International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.

Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia

In this paper we are aimed to investigate the relationship between Catalan knowledge and individual earnings in Catalonia. Using data from 2006, we find a positive earning return to Catalan proficiency; however, when accounting for self-selection into Catalan knowledge, we find a higher language return (20% of extra earnings), suggesting that individuals who are more prone to know Catalan are also less remunerated than others (negative selection effect). Moreover, we also find important complementarities between language knowledge and completed education, which means that only more educated individuals benefit from Catalan knowledge.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia

This paper investigates the economic value of Catalan knowledge for national and foreign first- and second-generation immigrants in Catalonia. Specifically, drawing on data from the “Survey on Living Conditions and Habits of the Catalan Population (2006)”, we want to quantify the expected earnings differential between individuals who are proficient in Catalan and those who are not, taking into account the potential endogeneity between knowledge of Catalan and earnings. The results indicate the existence of a positive return to knowledge of Catalan, with a 7.5% increase in earnings estimated by OLS; however, when we account for the presence of endogeneity, monthly earnings are around 18% higher for individuals who are able to speak and write Catalan. However, we also find that language and education are complementary inputs for generating earnings in Catalonia, given that knowledge of Catalan increases monthly earnings only for more educated individuals.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Analyzing complexity in foreign language monologic oral production in a CLIL context

The study tested three analytic tools applied in SLA research (T-unit, AS-unit and Idea-unit) against FL learner monologic oral data. The objective was to analyse their effectiveness for the assessment of complexity of learners' academic production in English. The data were learners' individual productions gathered during the implementation of a CLIL teaching sequence on Natural Sciences in a Catalan state secondary school. The analysis showed that only AS-unit was easily applicable and highly effective in segmenting the data and taking complexity measures

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13) - Easy Read (PDF 454 KB)

Easy Read version of Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13)