Proposta de modelo multicritérios para análise de investimentos em refinarias de petróleo no Brasil.

O processo de tomada de decisão que envolve a priorização e a seleção de projetos de investimentos na indústria do petróleo está longe de ser uma tarefa trivial. Ao mesmo tempo em que a empresa deve buscar relações favoráveis entre risco e retorno econômico-financeiro também deve se alinhar cada vez mais aos princípios do desenvolvimento sustentável em seus negócios. Em se tratando do caso da indústria petrolífera brasileira, formada essencialmente por um monopólio estatal, esta tarefa se torna ainda mais difícil, já que uma série de interesses públicos relacionados ao investimento também devem ser considerados. Sendo assim, o objetivo principal desta pesquisa foi o desenvolvimento e a aplicação de um modelo original de análise usando múltiplos critérios que auxiliasse na priorização e na seleção de projetos de investimentos nas refinarias de petróleo brasileiras. Utilizou-se uma metodologia de pesquisa quantitativa com o uso de diversos artefatos de matemática aplicada capazes de lidar adequadamente com as avaliações muitas vezes incompletas e subjetivas que caracterizam o problema da análise de investimentos em refinarias de petróleo. Ao final do trabalho, conseguiu-se obter um modelo suficientemente simples, ao ponto de ser facilmente implementado em uma planilha eletrônica, robusto, ao ser capaz de lidar de maneira bastante adequada com as principais peculiaridades que envolvem o setor do refino de petróleo no Brasil e flexível, de maneira que os critérios de análise e as alternativas de decisão pudessem ser facilmente adicionados, removidos ou alterados de acordo com as necessidades específicas exigidas para cada caso.

El futuro de la regulación del sector del abastecimiento en España

La gestión del servicio de abastecimiento de agua es un tema de muy relevante y de plena actualidad, no solo en España sino a nivel mundial. En España, desde la forma de prestación del servicio a través de la gestión directa o la gestión indirecta, o el tipo en sí de gestión indirecta que se desarrolle –empresa privada, pública o mixta- dan como resultado prácticamente tantas situaciones como ayuntamientos existen ya que la competencia es municipal, según reconoce la Ley de Bases de Régimen Local. La heterogeneidad de circunstancias de gestión de los recursos hídricos, la fragmentación de un sector clave y la falta de indicadores comparables entre diferentes opciones para la prestación de este servicio, parece indicar la necesidad de apostar por la creación de un ente regulador independiente dada la naturaleza monopolística del sector del abastecimiento y el saneamiento, junto con el carácter esencial del bien que se gestiona. Mientras que las instituciones gubernamentales dictan las políticas generales a través de leyes y reglamentos, los operadores -públicos, privados o mixtos- son los responsables de prestar los servicios a la población, y sería el órgano regulador quien velaría por el cumplimiento de las normas. El MAGRAMA está estudiando la posibilidad de elaborar una Ley sobre el Ciclo Integral del Agua de Uso Urbano con las dificultades que esto tiene en consideración a las competencias de las Comunidades Autónomas, lo que sin duda ayudaría a homologar la gestión del agua urbana en España, regulando un monopolio natural, ahora en manos de más de 8.100 municipios y un reducido número de empresas concesionarias, auténticas detentadoras de estos servicios. En este trabajo tratamos de analizar las ventajas que supondría para España contar con una agencia de regulación similar a las existentes en numerosos países, tanto europeos como de América Latina.

Entre économie de la fonctionnalité et monopole : la United Shoe Machinery Company dans la première moitié du XXe siècle

L’histoire de la United Shoe Machinery Company (USMC) montre que la réalité ne s’adapte pas toujours aux simplifications de la théorie. Comme le signale l’économie de la fonctionnalité, la stratégie de l’entreprise de vendre l’usage plutôt que la machine fournit plusieurs avantages importants, mais elle a également contribué au fait que les usines de chaussures subissent une véritable dépendance technologique de cette compagnie et au fait que l’USMC soit parvenue à une domination monopolistique du marché. D’autre part, en remettant en cause les rudiments généraux de la théorie économique néoclassique, cette position de monopole n’a pas empêché que l’entreprise ait un fonctionnement efficace et ait facilité la modernisation technologique de l’industrie de la chaussure, aux États-Unis et dans d’autres pays.

