Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Immigration and housing: rethinking the role of fiscal policies to manage diversity

We study the two key social issues of immigration and housing in lightof each other and analyse which housing policies work best to distributediversity (racial, economic, cultural) equally across our cities and towns. Inparticular, we compare the impact of direct government expenditure andtax incentives on the housing conditions of immigrants in four Europeancountries: France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The analysisshows that the different policies which have been adopted in these countrieshave not succeeded in preventing immigrants from being concentratedin certain neighbourhoods. The reason is that housing benefits andtax incentives are normally “spatially blind”. In our opinion, governmentsshould consider immigration indirectly in their housing policies and, forinstance, distribute social housing more evenly across different areas topromote sustainable levels of diversity.

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Water planning law and government.

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.

Legal issues in promoting FOSS in R+D projects - Policy, Organisation and Management

Creating and using FLOSS in R+D projects raises several legal issues, which need to be managed as soon as possible - preferably during the project planning stage. Challenges in the areas of project structure and policy, licenses and licensing, exploitation strategies, community management, and FLOSS-friendliness in general all have their legal aspects, which are commented here. Some recommendations are made for assisting in the use of FLOSS in R+D projects, especially in multiple party consortiums.

Osakeperusteinen palkitseminen: maksuttoman osakkeen hyödyntäminen kannustinjärjestelmissä

Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää osakeyhtiön palkitsemisjärjestelmiin liittyviä kysymyksiä päämies–agenttisuhteiden ja osakeyhtiöoikeudellisten periaatteiden kautta. Tutkielmassa selvitetään, kuinka maksuttomia osakkeita voidaan hyödyntää julkisen osakeyhtiön palkitsemisjärjestelmissä ja mitä haasteita ja mahdollisuuksia niiden käyttöön liittyy. Tutkimusmetodi työssä on lainopillinen ja aihetta lähestytään luontevasti kauppatieteellisen ja oikeustieteellisen näkökulman yhdistävän oikeustaloustieteen kautta. Ensisijaisena aineistona tutkielmassa käytetään voimassaolevaa lainsäädäntöä valmisteluaineistoineen ja näkökulmaa syvennetään aiemmin voimassa olleen lainsäädännön tarkastelulla. Toissijaisena aineistona tutkielmassa käytetään sekä eri asiantuntijoiden oikeudellista kirjallisuutta että palkitsemisen asiantuntijoiden laatimaa kirjallisuutta Suomesta ja muista länsimaista. Teoreettista työtä on syvennetty asiantuntijahaastattelulla ja yhtiöiden sijoittajatiedosta saatavalla informaatiolla. Merkittävin osakeyhtiön johdon ja yhtiön välisen suhteen tehokkuutta alentava seikka on päämies–agenttisuhteen valvontaongelma. Tämä liittyy päämies - agenttisuhteeseen, joka ilmenee negatiivisesti yhtiön ja yhtiön johdon intressien ristiriitatilanteissa. Valvontaongelma voi aiheuttaa ylimääräisiä transaktiokustannuksia ja tämä näkyy yhtiön toiminnan tehokkuuden laskemisena. Päämies–agenttisuhteen ratkaisuna lainsäädäntö ja erilaiset valvonnan keinot ovat tehottomia ja nykyisen yhtiöoikeudellisen ajattelun vastaisia. Tehokkaimmin valvontaongelma saadaan ratkaistua erilaisin kannustimin tapahtuvalla johdon ohjauksella. Osakesidonnainen palkitseminen on suosituin johdon ja yhtiön intressien yhdistämisen keino. Osakesidonnainen palkitseminen on parhaimmillaan eri osapuolien näkökulmasta sitouttavaa ja kannustavaa mutta osakepalkitsemisen käyttöön liittyy myös riskejä. Eräs keskeisistä yhtiöoikeudellisista periaatteista on yhdenvertaisuus, jota saatetaan loukata eri palkitsemisjärjestelmiä käytettäessä. Varojen jakoon ja järjestelmien rahoitukseen liittyy niin ikään riskejä, jotka saattavat vaarantaa järjestelmän onnistumisen. Liian avokätiset palkkiojärjestelmät taas saattavat aiheuttaa yhtiön eri sidosryhmien piirissä tyytymättömyyttä joka taas alentaa järjestelmän tehokkuutta. Yhtiön johto vastaa yhtiön strategian toteutumisesta ja linjaa Corporate Governance käytännön mukaisesti johdon palkitsemisen tavat. Yhtiön johto on kuitenkin päätöksistään vastuussa yhtiön residuaalioikeuden omaaville päämiehille, eli osakkeenomistajille. Vaikka yhtiön johto vastaa viime kädessä yhtiön toiminnasta, sen on huomioitava toiminnassaan yhtiön toiminnan tarkoitus ja sitä kautta yksittäisen osakkeenomistajan etu. Vaikka osakeyhtiössä toteutettaisiin enemmistöomistajan valitsemaa toimintalinjaa, osakeyhtiön yhdenvertaisuusperiaate korostaa juuri vähemmistöosakkeenomistajan asemaa. Johdon fidusiaaristen velvoitteiden voidaankin nähdä korostuvan johdon suhteessa vähemmistöosakkeenomistajaan. Tämä on huomioitava myös palkitsemisjärjestelmissä. Johdon palkitsemisjärjestelmien suunnittelussa ja toteutuksessa on suunnattava keskeinen huomio sen tavoitteiden toteutumiseen, eli yksittäisen osakkeenomistajan omistuksen arvon kasvattamiseen pidemmällä aikavälillä, pitäen huolta osakeyhtiön kantavista periaatteista.

