A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Fair and efficient student placement with couples

We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Inverse Problems for multiple invariant curves

Planar polynomial vector fields which admit invariant algebraic curves, Darboux integrating factors or Darboux first integrals are of special interest. In the present paper we solve the inverse problem for invariant algebraic curves with a given multiplicity and for integrating factors, under generic assumptions regarding the (multiple) invariant algebraic curves involved. In particular we prove, in this generic scenario, that the existence of a Darboux integrating factor implies Darboux integrability. Furthermore we construct examples where the genericity assumption does not hold and indicate that the situation is different for these.

Variational inequalities in Hilbert spaces with measures and optimal stopping problems

We study the existence theory for parabolic variational inequalities in weighted L2 spaces with respect to excessive measures associated with a transition semigroup. We characterize the value function of optimal stopping problems for finite and infinite dimensional diffusions as a generalized solution of such a variational inequality. The weighted L2 setting allows us to cover some singular cases, such as optimal stopping for stochastic equations with degenerate diffusion coeficient. As an application of the theory, we consider the pricing of American-style contingent claims. Among others, we treat the cases of assets with stochastic volatility and with path-dependent payoffs.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Taxonomical and biogeographical problems in Mediterranean shrews of the genus Crocidura (Mammalia, Insectivora) with reference to a new karyotype from Sicily (Italy)

Shrews of the genus Crocidura from Sicily revealed a new karyotype from Europe: 2n = 36, NF = 56, NFa = 52. With reference to the revision of Vesmanis (1976), this shrew is provisionally attributed to C. caudata Miller, 1901 and it is proposed to call it the "Sicilian shrew". Its chromosome complement is similar to that of shrews from Canary Islands and a species from Burundi (Central Africa), suggesting that it might have split off from a line of Paleotropical origin. Following these findings, the modern concept of Mediterranean island colonization by shrews must be revised. The distinctive characteristics of Mediterranean shrews should also be revised.

Intervention précoce dans la phase initiale des troubles psychotiques à Lausanne: quels problèmes et quelles solutions [Early intervention for the initial phase of psychotic disorders in Lausanne: what problems and what solutions?]

Schizophrenia has long been considered with pessimism, but the recent interest in the early phase of psychotic disorders has modified this often unjustified perception. Literature has demonstrated the benefit of the development of programs specialised in the treatment of early psychosis, which tend to be developed in many countries. It is however important to match them to local needs as well as to the structure of local health services. This paper reviews elements that justify such a development in Lausanne, Switzerland, and describe its various elements.

Inverse problems for invariant algebraic curves: explicit computations

Given an algebraic curve in the complex affine plane, we describe how to determine all planar polynomial vector fields which leave this curve invariant. If all (finite) singular points of the curve are nondegenerate, we give an explicit expression for these vector fields. In the general setting we provide an algorithmic approach, and as an alternative we discuss sigma processes.

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.