Just label it: Consumer rights, GM food labelling, and international trade

In the United States, there has been fierce debate over state, federal and international efforts to engage in genetically modified food labelling (GM food labelling). A grassroots coalition of consumers, environmentalists, organic farmers, and the food movement has pushed for law reform in respect of GM food labelling. The Just Label It campaign has encouraged United States consumers to send comments to the United States Food and Drug Administration to label genetically modified foods. This Chapter explores the various justifications made in respect of genetically modified food labelling. There has been a considerable effort to portray the issue of GM food labelling as one of consumer rights as part of ‘the right to know’. There has been a significant battle amongst farmers over GM food labelling – with organic farmers and biotechnology companies, fighting for precedence. There has also been a significant discussion about the use of GM food labelling as a form of environmental legislation. The prescriptions in GM food labelling regulations may serve to promote eco-labelling, and deter greenwashing. There has been a significant debate over whether GM food labelling may serve to regulate corporations – particularly from the food, agriculture, and biotechnology industries. There are significant issues about the interaction between intellectual property laws – particularly in respect of trade mark law and consumer protection – and regulatory proposals focused upon biotechnology. There has been a lack of international harmonization in respect of GM food labelling. As such, there has been a major use of comparative arguments about regulator models in respect of food labelling. There has also been a discussion about international law, particularly with the emergence of sweeping regional trade proposals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. This Chapter considers the United States debates over genetically modified food labelling – at state, federal, and international levels. The battles often involved the use of citizen-initiated referenda. The policy conflicts have been policy-centric disputes – pitting organic farmers, consumers, and environmentalists against the food industry and biotechnology industry. Such battles have raised questions about consumer rights, public health, freedom of speech, and corporate rights. The disputes highlighted larger issues about lobbying, fund-raising, and political influence. The role of money in United States has been a prominent concern of Lawrence Lessig in his recent academic and policy work with the group, Rootstrikers. Part 1 considers the debate in California over Proposition 37. Part 2 explores other key state initiatives in respect of GM food labelling. Part 3 examines the Federal debate in the United States over GM food labelling. Part 4 explores whether regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – will impact upon

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

The Expanding Live Cattle Trade in Northern Australian

The north Australian beef industry is complex and dynamic. It is strategically positioned to access new and existing export markets. To prosper in a global economy, it will require strong processing and live cattle sectors, continued rationalisation of infrastructure, uptake of appropriate technology, and the synergy obtained when industry sectors unite and cooperate to maintain market advantage. Strategies to address food safety, animal welfare, the environment and other consumer concerns must be delivered. Strategic alliances with quality assurance systems will develop. These alliances will be based on economies of scale and on vertical cooperation, rather than vertical integration. Industry sectors will need to increase their contribution to Research, Development and Extension. These contributions need to be global in outlook. Industry sectors should also be aware that change (positive or negative) in one sector will impact on other sectors. Feedback along the food chain is essential to maximise productivity and market share.

Exotic plant pests–a threat to the sustainability of Australia’s grains industry

Exotic plant pests (EPPs) threaten production, market access and sustainability of Australian plant production systems. For the grains industry there are over 600 identified EPPs of which 54 are considered high priority, posing a significant threat. Despite Australia’s geographical isolation and strong quarantine systems, the threat from EPPs has never been higher with the increasing levels of travel and trade, emphasising the need for improving our efforts in prevention, preparedness and surveillance for EPPs.

Trade Liberalization, Heterogeneous Firms and Industrial Dynamics

This master thesis studies how trade liberalization affects the firm-level productivity and industrial evolution. To do so, I built a dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as endogenous to investigate the influence of trade on firm’s productivity and the market structure. In the framework, heterogeneous firms in the same industry operate differently in equilibrium. Specifically, firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but by an evolution that rely on the decisions made by individual firms. I prove that trade liberalization has a general positive impact on technological adoption rates and hence increases the firm-level productivity. Besides, this endogenous technology adoption model also captures the stylized facts: exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in the same sector. I assume that the number of firms is endogenous, since, according to the empirical literature, the industrial evolution shows considerably different patterns across countries; some industries experience large scale of firms’ exit in the period of contracting market shares, while some industries display relative stable number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word “shakeout” is used to describe the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. In order to explain the causes of shakeout, I construct a model where forward-looking firms decide to enter and exit the market on the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual diffusion process that generates the rapid, large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is a positive feedback between firm’s exit and adoption, the reduction in the number of firms increases the incentives for remaining firms to adopt innovation. Therefore, in the setting of complete information, this model not only generates a shakeout but also captures the stability of an industry. However, the solely national view of industrial evolution neglects the importance of international trade in determining the shape of market structure. In particular, I show that the higher trade barriers lead to more fragile markets, encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of industry life cycle and raising the probability of a shakeout. Therefore, more liberalized trade generates more stable market structure from both national and international viewpoints. The main references are Ederington and McCalman(2008,2009).

Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.

O papel dos grupos de interesse no "trade policy making" brasileiro: o caso das negociações Brasil-Argentina para o setor automotivo

Desde a redemocratização do país em 1985 o MRE já vinha se posicionando à favor do diálogo com os mais diversos grupos e entidades sociais. Neste sentido, observou-se ao longo dos últimos anos um aprofundamento da interação com parlamentares, governos estaduais e municipais, empresários, sindicalistas, ONGs e imprensa. A construção de vínculos entre as organizações da sociedade civil críticas das negociações comerciais ao longo da década de 1990 permite falar na criação de um novo campo de ação coletiva transnacional, definido como um espaço de ação política formado por indivíduos e organizações da sociedade civil que participam do processo de elaboração de um conjunto comum de práticas, objetivos e crenças. O que se pode concluir é que diante de um contexto mais competitivo e globalizado, após processo de abertura comercial e intensificação da participação brasileira nas negociações internacionais, a representação dos interesses da classe empresarial teve que se adaptar criando uma nova forma de organização. Desse modo, o presente trabalho visa analisar a crescente interferência de grupos de interesse no processo de tomada de decisão, no que tange aos assuntos de política externa comercial brasileira, tais como as negociações comerciais internacionais por se tratar de um ambiente cujos interesses da classe empresarial mais podem ser afetados. As negociações comerciais internacionais é o ambiente em que a atuação empresarial mais pode ser percebida. As negociações do Mercosul e da ALCA possibilitam observar a participação ativa destes novos atores. Sendo assim, o trabalho apresenta a nova dinâmica de relacionamento entre Estado e grupos da sociedade civil (classe empresarial) para temas ligados a comércio exterior.

U. S. Trade in Tuna for Canning, 1987

U.S. tuna fleet activity, canned tuna processing, ex-vessel, wholesale and retail prices and imports in 1987 are described and compared to their counterparts in previous years. Industry statistics gathered from government agencies and industry contacts are presented in 14 figures and 8 tables. In 1987, U.S. tuna fisheries delivered 253,136 short tons (tons) of tuna to U.S. canneries. Domestic deliveries of albacore (white-meat) tuna were 2,836 tons, down 20 percent from 1986 levels. Domestic deliveries of tropical (light-meat) tuna (bigeye, blackfin, bluefin, skipjack, and yellowfin) were 251,000 tons, up 12 percent. Contract prices for tuna delivered by U. S. vessels to U. S. canneries increased dramatically in 1987. Depending on the size of fish in the delivery, ex-vessel prices of white-meat tuna increased as much as 27 percent, and prices of light-meat tuna increased as much as 47 percent. U. S. cannery receipts of imported and domestically caught raw frozen tuna for canning totaled 532,704 tons in 1987, up 2 percent from 1986 levels. U.S. cannery receipts of white-meat tuna were 104,197 tons, down 10 percent from 1986. Imports made up 97 percent of the total cannery supply. Total 1987 U. S. cannery receipts of raw, frozen light meat tuna were 428,507 tons, up 5 percent from 1986 levels. Imports made up 41 percent of the total cannery supply. The 1987 U.S. pack of canned tuna was 33.6 million standard cases, up 3 percent from 1986. The pack of white-meat tuna was 7.2 million standard cases, down 11 percent from 1986; the pack of light-meat tuna was 26.4 million standard cases, up 7 percent. U. S. imports of canned tuna in 1987 were 10.8 million standard cases, down 11 percent from 1986 levels, the first time in recent years that imports have declined. Per capita consumption of canned tuna in the United States was 3.5 pounds in 1987, down slightly from 1986. The retail composite price was $2.26 per pound, unchanged from 1986.

Prawn culture and policy options: technology import and culture through fishermen vis a vis industry

Recent developments in aquaculture has created an awareness that prawn culture is a dollar spinner, in which industry can step in to earn foreign exchange by producing an expensive food iten which has a high market demand abroad. The Government has to take a policy decision whether the prawn culture should be done through small fishermen to improve their socio-economic condition or through private industry with the high technology input and predefined objectives of export trade. Perhaps a simultaneous operation of the two could be allowed best in the interest of India. Perhaps in the interest of quick development and adoption of high production technology, through fishermen organization, the development is encouraged through the implimentation of welfare and area development schemes. In some selected areas private industry may be encoureged to use high production technology to develop prawns.

