Ciclo de los negocios en Colombia: el papel de la política de estabilización

Este documento mide la sincronización entre las políticas de estabilización y el ciclo de los negocios en Colombia en el periodo comprendido entre marzo de 1990 y junio de 2013. Para la construcción de los ciclos se utiliza la metodología clásica y se construye un ciclo de referencia a partir de ciclos individuales de tres índices de actividad económica real. Con el fin de medir la sincronización entre el ciclo de nego­cios y los ciclos de las políticas fiscal y monetaria se utiliza el estadístico de Harding y Pagan (2006). Se concluye que durante el periodo de estudio las políticas de estabilización tienden a ser procíclicas (por el lado fiscal) y acíclicas (por el lado monetario). En la literatura se conoce a este fenómeno como when it rains, it pours y es común que se presente en economías emergentes como la colombiana

Defining efficient policies in a general equilibrium model: a multi-objective approach

Macroeconomic policy makers are typically concerned with several indicators of economic performance. We thus propose to tackle the design of macroeconomic policy using Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques. More specifically, we employ Multiobjective Programming (MP) to seek so-called efficient policies. The MP approach is combined with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. We chose use of a CGE model since they have the dual advantage of being consistent with standard economic theory while allowing one to measure the effect(s) of a specific policy with real data. Applying the proposed methodology to Spain (via the 1995 Social Accounting Matrix) we first quantified the trade-offs between two specific policy objectives: growth and inflation, when designing fiscal policy. We then constructed a frontier of efficient policies involving real growth and inflation. In doing so, we found that policy in 1995 Spain displayed some degree of inefficiency with respect to these two policy objectives. We then offer two sets of policy recommendations that, ostensibly, could have helped Spain at the time. The first deals with efficiency independent of the importance given to both growth and inflation by policy makers (we label this set: general policy recommendations). A second set depends on which policy objective is seen as more important by policy makers: increasing growth or controlling inflation (we label this one: objective-specific recommendations).

Economic growth and public and private investment returns

We study the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment in 17 OECD economies through a VAR analysis with annual data from 1960 to 2014. From impulse response functions we find that public investment had a positive growth effect in most countries, and a contractionary effect in Finland, UK, Sweden, Japan, and Canada. Public investment led to private investment crowding out in Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Canada, Sweden, the UK and crowding-in effects in the rest of the countries. Private investment has a positive growth effect in all countries; crowds-out (crowds-in) public investment in Belgium and Sweden (in the rest of the countries). The partial rates of return of public and private investment are mostly positive.

Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment : crowding-in and crowding-out effects

Using annual data from 14 European Union countries, plus Canada, Japan and the United States, we evaluate the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment through VAR analysis. From impulse response functions, we are able to assess the extent of crowding-in or crowding-out of both components of investment. We also compute the associated macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment for each country. The results point mostly to the existence of positive effects of public investment and private investment on output. On the other hand, the crowding-in effects of public investment on private investment vary across countries, while the crowding-in effect of private investment on public investment is more generalised.

Fiscal rules: timing is everything. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02, September 2012

The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances.

The fiscal implications of a banking union. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02 [3?], September 2012

Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.

The distributional consequences of a fiscal food policy: evidence from the UK

The literature on fiscal food policies focuses on their effectiveness in altering diets and improving health, while this paper focuses on their welfare costs. A formal welfare economics framework is developed to calculate the combined individualistic and distributional impacts of a tax-subsidy. Distributional characteristics of foods targeted by a tax tend to be concentrated in lower-income households. Further, consumption of fruit and vegetables tends to be concentrated in higher-income households; therefore, a subsidy on such foods increases regressivity. Aggregate welfare changes that result from a fiscal food policy are found to range from an increase of 1.41 per cent to a reduction of 2.06 per cent according to whether a subsidy is included, the degree of inequality aversion, and whether substitution among foods is allowed.

Generating inclusive and sustainable growth: the role of policy and multilevel fiscal institutions

Incluye bibliografía

Fiscal rules and countercyclical policy: Frank Ramsey meets Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

Incluye Bibliografía

Coordination of macroeconomic policy and fiscal decentralization

Includes bibliography

Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Policy Coalitions Shape Welfare-policy Choices in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation

In general, fiscal adjustments are associated with significant reductions in social spending. Hence, the welfare state is not spared from austerity. Because the welfare state is still central to party competition, this is electorally risky. The paper addresses the following questions: Do left parties differ from their centrist and rightist competitors in the design of austerity measures? And does government type has an impact on the extent to which austerity policies rely on social spending cuts? By comparing 17 OECD countries between 1982 and 2009 we show that if governments embark on a path to austerity, their ideology does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of welfare state retrenchment. However, if major opposition parties and interest groups rally against social spending cuts, a broad pro-reform coalition is a crucial precondition for large fiscal consolidation programs to rely on substantial cuts to social security.