1000 resultados para Equilibrium Problem
Resumo:
The large appreciation and depreciation of the US dollar in the 1980s stimulated an important debate on the usefulness of unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks. In this paper, we propose a simple model to describe the evolution of the real exchange rate. We then propose a more general smooth transition (STR) function than has hitherto been employed, which is able to capture structural changes along the (long-run) equilibrium path, and show that this is consistent with our economic model. Our framework allows for a gradual adjustment between regimes and allows for under- and/or over-valued exchange rate adjustments. Using monthly and quarterly data for up to twenty OECD countries, we apply our methodology to investigate the univariate time series properties of CPI-based real exchange rates with both the U.S. dollar and German mark as the numeraire currencies. The empirical results show that, for more than half of the quarterly series, the evidence in favour of the stationarity of the real exchange rate was clearer in the sub-sample period post-1980.
Resumo:
We propose an alternative approach to obtaining a permanent equilibrium exchange rate (PEER), based on an unobserved components (UC) model. This approach offers a number of advantages over the conventional cointegration-based PEER. Firstly, we do not rely on the prerequisite that cointegration has to be found between the real exchange rate and macroeconomic fundamentals to obtain non-spurious long-run relationships and the PEER. Secondly, the impact that the permanent and transitory components of the macroeconomic fundamentals have on the real exchange rate can be modelled separately in the UC model. This is important for variables where the long and short-run effects may drive the real exchange rate in opposite directions, such as the relative government expenditure ratio. We also demonstrate that our proposed exchange rate models have good out-of sample forecasting properties. Our approach would be a useful technique for central banks to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate and to forecast the long-run movements of the exchange rate.
Resumo:
The Scottish Parliament has the authority to make a balanced-budget expansion or contraction in public expenditure, funded by corresponding local changes in the basic rate of income tax of up to 3p in the pound. This fiscal adjustment is known as the Scottish Variable Rate of income tax, though it has never, as yet, been used. In this paper we attempt to identify the impact on aggregate economic activity in Scotland of implementing these devolved fiscal powers. This is achieved through theoretical analysis and simulation using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland. This analysis generalises the conventional Keynesian model so that negative balanced-budget multipliers values are possible, reflecting a regional “inverted Haavelmo effect”. Key parameters determining the aggregate economic impact are the extent to which the Scottish Government create local amenities valuable to the Scottish population and the extent to which this is incorporated into local wage bargaining.
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This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.
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Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the literature: Eulerequation learning, which assumes that consumption decisions are made to satisfy the one-step-ahead perceived Euler equation; and infinite-horizon learning, in which consumption today is determined optimally from an infinite-horizon optimization problem with given beliefs. In our approach, agents hold a finite forecasting/planning horizon. We find for the Ramsey model that the unique rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable at all horizons. However, transitional dynamics can differ significantly depending upon the horizon.
Resumo:
We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private, third–party recommendations drawn from known distributions. In a “good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution we use is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs better than any symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. In a “bad–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff vector. In a “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a convex combination of Nash equilibrium outcomes (which is also a correlated equilibrium), and in a fourth “very–good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution yields high payoffs, but is not a correlated equilibrium. We compare behavior in all of these treatments to the case where subjects do not receive recommendations. We find that when recommendations are not given to subjects, behavior is very close to mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium play. When recommendations are given, behavior does differ from mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium, with the nature of the differ- ences varying according to the treatment. Our main finding is that subjects will follow third–party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoff–enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.
Resumo:
Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.
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We present a stylized intertemporal forward-looking model able that accommodates key regional economic features, an area where the literature is not well developed. The main difference, from the standard applications, is the role of saving and its implication for the balance of payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-looking behaviour for agents, the rate of private saving is exogenously determined and so no neoclassical financial adjustment is needed. Also, we focus on the similarities and the differences between myopic and forward-looking models, highlighting the divergences among the main adjustment equations and the resulting simulation outcomes.
Resumo:
This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.
Resumo:
This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.
Resumo:
The aim of the paper is to identify the added value from using general equilibrium techniques to consider the economy-wide impacts of increased efficiency in household energy use. We take as an illustrative case study the effect of a 5% improvement in household energy efficiency on the UK economy. This impact is measured through simulations that use models that have increasing degrees of endogeneity but are calibrated on a common data set. That is to say, we calculate rebound effects for models that progress from the most basic partial equilibrium approach to a fully specified general equilibrium treatment. The size of the rebound effect on total energy use depends upon: the elasticity of substitution of energy in household consumption; the energy intensity of the different elements of household consumption demand; and the impact of changes in income, economic activity and relative prices. A general equilibrium model is required to capture these final three impacts.
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This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.
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Guba and Sapir asked, in their joint paper [8], if the simultaneous conjugacy problem was solvable in Diagram Groups or, at least, for Thompson's group F. We give an elementary proof for the solution of the latter question. This relies purely on the description of F as the group of piecewise linear orientation-preserving homeomorphisms of the unit. The techniques we develop allow us also to solve the ordinary conjugacy problem as well, and we can compute roots and centralizers. Moreover, these techniques can be generalized to solve the same questions in larger groups of piecewise-linear homeomorphisms.
Resumo:
We derive a rational model of separable consumer choice which can also serve as a behavioral model. The central construct is [lambda] , the marginal utility of money, derived from the consumer's rest-of-life problem. We present a robust approximation of [lambda], and show how to incorporate liquidity constraints, indivisibilities and adaptation to a changing environment. We fi nd connections with numerous historical and recent constructs, both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive description of consumer choice.