Desire, Resentment and Reprisal: Revisiting the Emotions of Myth in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby

This article aims to reassess F. Scott Fitzgerald’s classic The Great Gatsby (1925), taking into consideration the myth-critical hypotheses of philosopher René Girard. Specifically, this essay will analyse the concepts of mimetic desire, resentment and reprisal violence as emotional components of myth, paying close attention to how the reinterpreted mythical pattern of the novel influences the depiction of such emotions as social traits of corruption. Finally, this article will challenge interpretations that have regarded Gatsby as a successful scapegoat-figure, examining instead how the mythical meanings and structures of the text stage an emotional crisis of frustrated desire and antagonism that ultimately offers no hope of communal restoration.

The postmodernist war on evidence-based practice

In this paper, we examine the war of words between those who contend that health care practice, including nursing, should primarily be informed by research (the evidence-based practice movement), and those who argue that there should be no restrictions on the sources of knowledge used by practitioners (the postmodernists). We review the postmodernist interventions of Dave Holmes and his colleagues, observing that the postmodernist style to which they adhere, which includes the use of continental philosophy, metaphors, and acerbic delivery, tends to obscure their substantive arguments. The heated nature of some responses to them has tended to have the same effect. However, the substantive arguments are important. Five main postmodernist charges are identified and discussed. The first argument, that the notion of ‘best evidence’ implies a hierarchical and exclusivist approach to knowledge, is persuasive. However, the contention that this hierarchy is maintained by the combined pressures of capitalism and vested interests within academia and the health services, is less well founded. Nevertheless, postmodernist contentions that the hierarchy embraced by the evidence-based practice movement damages health care because it excludes other forms of evidence that are needed to understand the complexity of care, it marginalizes important aspects of clinical knowledge, and it fails to take account of individuals or their experience, are all seen to be of some merit. However, we do not share the postmodernist conclusion that this adds up to a fascist order. Instead, we characterize evidence-based practice as a necessary but not sufficient component of health care knowledge.