Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Infinite index subgroups and finiteness properties of intersections of geometrically finite groups

We explore which types of finiteness properties are possible for intersections of geometrically finite groups of isometries in negatively curved symmetric rank one spaces. Our main tool is a twist construction which takes as input a geometrically finite group containing a normal subgroup of infinite index with given finiteness properties and infinite Abelian quotient, and produces a pair of geometrically finite groups whose intersection is isomorphic to the normal subgroup.

Inverse Problems for multiple invariant curves

Planar polynomial vector fields which admit invariant algebraic curves, Darboux integrating factors or Darboux first integrals are of special interest. In the present paper we solve the inverse problem for invariant algebraic curves with a given multiplicity and for integrating factors, under generic assumptions regarding the (multiple) invariant algebraic curves involved. In particular we prove, in this generic scenario, that the existence of a Darboux integrating factor implies Darboux integrability. Furthermore we construct examples where the genericity assumption does not hold and indicate that the situation is different for these.

Infinite time aggregation for the critical Patlak-Keller-Segel model in R2

We analyze the two-dimensional parabolic-elliptic Patlak-Keller-Segel model in the whole Euclidean space R2. Under the hypotheses of integrable initial data with finite second moment and entropy, we first show local in time existence for any mass of "free-energy solutions", namely weak solutions with some free energy estimates. We also prove that the solution exists as long as the entropy is controlled from above. The main result of the paper is to show the global existence of free-energy solutions with initial data as before for the critical mass 8 Π/Χ. Actually, we prove that solutions blow-up as a delta dirac at the center of mass when t→∞ keeping constant their second moment at any time. Furthermore, all moments larger than 2 blow-up as t→∞ if initially bounded.

Improving the risk concept: a revision of Arrow-Pratt theory in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments

In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.

Taxonomical and biogeographical problems in Mediterranean shrews of the genus Crocidura (Mammalia, Insectivora) with reference to a new karyotype from Sicily (Italy)

Shrews of the genus Crocidura from Sicily revealed a new karyotype from Europe: 2n = 36, NF = 56, NFa = 52. With reference to the revision of Vesmanis (1976), this shrew is provisionally attributed to C. caudata Miller, 1901 and it is proposed to call it the "Sicilian shrew". Its chromosome complement is similar to that of shrews from Canary Islands and a species from Burundi (Central Africa), suggesting that it might have split off from a line of Paleotropical origin. Following these findings, the modern concept of Mediterranean island colonization by shrews must be revised. The distinctive characteristics of Mediterranean shrews should also be revised.

Intervention précoce dans la phase initiale des troubles psychotiques à Lausanne: quels problèmes et quelles solutions [Early intervention for the initial phase of psychotic disorders in Lausanne: what problems and what solutions?]

Schizophrenia has long been considered with pessimism, but the recent interest in the early phase of psychotic disorders has modified this often unjustified perception. Literature has demonstrated the benefit of the development of programs specialised in the treatment of early psychosis, which tend to be developed in many countries. It is however important to match them to local needs as well as to the structure of local health services. This paper reviews elements that justify such a development in Lausanne, Switzerland, and describe its various elements.

Inverse problems for invariant algebraic curves: explicit computations

Given an algebraic curve in the complex affine plane, we describe how to determine all planar polynomial vector fields which leave this curve invariant. If all (finite) singular points of the curve are nondegenerate, we give an explicit expression for these vector fields. In the general setting we provide an algorithmic approach, and as an alternative we discuss sigma processes.

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.