Constituição e modelo de mercado : uso liberal e desuso neoliberal

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Políticas), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2016

"Marido espiritual" : possessão e violência simbólica no sul de Moçambique

Tese de doutoramento, Antropologia (Antropologia da Religião e do Simbólico), Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2016

The Dragon awakes: Is Chinese competition policy a cause for concern? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/14, 22 October 2013

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2007, is largely compatible with antitrust law in the European Union, the United States and other jurisdictions. Enforcement activity by the Chinese authorities is also approaching the level seen in the EU. The Chinese law, however, leaves significant room for the use of competition policy to further industrial policy objectives. The data presented in this Policy Contribution indicates that Chinese merger control might have asymmetrically targeted foreign companies, while favouring domestic companies. However, there are no indications that antitrust control has been used to favour domestic players. A strategy to achieve convergence in global antitrust enforcement should include support for Chinese competition authorities to develop the institutional tools they already have, and to improve merger control by promoting the adoption of a consumer-oriented test and enforcing M&A notification rules.

Relative direct democratic legitimacy. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2014

As the European Council convenes today and tomorrow (June 26-27th) to confirm Jean-Claude Juncker as the candidate for President of the European Commission, CEPS Director Daniel Gros shows in this Commentary that the Council should de facto also be considered more a 'mini parliament' than an assembly of states and that the European Parliament cannot claim the monopoly on democratic legitimacy. For a practical application of the principles Gros presents in this commentary, see his column in Project Syndicate, 17 June 2014, in which he rejects the view that Jean-Claude Juncker has a democratic mandate to lead the European Parliament (www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/daniel-gros-rejects-the-view-that-j...

Gazprom's expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009

The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated.

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

The Iasi-Ungheni pipeline: a means of achieving energy independence from Russia? Moldova's attempts at gas supply diversification. OSW Commentary No. 118, 2013-10-08

Since taking power in 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has been trying to end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, natural gas accounts for about 50% of the country’s energy balance (excluding Transnistria), and Gazprom has a monopoly on the supply of gas to the republic. The key element of Chișinău’s diversification project is the construction of the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which is designed to link the Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission networks, and consequently make it possible for Moldova to purchase gas from countries other than Russia. Despite significant delays, construction work on the interconnector began in August 2013. The Moldovan government sees ensuring energy independence from Russia as its top priority. The significance and urgency of the project reflect Chișinău’s frustration at Moscow’s continued attempts to use its monopoly of Moldova’s energy sector to exert political pressure on the republic. Nonetheless, despite numerous declarations by Moldovan and Romanian politicians, the Iasi- -Ungheni pipeline will not end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas before the end of the current decade. This timeframe is unrealistic for two reasons: first, because an additional gas pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau and a compression station must be constructed, which will take at least five years and will require significant investment; and second, because of the unrelenting opposition to the project coming from Gazprom, which currently controls Moldova’s pipelines and will likely try to torpedo any energy diversification attempts. Independence from Russian gas will only be possible after the the Gazprom-controlled Moldova-GAZ, the operator of the Moldovan transmission network and the country’s importer of natural gas, is divided. The division of the company has in fact been envisaged in the EU’s Third Energy Package, which is meant to be implemented by Moldova in 2020.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Why Are German Employers Associations Declining? A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.3, 2005

This paper challenges the conventional explanation for declining density of German employers associations. The dominant account asserts that German trade unions have taken advantage of increased globalization since the 1980s which has made internationally active enterprises more vulnerable to production disruptions to extract additional monopoly rents from multinational employers via aggressive collective bargaining. Small firms have responded to the increased union pressures by avoiding membership employers associations, which has produced the density declines. Data, however, disconfirm the conventional explanation; compensation increases have actually become increasingly smaller over the decades. This paper presents an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data. We argue that it is the large product manufacturers rather than the trade unions that have greatly increased price pressures on parts suppliers, which has led to a disproportionate number of suppliers to quit employers associations. The paper also discusses these findings in light of the "varieties of capitalism" literature. It points out that this literature has depicted national models as too homogeneous. The decision of several German employers associations to offer different classes of membership represents an accentuation of variety within national varieties of capitalism.

The great leap. Turkey under Erdogan. OSW Point of View 51, 27 May 2015

Since the AKP took power in 2002, Turkey has seen a replacement of the state’s elites, a real change of the political system and a redefinition of the state identity. All this has been accompanied by economic development and rapid social transformation. The pro-democratic reforms and improved prosperity in the first decade of the AKP’s rule created the opportunity for Turkey to become part of the West in terms of legal and political standards, while maintaining its cultural distinctness. However, from the point of view of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of a new Turkey, the political reforms turned out not to be a goal per se but a means to the end of achieving a monopoly on power. Once this goal was achieved, Erdogan began leading Turkey towards the status of an autocratic state focused on the Middle East and resentful towards the West. This trend is unlikely to be reversed under Erdogan’s rule. However, even if the government were to change, there would be no return to the Turkey from before the AKP era. In turn, the Turkish public will have to answer the questions regarding its civilisational identity and the vision of the political and social order.

The insurance industry. Hearings, Eighty-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 231 .

Continuous paging.