Feasibility of electrochemical chloride extraction from structural reinforced concrete using a sprayed conductive graphite powder–cement paste as anode

This article summarizes research on the application of a conductive cement paste as an anode in the now classical technique of electrochemical extraction of chlorides applied to a concrete structural element by spraying the paste on the surface of a concrete structural element, a pillar. Sprayed conductive cement paste, by adding graphite powder, is particularly useful to treat sizable vertical surfaces such are structural supports. Outcomes indicate that this kind of anode not only provides electrochemical chloride removal with similar efficiency, but also is able to retain moisture even without the use of a continuous dampening system.

Estrategias determinantes para la competitividad de un destino de sol y playa. El caso de Mazatlán, Sinaloa, México

El presente estudio se realizó con el propósito de dar un entendimiento global de la situación actual en lo referente a la competitividad de Mazatlán como destino turístico; conocer las particularidades del destino permite aplicar procedimientos innovadores y participativos en la búsqueda de competitividad, lo que favorece un mejor desarrollo turístico. El principal valor de esta investigación radica en la necesidad de identificar las estrategias para lograr competitividad y convertir el turismo de sol y playa en una palanca de desarrollo económico y generadora de empleos. El estudio se realizó bajo la perspectiva metodológica cualitativa ejecutada a través de diferentes métodos; por un lado, el enfoque de triangulación implicó análisis documental para contextualizar la competitividad turística del destino y por otro lado, análisis de datos generados de las discusiones en grupos focales con los actores de la actividad turística del destino. Se revisaron los fundamentos teóricos de la competitividad sistémica, con referencia especial al Índice de Competitividad Sistémica de las Ciudades Mexicanas (ICSar-ciudades) únicamente para definir indicadores o categorías analíticas que fueron incluidos en la discusión (marco regulatorio, ambiente de negocios e infraestructura y recursos humanos, culturales y naturales). Entre los principales resultados, se destaca la necesidad empaquetar los atractivos turísticos del destino, lo cual permita constituir un producto turístico, tarifado y publicado como un elemento completo; la necesidad de contar con adecuados canales de distribución y comercialización; un adecuado sistema de movilidad en el destino que cubra las necesidades de los turistas; el fortalecimiento de la infraestructura turística para maximizar los flujos turísticos; colaboración de todos los niveles de gobierno e Instituciones, sectores públicos o privados en el diseño e implementación de planes de marketing.

[Taxation research notes, 1799]

Folded leaf containing handwritten notes and figures related to tax acts, including a section of notes related to the use of "Sevill, Pillar, or Mexico" foreign silver coins. A section of the text is written in very faded pencil.

EU immigration trends and policies: Spain and France as case studies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 10, August 2013

From the Introduction. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht or the Maastricht Treaty, created the European Union (EU) from the existing European Economic Community (EEC.) It was signed by the member states on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.1 Among its many innovations was the creation of European citizenship, which would be granted to any person who was a citizen of an EU member state. Citizenship, however, is intertwined with immigration, which the Treaty also attempted to address. Policy on visas, immigration and asylum was originally placed under Pillar 3 of the EU, which dealt with Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, however, the Amsterdam Treaty moved these policies from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1, signaling “a shift toward more supranational decision-making in this area,” as opposed to the intergovernmental method of Pillars 2 and 3.2

The Member States’ Initiatives: An Inter-Institutional Turf War after the Treaty of Lisbon

With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon came the possibility for Member States to launch an initiative under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. This came into being as the scope of co-decision was expanded to cover the more sensitive issues of the third pillar (such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). It was considered necessary that Member States have a shared right of initiative with the European Commission. One case in which the right of initiative was invoked was the Initiative for a European Protection Order (EPO). This dossier is one of the first and few cases in which the Member States’ Initiative after the Treaty of Lisbon was used. It resulted in a turf war between the Presidency and the Commission regarding the scope of the Member States’ Initiatives. This article looks into the Member States’ Initiative as it was introduced after the Treaty of Lisbon and the debate that took place on the EPO.

