Malliavin calculus in finance

This article is an introduction to Malliavin Calculus for practitioners.We treat one specific application to the calculation of greeks in Finance.We consider also the kernel density method to compute greeks and anextension of the Vega index called the local vega index.

Merger failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interactionbetween the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informationalasymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation andcoordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree tomerge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partnerto make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goesahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers aremore likely to fail.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

Earnings management and audit adjustments: An empirical study of IBEX 35 constituents

Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Internacionalización bancaria: paradigmas teóricos y teorías explicativas

Los diferentes tipos de actividades que se incluyen en el epígrafe debanca internacional, dificulta la existencia de una única teoríaexplicativa de la internacionalización bancaria. Por el contrario,desde diferentes aproximaciones se han propuesto teorías parcialesdirigidas a explicar aspectos particulares del fenómeno. El objetivoprincipal de este artículo es proporcionar una visión completa delestado actual de la investigación, con el énfasis especial de integrarestas teorías parciales en alguno de los dos grandes paradigmas de lainversión directa en el exterior.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

2007 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities, and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair or leasing of any rail facility. The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa DOT rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Fund. In 2006, a state appropriation of $235,000 was added to the program. In 2007, $2 million was appropriated to support rail development and job growth.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

O contributo da contabilidade numa gestão transparente das OSFL - Caso: ADECO

Na actualidade, tem-se cada vez mais a consciência da necessidade e da importância de ter uma informação financeira credível e em tempo oportuno. A informação financeira passou a ser a base para avaliação do desempenho dos gestores, assim como para análise da situação económico-financeira das Organizações. A informação só é útil para tomada de decisão se tiverem as seguintes características qualitativas: Compreensibilidade, Relevância, Fiabilidade e Comparabilidade. No ambiente concorrencial em que as Organizações estão inseridas, a Contabilidade tem um papel fulcral como instrumento de tomada de decisão. As Organizações que têm como objectivos acções sociais, actuam nas áreas como: culturais e recreativas, solidariedade social, promoção do desenvolvimento comunitário, educacionais, de protecção ao ambiente, Saúde e da promoção da higiene, entre outros. Como essas Organizações não têm com objectivo o lucro, é necessário ter uma boa gestão e para que isso seja possível, é preciso ter-se instrumentos capazes para que isso seja possível e é neste âmbito que a Contabilidade entra como um auxílio para a gestão, como ferramenta capaz de mensurar e controlar processos, resultados e impactos nos projectos executados, a fim de que seus objectivos sociais sejam alcançados de uma forma consistente com o planeado. A sustentabilidade, a necessidade de demonstração e de aplicação dos recursos obtidos é um forte desafio que as Organizações do terceiro sector têm de ultrapassar e, neste âmbito, a Contabilidade pode constituir um meio importante para atingir esses objectivos, através da demonstração dos resultados alcançados. Nesta base, o contributo da Contabilidade na gestão das OSFL tem-se acentuado cada vez mais, demonstrando transparência na apresentação das suas contas, facilitando na captação de recursos e na fidelização dos seus parceiros e financiadores. Nowadays it has become increasingly aware of the need and importance of having credible and timely financial information. The financial information started to be the base for evaluation of the managers acting, as well as for analysis of the economicfinancial situation of the company. The information is only useful for socket of decision if they have the following qualitative characteristics: Comprehensive, Relevance, Reliable and Comparability. In the atmosphere concurrencies in that the Organizations are inserted the accounting has a crucial paper as instrument of socket of decision in the Organizations. The Organizations that have as purpose social action as for instance: cultural and recreational, social solidarity, promotion of the development community, education, of protection to the atmosphere, health and of the promotion of the hygiene, among others. As those Organizations don't have with objective the profit, it is necessary to have a good administration and for that to be possible, it is necessary to have capable instruments for that to be possible and it is in this extent that the accounting enters as an aid for the administration, as tool capable to measure and to control processes, results and impacts in the executed projects, so that their social objectives are reached in a solid way with the planed. Sustainability, the demonstration of the achieved results and the application of resources collected are strong challenges that the Organizations of the third sector have to overcome. To that extent, Accounting can contribute as an important way to reach those objectives through the demonstration of resources collected. In this base, the contribution of the Accounting has been accentuating more and more in the administration of the nonprofit organizations, demonstrating transparency in the presentation of their finance statements, facilitating the fundraising of Organizations and loyal partners and funders.

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).