1000 resultados para DNA Matching
Resumo:
OBJECTIVE: The intracellular Gram-negative bacterium Chlamydia pneumoniae has been associated with atherosclerosis. The presence of Chlamydia pneumoniae has been investigated in fragments of the arterial wall with a technique for DNA identification. METHODS: Arterial fragments obtained from vascular surgical procedures in 58 patients were analyzed. From these patients, 39 were males and the mean age was 65±6 years. The polymerase chain reaction was used to identify the bacterial DNA with a pair of primers that codify the major outer membrane protein (MOMP) of Chlamydia pneumoniae. The amplified product was visualized by electrophoresis in the 2% agarose gel stained with ethidium bromide, and it was considered positive when migrating in the band of molecular weight of the positive controls. RESULTS: Seven (12%) out of the 58 patients showed positive results for Chlamydia pneumoniae. CONCLUSION: DNA from Chlamydia pneumoniae was identified in the arterial wall of a substantial number of patients with atherosclerosis. This association, which has already been described in other countries, corroborates the evidence favoring a role played by Chlamydia pneumoniae in atherogenesis.
Resumo:
Dissertação de mestrado em Bioquímica Aplicada (área de especialização em Biotecnologia)
Resumo:
Dissertação de mestrado em Molecular Genetics
Resumo:
Dissertação de mestrado em Ecologia
Resumo:
Dissertação de mestrado em Ecologia
Resumo:
Seismic analysis, horizon matching, fault tracking, marked point process,stochastic annealing
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2010
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2012
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2013
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2014
Resumo:
We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to
Resumo:
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.
Resumo:
Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''
Resumo:
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
Resumo:
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.