The effects of fiscal policy after the global recession: assessing the evidences

This paper offers a commented review of the most recent empirical studies of the effects of fiscal contraction on economic growth, which have helped underpin the prescription that fiscal policy should be expansionary in coming years in order to contain economic semi-stagnation in the developed countries. The paper shows that there is ample literature showing that fiscal expansion helps the economy grow, and that fiscal contraction tends to reduce output and employment in the short term.

Fitness to stand trial : how discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability inform the law and psychiatry to create standards of normal

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform and support our conception of both the person and the punishable subject. A critical discourse analysis tracing these concepts through both the law and psychological tools used to evaluate the fitness of a person reveals that these concepts and their implied values are inconsistently applied to the mentally disordered who come into conflict with the law. I argue that the result of this inconsistency compromises a person's autonomy which is a contradiction to this concept as a foundational principle of the law. Ultimately, this thesis does not provide a solution to be employed in policy making, but its analysis leaves open possibilities for further exploration into the ways legal and social justice can be reconciled.

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.

Comparative Lessons on Corporate law and CSR: Hard Law as Solution? Do the French offer the way ahead?

This paper provides a comparative analysis of corporate law and CSR and asks whether there are lessons for Australia from corporate law and CSR developments in France. This presentation presents a summary of the provisions of the new French Act Number 2010-788 passed on 12 July 2010 – called “Grenelle 2” –. Firstly, article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes the Commercial Code to extend the reach of non-financial reporting and to ensure its pertinence. Secondly, article 227 Law’s Grenelle 2 amends certain provisions of the Commercial and Environmental Codes and incorporates into substantive law the liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries. In fine, article 224 of Law’s Grenelle 2 reinforces the pressure on the market to act in a responsible manner. It modifies article 214-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to compel institutional investors (mutual funds and fund management companies) to take social, environmental and governance criteria into account in their investment policy.

New media technologies, law, and society: an ecological approach

Joyce Tam de l'Université McGill est récipiendaire du 3ème prix du concours de la bourse d'initiation à la recherche offerte par le Regroupement Droit et changements aux étudiants du baccalauréat en droit.