Les contrats de cyberconsommation sont presque tous illégaux !

Le présent document est une retranscription écrite d’une conférence donnée le 08 octobre 2004 dans le cadre des Entretiens Jacques Cartier. Le style revendicatif et parlé utilisé lors de la présentation a été partiellement maintenu. Cette conférence est le fruit d’une étude subventionnée par le CRSH (programme INÉ) sur le « Contrat de cyberconsommation ».

Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills

This paper generalizes Hotelling's (1931) theory of nonrenewable resources to situations where resource pools and their users are distributed spacially. Extraction and transport costs are assumed to be linear in the rate of extraction, but utilization of each deposit may require a setup cost.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited.

Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the instantaneous rate of production form the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint.

Private Storage of Common Property

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.