Mexico and her military chieftains, from the revolution of Hidalgo to the present time : Comprising sketches of the lives of Hidalgo, Morelos, Iturbide, Santa Anna, Gomez, Farias, Bustamente, Paredes, Almonte, Arista, Alaman, Ampudia, Herrera, and De la Vega. by Fay. Robinson. Illustratd by twelve portraits and engravings.

UANL

Our Army at Monterey. Being a correct account of the proceedingsandevents which occurred to the Ar from the time of leaving Matamoros to the surrender of Monterrey with a description of the three days battle and the storming of Monterrey: the ceremonies attending the surrender: together with particulars of the capitulation

UANL

Summary of the art of war, or a new analytical compend of the principal combinations of strategy, of grand tactics and of military policy

UANL

Mental health treatment seeking by military members with posttraumatic stress disorder : findings on rates, characteristics, and predictors from a nationally representative Canadian military sample

Objective: The goal of this study was to identify rates, characteristies, and predictors of mental health treatment seeking by military members with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Method: Our sample was drawn from the 2002 Canadian Community Health Survey-Canadian Forces Supplement (CCHS-CF) dataset. The CCHS-CF is the first epidemiologic survey of PTSD and other mental health conditions in the Canadian military and includes 8441 nationally representative Canadian Forces (CF) members. Of those, 549 who met the criteria for lifetime PTSD were included in our analyses. To identify treatment rates and characteristics, we examined frequency of treatment contact by professional and facility type. To identify predictors of treatment seeking, we conducted a binary logistic regression with lifetime treatment seeking as the outcome variable. Results: About two-thirds of those with PTSD consulted with a professional regarding mental health problems. The most frequently consulted professionals, during both the last year and lifetime, included social workers and counsellors, medical doctors and general practitioners, and psychiatrists. Consultations during the last year most often took place in a CF facility. Treatment seeking was predicted by cumulative lifetime trauma exposure, index traumatic event type, PTSD symptom interference, and comorbid major depressive disorder. Those with comorbid depression were 3.75 times more likely to have sought treatment than those without. Conclusions: Although a significant portion of military members with PTSD sought mental health treatment, 1 in 3 never did. Trauma-related and illness and (or) need factors predicted treatment seeking. Of all the predictors of treatment seeking, comorbid depression most increased the likelihood of seeking treatment.

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives’

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.