The development of credit management

The objective of the examination was to create development suggestions to intensify the credit management in the subject enterprise. The target of the theory part was to add understanding concerning the credit management and to define the process of credit management. The target of the empirical part was to get to know the present conditions of the credit management in the subject enterprise as well as to establish the problems in the process. The research methodology is constructive, but there are also characteristics of action research.The target of constructive methodology is to create a solutionmodel for the relevant research problem. The methods used in the empirical part were participating observation, literary material and interviews. Within the results of the research a number of development suggestions for the credit management were presented. It is possible to achieve considerable returns while shortening the chain of cash payments. In the suggestions the importance of cooperation between different functions as well as training were emphasized.

Cooperative motion of intrinsic and actuated semiflexible swimmers

We examine the phenomenon of hydrodynamic-induced cooperativity for pairs of flagellated micro-organism swimmers, of which spermatozoa cells are an example. We consider semiflexible swimmers, where inextensible filaments are driven by an internal intrinsic force and torque-free mechanism (intrinsic swimmers). The velocity gain for swimming cooperatively, which depends on both the geometry and the driving, develops as a result of the near-field coupling of bending and hydrodynamic stresses. We identify the regimes where hydrodynamic cooperativity is advantageous and quantify the change in efficiency. When the filaments' axes are parallel, hydrodynamic interaction induces a directional instability that causes semiflexible swimmers that profit from swimming together to move apart from each other. Biologically, this implies that flagella need to select different synchronized collective states and to compensate for directional instabilities (e.g., by binding) in order to profit from swimming together. By analyzing the cooperative motion of pairs of externally actuated filaments, we assess the impact that stress distribution along the filaments has on their collective displacements.

A Forwarding Cooperation Protocol for Plain and Cluster-based Ad Hoc Networks

Peer-reviewed

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

Microfinance and credit rationing in Ghana: Does the microfinance type matter?

This study sets out to examine the extent to which access to credit and credit rationing are influenced by the microfinance type based on the major factors determining micro, small and medium enterprises’ access to credit from microfinance institutions in the era of financial liberalization. The data for the study were gleaned from the microfinance institutions’ credit and loan records consisting of the various pieces of information provided by the borrowers in the application process. Our results are puzzling and show that credit rationing is not influenced by the microfinance types but by the individual microfinance institutions. Keywords: Microfinance, Ghana, Credit Rationing. JEL codes: G21

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

Amyloid Beta Precursor Protein: Proper Credit for the Basic Biochemical Properties of the Most Studied Protein in the 21st Century

The amyloid precursor protein (APP) is mainly known for being the precursor of the ß-amyloid peptide, which accumulates in plaques found in the brain of Alzheimer's disease patients. Expression in different tissues and the degree of sequence identity among mammals indicate an essential and non-tissue specific physiological function. APP is anchored to the membrane and displays a single C-terminal intracellular domain and a longer N-terminal extracellular domain. The basic biochemical properties and the scattered data on research, not related to production of beta-amyloid peptide, suggest that the protein and the molecules resulting from APP proteolytic cleavage may act as adhesion factors, enzymes, hormones/neurotransmitters and/or protease inhibitors. APP deserves to be known for its quite notable properties and its physiological role(s).

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.