Stochastic optimal bid to electricity markets with environmental risk constraints

There are many factors that influence the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a generation company (GenCo) in the current energy market framework. Environmental policy issues have become more and more important for fossil-fuelled power plants and they have to be considered in their management, giving rise to emission limitations. This work allows to investigate the influence of both the allowances and emission reduction plan, and the incorporation of the derivatives medium-term commitments in the optimal generation bidding strategy to the day-ahead electricity market. Two different technologies have been considered: the coal thermal units, high-emission technology, and the combined cycle gas turbine units, low-emission technology. The Iberian Electricity Market and the Spanish National Emissions and Allocation Plans are the framework to deal with the environmental issues in the day-ahead market bidding strategies. To address emission limitations, some of the standard risk management methodologies developed for financial markets, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), have been extended. This study offers to electricity generation utilities a mathematical model to determinate the individual optimal generation bid to the wholesale electricity market, for each one of their generation units that maximizes the long-run profits of the utility abiding by the Iberian Electricity Market rules, the environmental restrictions set by the EU Emission Trading Scheme, as well as the restrictions set by the Spanish National Emissions Reduction Plan. The economic implications for a GenCo of including the environmental restrictions of these National Plans are analyzed and the most remarkable results will be presented.

Effect of investments on fundamentals and market reaction on pre-operational and operational Brazilian companies for the period 2006-2012

ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence on the market reaction to corporate investment decisions whose shareholder value is largely attributed to growth options. The exploratory research raised pre-operational companies and their operational pairs on the same economy segments. It had the purpose of investigating the existence of statistical differentiation from financial indicators that reflect the installed assets and growth assets, and then study the market reaction to changes in fixed assets as a signaling element about investment decisions. The formation process of operational assets and shareholder value almost exclusively dependent on asset growth stands out in the pre-operational companies. As a result, differentiation tests confirmed that the pre-operational companies had their value especially derived on growth options. The market reaction was particularly bigger in pre-operational companies with abnormal negative stock returns, while the operational companies had positive returns, which may indicate that the quality of the investment is judged based on the financial disclosure. Additionally, operational companies' investors await the disclosure to adjust their prices. We conclude that the results are consistent with the empirical evidence and the participants in financial markets to long-term capital formation investments should give that special attention.

Sovereign Risk, Anonymous Markets, and the Effects of Globalization

The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of globalization on the workings of financial markets. We adopt a "technological" view of globalization, which consists of an exogenous reduction in the cost of shipping goods across di¤erent regions of the world. We model financial markets where agents anonymously trade securities issued by every other agent in the world. In the absence of frictions, we show how globalization creates trade opportunities among residents of different regions of the world, thereby raising welfare. In the presence of sovereign risk, however, there emerge two crucial interactions between trade among residents within a region and trade among residents of di¤erent regions. First, the more residents within a region trade with each other, the more they can trade with residents of other regions. Second, the possibility of trade with residents of other regions sometimes leads a government to not enforce payments by its residents, destroying trade opportunities among residents within the region. The net effect on welfare of this process of creation and destruction of trade opportunities is ambiguous. We argue that there are no policies governments can take to avoid the negative effects of globalization on trade among domestic residents. In a dynamic extension, we analyze how our results are a¤ected by reputational considerations.

Theoretical notes on bubbles and the current crisis

We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of abubble or pyramid scheme in financial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of thefinancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show howthe model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a suddenand sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between financial and real economicactivity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the modelto explore the role of fiscal policy.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

Insider Trading and Real Investment

In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

Stock returns, term structure, inflation and real activity: An international perspective

This paper analyses the empirical interdependences among assetreturns, real activity and inflation from a multicountry and internationalpoint of view. We find that nominal stock returns are significantly relatedto inflation only in the US, that the US term structure of interest ratespredicts both domestic and foreign inflation rates while foreign termstructures do not have this predictive power and that innovations in inflationand exchange rates induce insignificant responses of real and financialvariables. An interpretation of the dynamics and some policy implicationsof the results are provided.

