979 resultados para Assignment Problem
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We prove existence theorems for the Dirichlet problem for hypersurfaces of constant special Lagrangian curvature in Hadamard manifolds. The first results are obtained using the continuity method and approximation and then refined using two iterations of the Perron method. The a-priori estimates used in the continuity method are valid in any ambient manifold.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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We establish existence and non-existence results to the Brezis-Nirenberg type problem involving the square root of the Laplacian in a bounded domain with zero Dirichlet boundary condition.
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A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.
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The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents' participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents' shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents' voluntary participation.
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A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
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We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
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In this paper we propose a stabilized conforming finite volume element method for the Stokes equations. On stating the convergence of the method, optimal a priori error estimates in different norms are obtained by establishing the adequate connection between the finite volume and stabilized finite element formulations. A superconvergence result is also derived by using a postprocessing projection method. In particular, the stabilization of the continuous lowest equal order pair finite volume element discretization is achieved by enriching the velocity space with local functions that do not necessarily vanish on the element boundaries. Finally, some numerical experiments that confirm the predicted behavior of the method are provided.
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We introduce and analyze two new semi-discrete numerical methods for the multi-dimensional Vlasov-Poisson system. The schemes are constructed by combing a discontinuous Galerkin approximation to the Vlasov equation together with a mixed finite element method for the Poisson problem. We show optimal error estimates in the case of smooth compactly supported initial data. We propose a scheme that preserves the total energy of the system.
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This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.
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I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the final assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I define a new concept of fairness, called no unjustified lower chances: priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify different achievable chances regarding another object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhauser' (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustified lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante efficient random assignments.
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In this study I try to explain the systemic problem of the low economic competitiveness of nuclear energy for the production of electricity by carrying out a biophysical analysis of its production process. Given the fact that neither econometric approaches nor onedimensional methods of energy analyses are effective, I introduce the concept of biophysical explanation as a quantitative analysis capable of handling the inherent ambiguity associated with the concept of energy. In particular, the quantities of energy, considered as relevant for the assessment, can only be measured and aggregated after having agreed on a pre-analytical definition of a grammar characterizing a given set of finite transformations. Using this grammar it becomes possible to provide a biophysical explanation for the low economic competitiveness of nuclear energy in the production of electricity. When comparing the various unit operations of the process of production of electricity with nuclear energy to the analogous unit operations of the process of production of fossil energy, we see that the various phases of the process are the same. The only difference is related to characteristics of the process associated with the generation of heat which are completely different in the two systems. Since the cost of production of fossil energy provides the base line of economic competitiveness of electricity, the (lack of) economic competitiveness of the production of electricity from nuclear energy can be studied, by comparing the biophysical costs associated with the different unit operations taking place in nuclear and fossil power plants when generating process heat or net electricity. In particular, the analysis focuses on fossil-fuel requirements and labor requirements for those phases that both nuclear plants and fossil energy plants have in common: (i) mining; (ii) refining/enriching; (iii) generating heat/electricity; (iv) handling the pollution/radioactive wastes. By adopting this approach, it becomes possible to explain the systemic low economic competitiveness of nuclear energy in the production of electricity, because of: (i) its dependence on oil, limiting its possible role as a carbon-free alternative; (ii) the choices made in relation to its fuel cycle, especially whether it includes reprocessing operations or not; (iii) the unavoidable uncertainty in the definition of the characteristics of its process; (iv) its large inertia (lack of flexibility) due to issues of time scale; and (v) its low power level.
Estimating the Prevalence of Problem Opiate and Problem Cocaine Use in Northern Ireland (PDF 213 KB)
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Apr-06