European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

Historic turning point or just another chapter? The results of a foreign-policy summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 24 March 2014

The March 2014 European Council could enter the history books as a turning point, not only in the EU’s relations with Russia but also in its role as a foreign policy actor. Events in Ukraine inevitably dominated the Summit, with EU leaders adopting a balanced approach aimed at achieving three key objectives – de-escalation, containment/deterrence and cooperation – based on political and economic support for Ukraine, increased but limited pressure on Russia, and moves to strengthen ties with other EU neighbours. The Summit also discussed a range of economic and environmental policy issues, with the situation in Ukraine casting a long shadow over the discussion on energy policy, but failed to reach agreement on the EU’s climate goals to 2030, or to put more flesh on the bones of calls for a European “industrial renaissance”. However, two other developments were particularly significant: the creation of the second pillar of the future banking union, establishing a single regime for winding down failing banks; and changes to the savings tax directive, bringing years of negotiation to an end.

A Monetary Union Requires a Banking Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 33/2014

This paper argues that a monetary union requires a banking union. While the USA developed both during a time span of two centuries, the EMU was created in the course of two decades and remains unfinished as the economic pillar is largely missing. The financial crisis and the Eurocrisis have shown that a genuine banking union is even more needed for the Eurozone than a budget or a fiscal union to let the euro survive.

The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin's privileged position in the eurozone. OSW Commentary No. 123, 10.01.2014

On 18 December 2013, EU finance ministers reached agreement on the structure of a banking union. The body will be tasked with oversight of the largest banks across the EU. It will also devise recovery and resolution programmes for institutions at risk of bankruptcy, and it will handle wind-up arrangements and decide on the allocation of resulting costs. The proposals are expected to be approved by March of this year by the governments of the eurozone states, by other EU members interested in joining the banking union, and by the European Parliament. A compromise on the supervision of the largest banks in the eurozone was reached several months ago. The most recent negotiations focused on the second pillar of the banking union: a Single Resolution Mechanism. The parties successfully negotiated a set of procedures for rescuing banks capable of recovery and for the closure of institutions that cannot be rescued. A joint position was also agreed on the allocation of costs resulting from such actions.

Kazakhstan: the regional success story; Tajikistan: a trial period; Uzbekistan: the major source of instability in Central Asia? OSW Study 15/2004

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan can boast economic development like no other country in Central Asia. In contrast to other countries of the region, which have rich natural resources, Kazakhstan has managed to use its economic potential in a way that yields concrete benefits now and, at the same time, creates prospects for further sustainable economic growth. Tajikistan: Tajikistan in its present state has been built on the civil war experiences and provisions of the peace accords signed in 1997. These have had a great impact on the present form of the state, its political scene and power mechanisms. President Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in the state. The political system, which he has cocreated, is based on - unique in this region - political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic party), decentralisation (far-going independence of the regions and relatively limited potential of the central structures) and compromise as the basic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation of the country. Uzbekistan: With its geographic location, potential, ambitions and political priorities, Uzbekistan could play a leading role in Central Asia. The international community has perceived the country as the pillar of stability in the region. This perception was further reinforced after 11th September 2001 and was certainly among the factors that inspired the United States to start closer political and military cooperation with Tashkent. The administration in Washington had expected that closer contacts might galvanise political, economic and social change in Uzbekistan, thus reinforcing positive trends in other countries of the region as well. But the relations between Washington and Tashkent are in crisis (which the United States will certainly try to overcome), and we have seen rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia and China.

The European Council’s Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 2020: Subverting the ‘Lisbonisation’ of Justice and Home Affairs? CEPS Essay No. 13, 14 July 2014

In its Conclusions of 26-27 June 2014, the European Council has adopted the new “Strategic Guidelines for Legislative and Operational Planning for the coming years within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)”. These Guidelines reveal a pre-Lisbon Treaty mindset among the EU member states and the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This essay argues that the Guidelines are mainly driven by the interests and agendas of national Ministries of Interior and Justice and are only “strategic” to the extent that they aim at first, re-injecting ‘intergovernmentalism’ or bringing back the old EU Third Pillar ways of working to the new EU institutional setting of the AFSJ and second, at sidelining the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and rule of law in the AFSJ. The paper argues that the European Council Guidelines seek to prevent the advances in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly its emphasis on supranational democratic, legal and judicial accountability. As a consequence of this move to ‘de-Lisbonise’ JHA cooperation, fundamental rights and rule of law-related initiatives will be neglected and the interest of the individual will be displaced from the centre of gravity in the coming AFSJ 2020 policy agenda.

The Sustainability Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on the European Industry. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 17/2007

This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that – with some improvements – has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.