets out to analyse recent regime developments in Ukraine in relation to semi-presidentialism. The article asks: to what extent and in what ways theoretical arguments against semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems) are relevant for understanding the changing directions of the Ukrainian regime since the 1990s? The article also reviews the by now overwhelming evidence suggesting that President Yanukovych is turning Ukraine into a more authoritarian hybrid regime and raises the question to what extent the president-parliamentary system might serve this end. The article argues that both kinds of semi-presidentialism have, in different ways, exacerbated rather than mitigated institutional conflict and political stalemate. The return to the president-parliamentary system in 2010 – the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratisation – was a step in the wrong direction. The premier-presidential regime was by no means ideal, but it had at least two advantages. It weakened the presidential dominance and it explicitly anchored the survival of the government in parliament. The return to the 1996 constitution ties in well with the notion that President Viktor Yanukovych has embarked on an outright authoritarian path.

The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs

The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in their paper “Updating Ambiguos Beliefs” they justify the Dempster-Schafer rule based on a maximum likelihood procedure. This note shows in the context of Schmeidler-Gilboa preferences under uncertainty, that the Dempster-Schafer rule is in general not ex-ante optimal. This contrasts with Brown’s result that Bayes’ rule is ex-ante optimal for standard Savage preferences with additive probabilities.

Term structure dynamics and no-arbitrage under the Taylor rule

A determinação da taxa de juros estrutura a termo é um dos temas principais da gestão de ativos financeiros. Considerando a grande importância dos ativos financeiros para a condução das políticas econômicas, é fundamental para compreender a estrutura que é determinado. O principal objetivo deste estudo é estimar a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros brasileiras, juntamente com taxa de juros de curto prazo. A estrutura a termo será modelado com base em um modelo com uma estrutura afim. A estimativa foi feita considerando a inclusão de três fatores latentes e duas variáveis ​​macroeconômicas, através da técnica Bayesiana da Cadeia de Monte Carlo Markov (MCMC).

Bailey's rule for the welfare of inflation: a theoretical foundation

This paper demonstrates that for a very general class of monetary models (the Sidrauski type models and the cash-in-advance models), Bailey’s rule to evaluate the welfare efect of infation is in deed accurate. The result applies for any technology or preference, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the ination rate. In general, a dynamic version of Bailey’s rule is established. In particular, the result extends to models in which there is a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services. A dditionally, it is argued that the relevant money demand concept for this issue- the impact of in ination under welfare- is the monetary base.

Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Repensando a relação entre estado, direito e desenvolvimento: os limites do paradigma rule of law e a relevância das alternativas institucionais

Assumindo a primazia da abordagem institucionalista na agenda contemporânea do desenvolvimento, este artigo procurará discutir alguns de seus limites, descritivos e normativos, no que tange, em especial, ao sistema financeiro. Particularmente, procurar-se-á sugerir que os programas de difusão do rule of law têm se constituído em um paradigma estreito do papel exercido pelo direito, segundo a qual cabe ao ambiente jurídico cumprir, apenas e tão somente, a função de garantidor dos interesses de investidores privados, entendidos como atores centrais de um modelo de financiamento baseado em transações de mercado. O texto sugere que o paradigma rule of law, como estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento, tem dificuldade em lidar com a existência de alternativas institucionais de organização econômica e financeira, para além de um modelo de mercado baseado em atores atomizados e carentes de segurança jurídica. Um exemplo disso, que escapa do instrumental tradicional, é o modelo brasileiro de financiamento, que, apesar de ter vivenciado inúmeras reformas institucionais, dedicadas a elevar o nível de proteção de investidores, ainda concentra em um banco de desenvolvimento – o BNDES – grande parte do financiamento de longo prazo do país. O artigo assume, portanto, que, sim, o direito e as instituições, de fato, importam para o desenvolvimento, mas há uma variedade de possibilidades e funções a serem exercidas pelos arranjos institucionais e ferramentas jurídicas – muito além do que supõem os programas de rule of law. Uma bem sucedida organização institucional baseada em um banco de desenvolvimento é um exemplo disso.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

The Taylor rule under inquiry: Hidden states

This work empirically evaluates the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Markov-Switching Regimes. I find that the inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting heavily with Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian data. When the inflation parameter is greater than one, it encompasses periods that these authors considered they should be less than one. Brazil is used for comparative purposes because it experienced a high level inflation until 1994 and then a major stabilization plan reduced the growth in prices to civilized levels. Thus, it is a natural laboratory to test theories designed to work in any environment. The findings point to a theoretical gap that deserves further investigation and show that monetary policy in Brazil has been ineffective, which is coherent with the general attitude of population in relation to this measure.