Accountability and ideology: when left looks right and right looks left

Abstract Managers face hard choices between process and outcome systems of accountability in evaluating employees, but little is known about how managers resolve them. Building on the premise that political ideologies serve as uncertainty-reducing heuristics, two studies of working managers show that: (1) conservatives prefer outcome accountability and liberals prefer process accountability in an unspecified policy domain; (2) this split becomes more pronounced in a controversial domain (public schools) in which the foreground value is educational efficiency but reverses direction in a controversial domain (affirmative action) in which the foreground value is demographic equality; (3) managers who discover employees have subverted their preferred system favor tinkering over switching to an alternative system; (4) but bipartisan consensus arises when managers have clear evidence about employee trustworthiness and the tightness of the causal links between employee effort and success. These findings shed light on ideological and contextual factors that shape preferences for accountability systems.

Conformational preferences for some 2-substituted N-methoxy-N-methylacetamides through spectroscopic and theoretical studies

The analysis of the IR carbonyl band of the 2-substituted N-methoxy-N-methylacetamides Y-CH(2)C(O)-N(OMe)Me (Y = F1, OMe 2, OPh 3, Cl 4), supported by B3LYP/6-311++G(3df, 3pd) calculations along with the NBO analysis for 1-4, indicated the existence of cis-gauche conformers i.e. (c) and (g) for 1 and 3, (c(1), c(2)) and (g(1), g(2)) for 2, and (c) and (g(1), g(2)) for 4. In the gas phase, the g conformer population prevails over the c one, for 1 and 3, the (c(1) + c(2)) population prevails over the (g(1) + g(2)) one for 2, and the (g(1) + g(2)) conformer population is more abundant than (c) one for 4. In n-hexane solution, the cis conformer is more abundant for 1-3. The occurrence of Fermi resonance in the nu(CO) region, in n-hexane, precludes the estimative of relative populations of the (c, g(1), g(2)) conformers for 4. The SCI-PCM calculations agree with the solvent effect on the nu(CO) band component relative intensities for 1-3. NBO analysis showed that the n(N) -> pi.(CO), orbital interaction is the main factor which stabilizes the gauche (g, g(1), g(2)) conformers for 1-4 into a larger extent relative to the cis (c, c(1), c(2)) ones. The n(y) -> pi(.)(Co,) sigma(C-Y) -> pi.(CO,) pi(CO) -> sigma(C-Y) and 7co orbital interactions still contribute, but into a minor extent for the stabilization of the gauche conformers relative to the cis ones. The existence of some pyramidalization at the nitrogen atom of the Weinreb amides 1-4 is responsible for the occurrence of Y(delta)-(4)center dot center dot center dot O(delta)-(9) and Y(delta)-(4)center dot center dot center dot N(delta)-(7) short contacts in the gauche (g, g(1), g(2)) conformers, which originates strong repulsive Coulombic interactions, acting in opposition to the large orbital stabilization of the gauche conformer with respect to the cis one. Therefore, a delicate balance of the Coulombic and orbital interactions seems to be responsible for the observed stabilization of the gauche (g, g(1), g(2)) and cis (c, c(1), c(2)) conformers, both in the gas phase and in the solution for 1-4. However, the cis conformer predominance, in non polar solvents, for the 2-substituted N-methoxy-N-methyl acetamides 1-3, bearing in a first raw (fluorine and oxygen) atoms, is in the opposite direction to the gauche conformer preference for the corresponding 2-substituted N,N-dialkyl-acetamides. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Compositional Model Repositories via Dynamic Constraint Satisfaction with Order-of-Magnitude Preferences

The predominant knowledge-based approach to automated model construction, compositional modelling, employs a set of models of particular functional components. Its inference mechanism takes a scenario describing the constituent interacting components of a system and translates it into a useful mathematical model. This paper presents a novel compositional modelling approach aimed at building model repositories. It furthers the field in two respects. Firstly, it expands the application domain of compositional modelling to systems that can not be easily described in terms of interacting functional components, such as ecological systems. Secondly, it enables the incorporation of user preferences into the model selection process. These features are achieved by casting the compositional modelling problem as an activity-based dynamic preference constraint satisfaction problem, where the dynamic constraints describe the restrictions imposed over the composition of partial models and the preferences correspond to those of the user of the automated modeller. In addition, the preference levels are represented through the use of symbolic values that differ in orders of magnitude.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous time preferences

This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income inequality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time preferences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also offers an alternative explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation between time preference and labor income. Under some speciÖc distributions regarding wage offers and time preferences, we show how the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income distribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the parameters of the model.

Local concavifiability of preferences and determinacy of equilibrium

In this paper we consider strictly convex monotone continuous complete preorderings on R+n that are locally representable by a concave utility function. By Alexandroff 's (1939) theorem, this function is twice dífferentiable almost everywhere. We show that if the bordered hessian determinant of a concave utility representation vanishes on a null set. Then demand is countably rectifiable, that is, except for a null set of bundles, it is a countable union of c1 manifolds. This property of consumer demand is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium prices of apure exchange economy will be locally unique, for almost every endowment. We give an example of an economy satisfying these conditions but not the Katzner (1968) - Debreu (1970, 1972) smoothness conditions.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.