Interpolatory methods for model reduction of large-scale dynamical systems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2013

Statistical model identification : dynamical processes and large-scale networks in systems biology

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014

Statistical model identification : dynamical processes and large-scale networks in systems biology

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014

Computational methods for model reduction of large-scale sparse structured descriptor systems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2015

Statistical analysis of stress and deformation state in polycrystalline aggregates with a large number of grains

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2015

Records of large fresh-water mussels.

v.24:no.24(1941)

Diversity and habitat preference of medium and large-sized mammals in an urban forest fragment of southwestern Amazon

We assessed the species composition and abundance of medium and large-sized mammals in an urban forest fragment in the Brazilian Amazon, and recorded the preference of some species for particular phytophysiognomies. We placed nine transects with 20 sand plots each in three phytophysiognomies: open rainforest with a dominance of bamboos (OFB), open rainforest with palm trees (OFP), and dense rainforest (DF). We calculated species abundance as the number of records/plot.day, in a total of 2,700 plots.day. We recorded twelve mammal species; Sylvilagus brasiliensis (Linnaeus, 1758) and Dasyprocta fuliginosa (Wagler, 1831) were the most abundant. The results differed among phytophysiognomies: DF presented the highest mammal diversity, whereas the species composition of OFP was less similar than that of other phytophysiognomies. Rodents showed higher preference for OFP and Sylvilagus brasiliensis was more abundant in OFB. The study area showed high species richness, with the occurrence of mesopredators, but there was a predominance of common species adaptable to disturbed environments, which reflects the severe isolation degree of the forest fragment and the hunting pressure that is still present.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.