Unit Root Analysis of Traffic Time Series in Toll Highways

Concession contracts in highways often include some kind of clauses (for example, a minimum traffic guarantee) that allow for better management of the business risks. The value of these clauses may be important and should be added to the total value of the concession. However, in these cases, traditional valuation techniques, like the NPV (net present value) of the project, are insufficient. An alternative methodology for the valuation of highway concession is one based on the real options approach. This methodology is generally built on the assumption of the evolution of traffic volume as a GBM (geometric Brownian motion), which is the hypothesis analyzed in this paper. First, a description of the methodology used for the analysis of the existence of unit roots (i.e., the hypothesis of non-stationarity) is provided. The Dickey-Fuller approach has been used, which is the most common test for this kind of analysis. Then this methodology is applied to perform a statistical analysis of traffic series in Spanish toll highways. For this purpose, data on the AADT (annual average daily traffic) on a set of highways have been used. The period of analysis is around thirty years in most cases. The main outcome of the research is that the hypothesis that traffic volume follows a GBM process in Spanish toll highways cannot be rejected. This result is robust, and therefore it can be used as a starting point for the application of the real options theory to assess toll highway concessions.

Dealing with traffic risk in Latin American toll roads

Análisis de los sistemas de mitigación del riesgo de tráfico en autopistas de peaje en diferentes países de Latinoamérica. This paper presents a cross-country analysis of traffic risk allocation in road concessions of Latin America. It shows that some countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru have been greatly concerned with mitigating traffic risk, either by putting into practice public guarantees, implementing flexible term concessions, or through availability payment concessions; whereas other countries such as Mexico and Brazil have assigned traffic risk to the private concessionaire by using fixed-term concession contracts without any traffic guarantees. Based on an analysis of data from 1990 to 2010, the paper finds that shifting traffic risk from the concessionaire to the government or users was not confined to the riskiest projects, as one might expect. The analysis also suggests that the implementation of traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in Latin American toll roads has not been very successful in reducing renegotiation rates or in increasing the number of bidders in the tenders

Analysis of road safety incentives applied in PPP road = Análisis de incentivos a la seguridad aplicados en concesiones de carreteras

En este artículo se recoge cómo se ha regulado este aspecto tradicionalmente en concesiones y cómo se viene haciendo más recientemente, comparando para tres concesiones europeas puestas en servicio en los últimos años, las bonificaciones con el beneficio social que corresponden a cada nivel de reducción de la accidentalidad en la carretera. Los resultados arrojan que los incentivos aplicados, tanto antiguamente como los más recientes, son anodinos por dos motivos: porque son muy inferiores al beneficio social derivado de ellos y porque aparentemente son muy inferiores al coste de las actuaciones de mejora de la seguridad vial. Road safety is one of the most important issues in PPP roads. At this respect, to achieve a property regulation it is necessary to introduce objective and explicit incentives in the contracts. Besides, these incentives must be focused at the net social benefit. This paper explains how road safety has been introduced traditionally in PPP road contracts and how it is been doing it nowadays, comparing for three recent concessions of Europe, the bonuses and the social benefit associated to each reduction of accidents in the roads. As a result, it can be affirmed that the incentives applied, both traditional and the most ones, are unremarkable for two reasons: because they are much lower than the social benefit derived from them and because they apparently are well below the cost of measures to improve road safety.

Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

Formulación de incentivos óptimos y viables para la mejora de la seguridad vial en concesiones de carreteras

