Incentives and standards in agency contracts

This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role.

Fixed wages and bonuses in agency contracts: the case of a continuous state space

In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal–agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal contract may involve a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom in the optimal tax literature.

Linking contracts, processes and services: An event-driven approach

This paper addresses the problem of mapping business contract conditions onto the messages and rules that represent service interactions in a collaborative business process. We describe why this mapping is not straightforward by means of an example. We then consider a message-driven process language as a target for the mapping and use this mapping solution to discuss broad range of problems related to the mapping problem.

The propensity to hedge with futures contracts:the case of potato futures contracts

This paper studies why UK non-financial firms hedge with potato futures contracts. It is found that the financial characteristics of firms in the sample play an important role in influencing the propensity to hedge. For example, it is found that firms that hedge are on average larger than firms that do not hedge. Firms that hedge also have more volatile earnings. Furthermore, firms that do hedge appear to want to smooth earnings to reduce the costs of financial distress and avoid entering the highest tax threshold. © 2005 Taylor & Francis.

A systems approach to tendering for contracts in the construction industry

DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT ASTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENT

The management of foreign exchange exposure on business contracts overseas

This thesis is a piece of applied research. It is the result of a joint project between the University of Aston Interdisciplinary Higher Degrees Scheme and International Aeradio plc (IAL). It considers the structure and organisation of overseas business and the effects that exchange rate movements have on financial performance. It looks in detail at a series of overseas contracts and factors which affect the monitoring and performance of those contracts. From this initial research is developed a series of conceptual models which attempt to capture the effects of foreign exchange rate movements on contract costing, the monitoring of performance on overseas contracts and a measure of company wide exposure. These models are then considered in the context of real IAL generated data and circumstances. The work is finally considered in the context of a survey of other companies with a similar mode of undertaking overseas business with the aim of placing the work in a general context.

Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts

With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992). This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.