Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

Implementing a double dividend: recycling ecotaxes towards lower labour taxes

In this paper we follow the tradition of applied general equilibrium modelling of the Walrasian static variety to study the empirical viability of a double dividend (green, welfare, and employment) in the Spanish economy. We consider a counterfactual scenario in which an ecotax is levied on the intermediate and final use of energy goods. Under a revenue neutral assumption, we evaluate the real income and employment impact of lowering payroll taxes. To appraise to what extent the model structure and behavioural assumptions may influence the results, we perform simulations under a range of alternative model and policy scenarios. We conclude that a double dividend –better environmental quality, as measured by reduced CO2 emissions, and improved levels of employment– may be an achievable goal of economic policy.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

A relative double commutant theorem for hereditary sub-C*-algebras

We prove a double commutant theorem for hereditary subalgebras of a large class of C*-algebras, partially resolving a problem posed by Pedersen[8]. Double commutant theorems originated with von Neumann, whose seminal result evolved into an entire field now called von Neumann algebra theory. Voiculescu proved a C*-algebraic double commutant theorem for separable subalgebras of the Calkin algebra. We prove a similar result for hereditary subalgebras which holds for arbitrary corona C*-algebras. (It is not clear how generally Voiculescu's double commutant theorem holds.)

Trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions; bilateral trade need not be the answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.

Model structures on the category of small double categories

In this paper we obtain several model structures on DblCat, the category of small double categories. Our model structures have three sources. We first transfer across a categorification-nerve adjunction. Secondly, we view double categories as internal categories in Cat and take as our weak equivalences various internal equivalences defined via Grothendieck topologies. Thirdly, DblCat inherits a model structure as a category of algebras over a 2-monad. Some of these model structures coincide and the different points of view give us further results about cofibrant replacements and cofi brant objects. As part of this program we give explicit descriptions and discuss properties of free double categories, quotient double categories, colimits of double categories, and several nerves and categorifications.

Aspergillus fumigatus fungus ball in hospitalized patients with chronic pulmonary disease: usefulness of double immunodiffusion test as a screening procedure

Double immunodiffusion (DID) was used as a screening test for the diagnosis of aspergillosis. Three hundred and fifty patients were tested, all of them referred from a specialized chest disease hospital and without a definitive etiological diagnosis. When DID was positive addtional information such as clinical history and radiographic findings were requested and also surgical specimens were obtained whenever possible. Specific precipitin hamds for Aspergillus fumigatus antigen were found in 29 (8.3%) of 350 patients sera. Nineteen (65.5%) of the 29 patients with positive serology were recognized as having a fungus ball by X-rays signs in 17 or by pathological examination in 2 or by both in 8 patients. This two-year prospective study has shown that pulmonary aspergillos is a considerable problem among patiens admitted to a Chest Diseases Hospital, especially in those with pulmonary cavities or bronchiectasis.