La evolución de los roles de la Administración y empresas en la prestación de servicios públicos, así como las crecientes restricciones presupuestarias para financiarlos, están propiciando una cada vez mayor utilización del sistema concesional para la financiación y gestión de carreteras. Ante esta situación, cabe cuestionarse si la regulación de las prestaciones a obtener se está introduciendo de forma adecuada en los contratos. Uno de los aspectos más relevantes en este sentido es el relacionado con la seguridad de la infraestructura, sobre el cual la empresa concesionaria tiene capacidad de actuación pero, en un sentido económico estricto, pocos incentivos para mejorarla. Todo ello a pesar de los elevados costes sociales derivados de la accidentalidad. Esta tesis analiza la idoneidad de los indicadores e incentivos de seguridad vial que se vienen aplicando en concesiones de carreteras, encontrándose una gran heterogeneidad e incluso incorrecciones técnicas en su formulación. Además se pone de manifiesto la poca vinculación que tienen con la estructura de costes y beneficios de las actuaciones de mejora de seguridad vial, por lo que su introducción en los contratos resulta anodina. Con el objeto de superar esta situación, en esta tesis se analizan en profundidad los aspectos que intervienen en la formulación de indicadores e incentivos de seguridad vial. De este análisis se deduce la ecuación que liga, por tipología de carretera, el beneficio social derivado del nivel de seguridad de la carretera y el coste para alcanzarlo. A través de esta ecuación se determina el nivel de seguridad óptimo desde el punto de vista económico‐social. La investigación continúa extrapolando métodos de la teoría microeconómica de incentivos al campo de las concesiones de carreteras, a fin de determinar la formulación del incentivo de seguridad vial teóricamente óptimo. Asimismo, la tesis toma en consideración la experiencia en la aplicación práctica de incentivos en concesiones vigentes, realizándose una propuesta para superar las controversias que se están produciendo actualmente en España. Además, se ha simulado la aplicación de la formulación propuesta a diversas concesiones con un doble objetivo: verificar la viabilidad económica de su aplicación y corroborar en qué medida se adecua mejor al óptimo económico‐social. Como resultado, se proponen un indicador y un incentivo concretos que inducen a las concesionarias a orientar su gestión hacia la consecución del nivel de seguridad vial óptimo desde el punto de vista económico‐social, todo ello dentro de un marco de viabilidad presupuestaria. Changes in the roles of Government and the Private Sector in the provision of public services along with the budget constraints to finance them are resulting in an increasing use of the concession system for financing and managing roads. Taking this into account, the question is whether the regulation of quality criteria is being properly introduced in the contracts or not. One of the most important aspects at this respect is the road safety. On the one hand, concessionaires are able to manage this aspect up to a point. On the other hand, from an strict economic point of view, they have little incentive to improve it, despite the high social costs of accidents. This thesis has analyzed the suitability of indicators and incentives usually introduced in road concession contracts, finding high heterogeneity, and even technical inaccuracies on their formulation. It has also been found the lack of connection between these incentives and the costs of measures to improve road safety, therefore they are not expected to fulfil their purpose. In order to overcome this situation, this thesis firstly analyzes in depth the issues involved in the development of road safety indicators and incentives. This analysis yields the equation which links the social benefit derived from the level of road safety and the cost to achieve it. In its turn, through this equation it is possible to meet the optimal road safety level from the socio‐economic point of view. Secondly, this thesis extrapolates microeconomic methods to the field of highway concessions, with the aim of determining the formulation of the optimal road safety incentive. Furthermore, the thesis takes into account the experience in the practical application of incentives on existing concessions, performing a proposal to settle the disputes between concessionaires and the Public Administrations. Finally, the thesis simulates the implementation of the proposed indicator and incentive to real concessions with the aim of verifying the economic feasibility of their application and confirming how they match the socio‐economic optimum. As a result, this thesis proposes an indicator and incentive that induce companies to drive the management of the concession towards achieving the optimal road safety level, all within a framework of the budgetary feasibility.

Functional breakdown of the lipid bilayer of the myelin membrane in central and peripheral nervous system by disrupted galactocerebroside synthesis

The lipid bilayer of the myelin membrane of the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system (PNS) contains the oligodendrocyte- and Schwann cell-specific glycosphingolipids galactocerebrosides (GalC) and GalC-derived sulfatides (sGalC). We have generated a UDP-galactose ceramide galactosyltransferase (CGT) null mutant mouse (cgt−/−) with CNS and PNS myelin completely depleted of GalC and derived sGalC. Oligodendrocytes and Schwann cells are unable to restore the structure and function of these galactosphingolipids to maintain the insulator function of the membrane bilayer. The velocity of nerve conduction of homozygous cgt−/− mice is reduced to that of unmyelinated axons. This indicates a severely altered ion permeability of the lipid bilayer. GalC and sGalC are essential for the unperturbed lipid bilayer of the myelin membrane of CNS and PNS. The severe dysmyelinosis leads to death of the cgt−/− mouse at the end of the myelination period.