Giffen goods and market making

This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible forthe Giffen goods anomaly affecting competitive traders demands in multi-asset, noisy rational expectations equilibrium models. The role thatinformation plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market withrisk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents havea dual motive for trading: speculation and market making. Whilespeculation entails using prices to assess the effect of private signalerror terms, market making requires employing them to disentangle noisetraders effects in traders aggregate orders. In a correlated environment,this complicates a trader s signal-extraction problem and maygenerate upward-sloping demand curves. Assuming either (i) that competitive,risk neutral market makers price the assets, or that (ii) the risktolerance coefficient of uninformed traders grows without bound, removesthe market making component from informed traders demands, rendering themwell behaved in prices.

Why are capital flows so much more volatile in emerging than in developed countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks ( crises ) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) the most important one shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Biaixos informatius als mercats de valors

[cat] L'article presenta els resultats d'unes proves empíriques que mostren com en la informació econòmica a la premsa escrita poden haver-hi biaixos sistemàtics. Les empreses de sectors regulats son més actives informativament la qual cosa es tradueix en un major protagonisme en la premsa econòmica especialitzada. La primera prova empírica consisteix en una comprovació del protagonisme de les empreses de l'Ibex 35 i del Dow Jones a la premsa general i la econòmica d'Espanya i els Estats Units respectivament En la segona es fa una anàlisi de la informació del periòdic econòmic Expansión. L'existència de biaixos informatius sistemàtics indueix a qüestionar-se la hipòtesi de racionalitat en els mercats financers.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Profit at Risk as a Risk Management Tool in Deregulated Energy Markets

Euroopan energiamarkkinat ovat olleet viimeisen kymmenen vuoden aikana suurten muutosten alla. Markkinoiden kehitys on ollut huomattavaa myös Iso-Britanniassa, jossa sähkö- ja kaasumarkkinat ovat olleet avoinna kilpailulle jo muutamia vuosia. Ennen markkinoiden avautumista energiyhtiöt pystyivät siirtämään kaikki riskit suoraan asiakkaan kannettaviksi. Markkinoiden avautumisen myötä lisääntynyt kilpailu on kuitenkin pakottanut energiayhtiöitä ajanmukaistamaan näkemyksiään riskeistä. Riskitekijät, joista ei aiemmin tarvinnut välittää, on nyt pystyttävä tunnistamaan ja hallitsemaan. Tämä työ keskittyy hinta- ja volyymiriskien hallintaan. Rahoitusmarkkinoilla pitkään käytettyjä riskienhallintatyökaluja on otettu käyttöön myös energiamarkkinoilla. Energiamarkkinoiden piirteet poikkeavat kuitenkin rahoitusmarkkinoista, eikä näitä työkaluja voida ottaa käyttöön muutoksitta. Silti, jopa muutosten jälkeen rahoitusmarkkinoiden riskienhallitavälineet aliarvioivat energiamarkkinoiden hinta- ja volyymiriskejä. Tässä yhteydessä työssä esitetään Profit at Risk, PaR. PaR on skenaariopohjainen riskienhallinnan työkalu, joka on kehitetty erityisesti energiamarkkinoille ja täten huomioi niiden erikoispiirteet. Työn rungon muodostavat energiamarkkinoiden käyttäytyminen, hinta- ja volyymiriskitekijät sekä pohdinta miten hinta- ja volyymiriskeiltä voidaan suojautua ja miten niitä voidaan hallita. PaR-metodologiaa verrataan perinteisiin riskienhallintamenetelmiin ja työn tavoitteena on tuoda esiin ne tekijät, joiden ansiosta PaR on sopivampi työkalu energiamarkkinoiden riskienhallintaan kuin perinteiset menetelmät. Käytännön esimerkkinä työssä toimii Fortum Energy plus’n PaR –malli. Koska PaR on kehitetty erityisesti energiamarkkinoille, se huomioi täysin markkinoiden aiheuttamat hinta- ja volyymiriskit. Käytännön esimerkki kuitenkin osoittaa, että PaR menetelmästä ei ole riskienhallinnallista hyötyä ellei työkalun käyttäjällä ole täydellistä tietämystä niin energiamarkkinoista kuin markkinoiden muutoksiin vaikuttavien tekijöiden käyttäytymisestä.