One or the other? Do we have to choose? : summative and-or formative evaluation. '¿Una u otra? ¿Tenemos que elegir? : evaluación formativa y-o sumativa'.

Se definen los conceptos de evaluación sumativa y evaluación formativa con el ánimo de ver si son tan diferentes y excluyentes. Se proponen caminos para combinar ambas y para incluir a los estudiantes en el proceso de evaluación.

La implantación de los nuevos grados : propuestas de mejora.

Monográfico con el título: 'Mejorar la escuela: perspectivas didácticas y organizativas'. Resumen basado en el de la publicación

An analysis of grammatical errors by children with cochlear implants

Spontaneous writing samples of deaf children with cochlear implants were analyzed for syntactic errors and other descriptive characteristics. These results were compared to a small sample of writings from hearing children.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

The fiscal implications of a banking union. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02 [3?], September 2012

Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.

On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policies. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/04, 9 November 2012

For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems. Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Case Study: Interacting with Volumetric Medical Datasets in Networked CAVE Environments

Virtual Reality (VR) is widely used in visualizing medical datasets. This interest has emerged due to the usefulness of its techniques and features. Such features include immersion, collaboration, and interactivity. In a medical visualization context, immersion is important, because it allows users to interact directly and closelywith detailed structures in medical datasets. Collaboration on the other hand is beneficial, because it gives medical practitioners the chance to share their expertise and offer feedback and advice in a more effective and intuitive approach. Interactivity is crucial in medical visualization and simulation systems, because responsiveand instantaneous actions are key attributes in applications, such as surgical simulations. In this paper we present a case study that investigates the use of VR in a collaborative networked CAVE environment from a medical volumetric visualization perspective. The study will present a networked CAVE application, which has been built to visualize and interact with volumetric datasets. We will summarize the advantages of such an application and the potential benefits of our system. We also will describe the aspects related to this application area and the relevant issues of such implementations.

Low-cost optical tracking for immersive collaboration in the CAVE using the Wii remote

We present a novel way of interacting with an immersive virtual environment which involves inexpensive motion-capture using the Wii Remote®. A software framework is also presented to visualize and share this information across two remote CAVETM-like environments. The resulting applications can be used to assist rehabilitation by sending motion information across remote sites. The application’s software and hardware components are scalable enough to be used on desktop computer when home-based rehabilitation is preferred.

A tool for replay and analysis of gaze-enhanced multiparty sessions captured in immersive collaborative environments

A desktop tool for replay and analysis of gaze-enhanced multiparty virtual collaborative sessions is described. We linked three CAVE (TM)-like environments, creating a multiparty collaborative virtual space where avatars are animated with 3D gaze as well as head and hand motions in real time. Log files are recorded for subsequent playback and analysis Using the proposed software tool. During replaying the user can rotate the viewpoint and navigate in the simulated 3D scene. The playback mechanism relies on multiple distributed log files captured at every site. This structure enables an observer to experience latencies of movement and information transfer for every site as this is important fir conversation analysis. Playback uses an event-replay algorithm, modified to allow fast traversal of the scene by selective rendering of nodes, and to simulate fast random access. The tool's is analysis module can show each participant's 3D gaze points and areas where gaze has been concentrated.