Study on the quality of beche-de-mer in trade and shrinkage of specimens during processing

The beche-de-mer industry in India is a cent percent export oriented industry being confined to south east coast in Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar in Tamil Nadu. Chemical quality of 180 trade samples of beche-de-mer of four sizes collected from the beche-de-mer curing centres of Ramanathapuram district was studied. Moisture ranged from 6.2 to 24.4% and sand content from 0.11 to 20.42% for all grades. Mean values of sand content are for grade 1=3.47%, grade 2=4.50%, grade 3=3.68%, grade 4=6.87%. Sodium chloride was almost constant for all grades at 5.7%. TVBN values ranged from 10 to 78.4 mg%. 44 laboratory samples of different grades were prepared following trade practice and examined for chemical quality. Mean moisture values are for grade 1=13.4%, grade 2=12.44%, grade 3=12.62%, grade 4=12.08% and mean values of sand are for grade 1=0.70%, grade 2=0.90%, grade 3=1.16%, grade 4=2.15%. The percentage of shrinkage of the animals ranged from 56% to 60% for dried beche-de-mer of 7.5 cm size and above.

Status of the shrimp sector in Bangladesh in the context of HACCP and trade issues: a review

Shrimp culture in Bangladesh has emerged as an important aquaculture industry over the last three decades although its culture in greater parts of the farming area is done in traditional ways. In the meantime, the government of Bangladesh has taken necessary measures along with the private sectors to increase production, upgrade processing industries and to promote export performance. Long supply chain in raw material collection, inadequate infrastructure facilities, poor level of cool chain and lack of adequate HACCP-based training on hygiene and sanitation of different groups of people involved in the field level are the main problems of quality loss of raw materials. Shortage of raw materials results in poor capacity utilization of the processing plants. The growth of bagda (P. monodon) hatchery has expanded rapidly over the last few years, remaining mostly concentrated in Cox's Bazar region is enough to meet the target production. However, there is a shortage of pelleted shrimp feed in Bangladesh. A large number of export processors are now producing increasing amounts of value-added products such as individually quick-frozen, peeled and divined, butterfly cut shrimp, as well as cooked products. The export earnings from value added products is about half of the total export value. About 95% of total fish products are exported to European countries, USA and Japan and the remaining to the Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Most of the EU approved shrimp processing industries have been upgraded with laboratory facilities and provided HACCP training to their workers. As of now, HACCP is applied on the processing plants, but to ensure the quality of raw materials and to reduce risks, shrimp farms are also required to adopt HACCP plan. There is increased pressure time to time from importing countries for fish processors to establish effective quality assurance system in processing plants. Fish Inspection and Quality Control (FIQC) of the Department of Fisheries while having moderately equipped laboratories with chemical, bio-chemical and microbiological testing facilities and qualified technical personnel, the creation of facilities for testing of antibiotics is underway. FIQC mainly supervises quality aspects of the processing plants and has little or no control over raw material supply chains from farm to processing plants. Bangladesh export consignments sometimes face rejection due to reported poor quality of the products. Three types of barriers are reported for export of shrimp to EU countries. These are:(1) government participation in trade and restrictive practices (state aid, countervailing duties, state trading enterprises, government monopoly practices), customs and administrative entry procedures (anti-dumping duties, customs valuation, classification, formalities, rules of origin); (2) technical barriers to trade or TBT (technical regulations, standards, testing, certification arrangement); (3) specific limitations (quantitative restrictions, import licensing, embargoes, exchange control, discriminatory sourcing, export restraints, measures to regulate domestic prices, requirements concerning marking, labeling and packaging).

Status of sturgeon aquaculture and sturgeon trade in China: a review based on two recent nationwide surveys

The authors reviewed the aquacultural history of Acipenseriformes in China, related the legal status and examined the current status of the cultured species or hybrids, origins of seedlings, quantities of production, geographic distribution in farming, and the sustainability for both restocking programmes and human consumption. The census shows that since 2000, the production of cultured sturgeons in China appears to have become the largest in the world. As of 2000, the rapid growth of sturgeon farming in China mainly for commercial purposes has shifted harvests in the Amur River from caviar production to the artificial culture of sturgeon seedlings. This dramatic development has also caused a series of extant and potential problems, including insufficient market availability and the impact of exotic sturgeons on indigenous sturgeon species. Annual preservation of sufficient higher-age sturgeons should be a national priority in order to establish a sustainable sturgeon-culture industry and to preserve a gene pool of critically endangered sturgeon species to prevent their extinction.

Trade-off between minimum number of wireless sensors and the accuracy of temperature profile in cold rooms: a model-based framework

Evaluation of temperature distribution in cold rooms is an important consideration in the design of food storage solutions. Two common approaches used in both industry and academia to address this question are the deployment of wireless sensors, and modelling with Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). However, for a realworld evaluation of temperature distribution in a cold room, both approaches have their limitations. For wireless sensors, it is economically unfeasible to carry out large-scale deployment (to obtain a high resolution of temperature distribution); while with CFD modelling, it is usually not accurate enough to get a reliable result. In this paper, we propose a model-based framework which combines the wireless sensors technique with CFD modelling technique together to achieve a satisfactory trade-off between minimum number of wireless sensors and the accuracy of temperature profile in cold rooms. A case study is presented to demonstrate the usability of the framework.