The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

An experiment on Nash implementation

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nashimplementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

We use a Colombian TV game show to test gender differences in competitivebehavior where there is no opportunity for discrimination and females face no genderspecificexternal constraints. Each game started with six contestants who had toanswer general knowledge questions in private. There were five rounds of questionsand, at the end of each, one participant was eliminated. Despite equality in startingnumbers, women earn less than men and exit the game at a faster rate. In particular,there are more voluntary withdrawals by women than men. We draw an analogybetween the game and the process by which employees rise through the levels of acorporation. As such, we note that glass ceilings may result, in part, from women sown behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave. At thesame time, our results illustrate that maintaining and promoting gender diversity at thelower/middle ranks of organizations is necessary to obtain gender diversity at the top.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.

How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

Predestination and the Protestant ethic

This paper shows an equivalence result between the utility functions of secularagents who abide by a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religiousagents who believe that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. Thisresult formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the connection between the worldlyasceticism of Protestants and the religious premises of Calvinism. Furthermore,ongoing economies are often modeled with preference relations such as "Keeping upwith the Joneses" which are not associated with religion. Our results relate thesesecular economies of today and economies of the past shaped by religious ideas.

The economics of anti-parasite defences in animal societies

RESUME : De nombreuses espèces animales vivent en groupe. Du simple grégarisme aux colonies hautement intégrées de fourmis, la vie sociale a atteint des degrés divers de complexité. Les nombreuses interactions entre membres d'une société favorisent la transmission de parasites. Cela représente un coût potentiel de la vie sociale. Cette thèse s'intéresse aux défenses permettant de réduire le coût du parasitisme dans les colonies de fourmis ainsi qu'à la manière dont le parasitisme a pu façonner certains aspects de ces sociétés. Les colonies de fourmis des bois (Forimica paralugubris) contiennent de grandes quantités de résine de conifères. Cette résine réduit la densité microbienne dans le nid et augmente la survie des ouvrières lors d'infections parasitaires. Dans cette thèse, nous montrons, d'une part, que les ouvrières collectent activement la résine et que ce comportement est plutôt préventif que curatif et, d'autre part, que la résine permet aux ouvrières une utilisation moindre de leurs défenses immunitaires. Ces résultats permettent de conclure que ce comportement réduit l'exposition au parasitisme et qu'il a une fonction adaptative. L'émergence d'un tel comportement de médication chez une espèce d'insectes sociaux illustre le fait que la socialité, bien yue provoquant une exposition accrue au parasitisme, permet également l'émergence de mécanismes sociaux de défense. II a été suggéré que la présence de plusieurs reines au sein d'un même nid (polygynie) améliore la résistance aux parasites en augmentant la diversité génétique au sein de la colonie. En accord avec cette hypothèse, nous montrons qu'une augmentation de la diversité génétique au sein de groupes expérimentaux de Formica selysi améliore leur survie lors d'une infection parasitaire. Cependant, nous suggérons également que sur le terrain, d'autres facteurs corrélés à la polygynie ont des effets antagoniques sur la résistance. Nous montrons par exemple que les ouvrières polygynes semblent avoir une capacité moindre à monter une réponse immunitaire. Certains aspects de la reproduction des fourmis ont pu également être façonnés par le parasitisme. L'accouplement n'a lieu que lors d'une courte période au début de la vie adulte, généralement à l'extérieur de la colonie. Les reines stockent ensuite le sperme et l'utilisent parcimonieusement au cours de leur vie alors que les males meurent rapidement. Nous montrons que les défenses immunitaires des reines de fourmis des bois (F. paralugubris) sont fortement affectées par l'accouplement. Ces modulations immunitaires sont probablement liées à une augmentation de l'exposition au parasitisme lors de l'accouplement ainsi qu'à des blessures copulatoires. I1 semble donc que l'accouplement soit accompagné de coûts immunitaires pour les reines. Dans son ensemble, cette thèse illustre la diversité des mécanismes de défenses contre les parasites dans les sociétés de fourmis. La vie sociale, en offrant un nouveau niveau d'interaction, permet en effet l'émergence d'adaptations originales. Cela explique probablement le grand succès écologique des espèces sociales. SUMMARY : Sociality is widespread among animals and has reached variable degrees of complexity, from loose social Groups to highly integrated ant colonies. The many interactions between members of a social group promote the spread of parasites, but social life also permits the evolution of original defence mechanisms. This thesis sheds light on how ant colonies defend themselves against parasites, and on how parasitism shapes certain aspects of these societies. Wood ants nests (Formica paralugubris) contain large amounts of conifer resin which reduces the microbial density in ant nests and enhances the survival of ants challenged by some pathogens. We show that resin is actively collected by workers and that resin collection is rather a prophylactic than a curative behaviour. Moreover, we suggest that resin reduces the use of the immune defences of workers. Altogether, these results indicate that the use of resin is a collective adaptation to prevent the spread of parasites. The emergence of medication in a social insect species illustrates that sociality does not only increase the exposure to parasites but also allows the emergence of social mechanisms to counter this threat. The number of reproducing queens per colony is a variable trait in ants. It has been suggested that polygyny (the occurrence of multiple queens within a colony), by increasing the colonial genetic diversity, improves disease resistance. In line with this hypothesis, we show that in a socially polymorphic ant (Formica selysi), an experimental increase of colony genetic diversity enhances disease resistance. However, we also suggest that factors covarying with queen number variation in the field have antagonistic effects on parasite resistance. We show for instance that polygyne workers seem to have lower immune defences. Parasites may also shape some aspects of ant queen reproductive biology. Ant queens mate at the beginning of their adult life, usually outside of the colony, and store sperm for several years to fertilize eggs. Males die shortly after mating and queens never remate later in life, which drastically reduces sexual conflicts. Moreover, mating and nest founding occur away from the collective defence mechanisms of the natal colony and might be associated with an increased risk of parasitism. We show that mating affects the immune defences of wood ant queens (F. paralugubris) in multiple ways that are consistent with mating wounds and increased risk of parasitism. We suggest that mating is associated with immunity costs in ants, despite the reduced level of sexual conflicts. Altogether, my thesis illustrates the diversity of anti-parasite mechanisms in ant societies. This sheds light on how sociality, by offering a new level of interactions, allows the evolution of original adaptations, which may explain the wide ecological success of social species.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.