Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Revenue-neutral tax policy under price uncertainty

The firm's response to revenue-neutral taxation is investigated under price uncertainty. Revenue-neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to sign the firm's response: a reduction in the marginal rate causes the firm to contract output. Implications are established for the equilibrium level of treasury receipts.

Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Increasing uncertainty: A definition

We present a definition of increasing uncertainty, in which an elementary increase in the uncertainty of any act corresponds to the addition of an 'elementary bet' that increases consumption by a fixed amount in (relatively) 'good' states and decreases consumption by a fixed (and possibly different) amount in (relatively) 'bad' states. This definition naturally gives rise to a dual definition of comparative aversion to uncertainty. We characterize this definition for a popular class of generalized models of choice under uncertainty.

Uncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permits

Auctions have become popular as means of allocating emissions permits in the emissions trading schemes developed around the world. Mostly, only a subset of the regulated polluters participate in these auctions along with speculators, creating a market with relatively few participants and, thus, incentive for strategic bidding. I characterize the bidding behavior of the polluters and the speculators, examining the effect of the latter on the profits of the former and on the auction outcome. It turns out that in addition to bidding for compliance, polluters also bid for speculation in the aftermarket. While the presence of the speculators forces the polluters to bid closer to their true valuations, it also creates a trade-off between increasing the revenue accrued to the regulator and reducing the profits of the auction-participating polluters. Nevertheless, the profits of the latter increase in the speculators' risk aversion.

Risk management for mathematical optimization under uncertainty

We present a general multistage stochastic mixed 0-1 problem where the uncertainty appears everywhere in the objective function, constraints matrix and right-hand-side. The uncertainty is represented by a scenario tree that can be a symmetric or a nonsymmetric one. The stochastic model is converted in a mixed 0-1 Deterministic Equivalent Model in compact representation. Due to the difficulty of the problem, the solution offered by the stochastic model has been traditionally obtained by optimizing the objective function expected value (i.e., mean) over the scenarios, usually, along a time horizon. This approach (so named risk neutral) has the inconvenience of providing a solution that ignores the variance of the objective value of the scenarios and, so, the occurrence of scenarios with an objective value below the expected one. Alternatively, we present several approaches for risk averse management, namely, a scenario immunization strategy, the optimization of the well known Value-at-Risk (VaR) and several variants of the Conditional Value-at-Risk strategies, the optimization of the expected mean minus the weighted probability of having a "bad" scenario to occur for the given solution provided by the model, the optimization of the objective function expected value subject to stochastic dominance constraints (SDC) for a set of profiles given by the pairs of threshold objective values and either bounds on the probability of not reaching the thresholds or the expected shortfall over them, and the optimization of a mixture of the VaR and SDC strategies.

Improving sample representativeness in environmental studies: a major component for the uncertainty budget

For environmental quality assessment, INAA has been applied for determining chemical elements in small (200 mg) and large (200 g) samples of leaves from 200 trees. By applying the Ingamells` constant, the expected percent standard deviation was estimated in 0.9-2.2% for 200 mg samples. Otherwise, for composite samples (200 g), expected standard deviation varied from 0.5 to 10% in spite of analytical uncertainties ranging from 2 to 30%. Results thereby suggested the expression of the degree of representativeness as a source of uncertainty, contributing for increasing of the reliability of environmental studies mainly in the case of composite samples.

Multicriteria analysis in decision making under information uncertainty

This paper presents results of research related to multicriteria decision making under information uncertainty. The Bell-man-Zadeh approach to decision making in a fuzzy environment is utilized for analyzing multicriteria optimization models (< X, M > models) under deterministic information. Its application conforms to the principle of guaranteed result and provides constructive lines in obtaining harmonious solutions on the basis of analyzing associated maxmin problems. This circumstance permits one to generalize the classic approach to considering the uncertainty of quantitative information (based on constructing and analyzing payoff matrices reflecting effects which can be obtained for different combinations of solution alternatives and the so-called states of nature) in monocriteria decision making to multicriteria problems. Considering that the uncertainty of information can produce considerable decision uncertainty regions, the resolving capacity of this generalization does not always permit one to obtain unique solutions. Taking this into account, a proposed general scheme of multicriteria decision making under information uncertainty also includes the construction and analysis of the so-called < X, R > models (which contain fuzzy preference relations as criteria of optimality) as a means for the subsequent contraction of the decision uncertainty regions. The paper results are of a universal character and are illustrated by a simple example. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Optimal irrigation depth for bean crops considering water constraints and farmer`s risk aversion level

Nowadays, the rising competition for the use of water and environmental resources with consequent restrictions for farmers should change the paradigm in terms of irrigation concepts, or rather, in order to attain economical efficiency other than to supply water requirement for the crop. Therefore, taking into account the social and economical role of bean activity in Brazil, as well as the risk inherent to crop due to its high sensibility to both deficit and excessive water, the optimization methods regarding to irrigation management have become more interesting and essential. This study intends to present a way to determine the optimal water supply, considering different combinations between desired bean yield and level of risk, bringing as a result a graph with the former associated with the latter, depending on different water depths.

Risk premiums and benefit measures for generalized-expected-utility theories

Standard tools for the analysis of economic problems involving uncertainty, including risk premiums, certainty equivalents and the notions of absolute and relative risk aversion, are developed without making specific assumptions on functional form beyond the basic requirements of monotonicity, transitivity, continuity, and the presumption that individuals prefer certainty to risk. Individuals are not required to display probabilistic sophistication. The approach relies on the distance and benefit functions to characterize preferences relative to a given state-contingent vector of outcomes. The distance and benefit functions are used to derive absolute and relative risk premiums and to characterize preferences exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). A generalization of the notion of Schur-concavity is presented. If preferences are generalized Schur concave, the absolute and relative risk premiums are generalized Schur convex, and the certainty equivalents are generalized Schur concave.

Response to price and production risk: The case of Australian wheat

A model of Australian wheat grower supply response was specified under the constraints of price and yield uncertainty, risk aversion, partial adjustment, and quadratic costs. The model was solved to obtain area planted. The results of estimation indicate that risk arising from prices and climate have had a significant influence on producer decision making. The coefficient of relative risk aversion and short-run and long-run elasticities of supply with respect to price were calculated. Wheat growers' risk premium, expected at the start of the season for exposed price and yield risk, was 2.8 percent of revenue or 10.4 percent of profit as measured by producer surplus. (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.