Algunos apuntes acerca de los motivos para modificar la Ley 22/1988, de Costas

Después de más de treinta años, la ley de costas española ha sido profundamente modificada. Sigue en vigor, excepto en aquellos aspectos que se han revisado, pero los cambios son tan profundos que se ha dibujado un escenario notablemente distinto al anterior. En este trabajo se recogen los motivos que han hecho de la ley de 1988 una norma difícil de aplicar, así como la controversia generada especialmente por la transformación de los propietarios de viviendas situadas en el dominio público, en titulares de un derecho de ocupación temporal. Los efectos de los informes de la Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento Europeo, emitidos en 2009 y 2013, han sido también determinantes en la redacción de la Ley 2/2013 de protección y uso sostenible del litoral y de modificación de la Ley 22/1988, de Costas.

Gold Company Claims, Witwatersrand, South Africa, 1895 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Bacon's new map of the Witwatersrand goldfields in the districts of Pretoria and Heidelberg, Transvaal, S. A. R. : shewing the main and other reefs, with the farms, gold mining company's claims and concessions : from information in the Surveyor-General's Department. It was published by G. W. Bacon & Co. in 1895. Scale [ca. 1:88,992].The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM Zone 35S, meters, WGS 1984) projected coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, roads, railroads, cities and other human settlements, administrative boundaries, farms, homesteads, main reefs, other reefs, probable connections, and mills. Includes also notes and inset: "Enlarged map of the farms Lanlaagte, Turffontein, Dornfontein & Elandsfontein, shewing the boundaries of the principal deep level gold mining coys. on the Witwatersrand goldfields" and a geological profile of the area north of Magaliesberg to the south of Witwatersrange.This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

Life after Bali: renewing the world trade negotiating agenda. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/17, December 2013

The crisis has contributed to a slowdown in global trade volumes, with trade virtually stagnant in the twelve months to July 2013. In this context, fruitful negotiations in the World Trade Organisation’s 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali are crucial to sustain the institution’s credibility and prove that multilateral negotiations can still deliver success. WTO trade talks are the only ongoing trade liberalisation process that has development at its core. The Doha mini-package under consideration at Bali is a collection of watered-down but deliverable elements of a deal comprising agriculture, trade facilitation and special and differential treatment/less developed country concessions. Post-Bali, the WTO should aim to reverse the current disenchantment with multilateral trade negotiations. This means formulating a relevant trade negotiating agenda with an understanding of global value chains at its core. However, the transition to the new agenda requires a closure of the ongoing Round. The easiest way to conclude the Doha Round would be to select another discrete set of deliverables that fulfills the development commitment of the Doha Development Agenda, thus paving the way for a new Round.

The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.

Diplomatic Spin: EU3+3 talks on Iran’s nuclear file. CEPS Commentary, 21 November 2014

The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran on 24 November 2013 gave negotiators one year to forge a comprehensive agreement that restricts the country’s ability to militarise its nuclear programme. That deadline will lapse in the next few days and diplomats involved in the talks have been trying to rein in expectations that a deal will be struck on time. Satisfying domestic constituencies in Iran and the US is what makes the politics of dealing with the nuclear file so much harder than the physics of slowing down the nuclear programme. Any future deal will have to stand on its own merits, enabling Iran and the EU3+3 to cooperate on the other geopolitical challenges they face. Both parties should therefore balance their demands with what they can realistically offer and make concessions to reach a compromise. The author of this CEPS Commentary argues that if no deal is reached on November 24th, then diplomacy should be allowed to keep on spinning for a few more months.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests. OSW COMMENTARY No. 150, 2014-10-29

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent with Serbia’s. Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbouring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourhood. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing support for Balkan countries’ European integration.