Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

The customer valuations game as a basis for revenue management

I describe the customer valuations game, a simple intuitive game that can serve as a foundation for teaching revenue management. The game requires little or no preparation, props or software, takes around two hours (and hence can be finished in one session), and illustrates the formation of classical (airline and hotel) revenue management mechanisms such as advanced purchase discounts, booking limits and fixed multiple prices. I normally use the game as a base to introduce RM and to develop RM forecasting and optimization concepts off it. The game is particularly suited for non-technical audiences.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.

A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where alI exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples of the EPA auction game under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. When the uniform price equilibrium holds, sellers shade their bids up and buyers shade their bids down. In the example where the uniform price equilibrium does not hold, both buyers and sellers shade their bids down in an equilibrium.

Hybrid heuristic-waterfilling game theory approach in MC-CDMA resource allocation

This paper discusses the power allocation with fixed rate constraint problem in multi-carrier code division multiple access (MC-CDMA) networks, that has been solved through game theoretic perspective by the use of an iterative water-filling algorithm (IWFA). The problem is analyzed under various interference density configurations, and its reliability is studied in terms of solution existence and uniqueness. Moreover, numerical results reveal the approach shortcoming, thus a new method combining swarm intelligence and IWFA is proposed to make practicable the use of game theoretic approaches in realistic MC-CDMA systems scenarios. The contribution of this paper is twofold: (i) provide a complete analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the game solution, from simple to more realist and complex interference scenarios; (ii) propose a hybrid power allocation optimization method combining swarm intelligence, game theory and IWFA. To corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed method, an outage probability analysis in realistic interference scenarios, and a complexity comparison with the classical IWFA are presented. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Food Fury: Online Casual Game Development for Nutrition Education

Introduction: The United States is currently experiencing increased prevalence of obesity. This is a particular problem amongst children who require dietary and activity behavioral change to mitigate this problem. The use of computer games as channels to motivate health behavior in children is increasing. Casual games are a subset of computer games that are simple in design, easy to access and play, popular with children, and have the potential to be effective for drill and practice learning. [See PDF for complete abstract]

Combining influence maps and cellular automata for reactive game agents

Agents make up an important part of game worlds, ranging from the characters and monsters that live in the world to the armies that the player controls. Despite their importance, agents in current games rarely display an awareness of their environment or react appropriately, which severely detracts from the believability of the game. Some games have included agents with a basic awareness of other agents, but they are still unaware of important game events or environmental conditions. This paper presents an agent design we have developed, which combines cellular automata for environmental modeling with influence maps for agent decision-making. The agents were implemented into a 3D game environment we have developed, the EmerGEnT system, and tuned through three experiments. The result is simple, flexible game agents that are able to respond to natural phenomena (e.g. rain or fire), while pursuing a goal.

An investigation of two real time machine learning techniques that could enhance the adaptability of game AI agents

Developers strive to create innovative Artificial Intelligence (AI) behaviour in their games as a key selling point. Machine Learning is an area of AI that looks at how applications and agents can be programmed to learn their own behaviour without the need to manually design and implement each aspect of it. Machine learning methods have been utilised infrequently within games and are usually trained to learn offline before the game is released to the players. In order to investigate new ways AI could be applied innovatively to games it is wise to explore how machine learning methods could be utilised in real-time as the game is played, so as to allow AI agents to learn directly from the player or their environment. Two machine learning methods were implemented into a simple 2D Fighter test game to allow the agents to fully showcase their learned behaviour as the game is played. The methods chosen were: Q-Learning and an NGram based system. It was found that N-Grams and QLearning could significantly benefit game developers as they facilitate fast, realistic learning at run-time.

Clustering Of Water Bodies In Unpolluted And Polluted Environments Based On Escherichia Coli Phylogroup Abundance Using A Simple Interaction Database.

Different types of water bodies, including lakes, streams, and coastal marine waters, are often susceptible to fecal contamination from a range of point and nonpoint sources, and have been evaluated using fecal indicator microorganisms. The most commonly used fecal indicator is Escherichia coli, but traditional cultivation methods do not allow discrimination of the source of pollution. The use of triplex PCR offers an approach that is fast and inexpensive, and here enabled the identification of phylogroups. The phylogenetic distribution of E. coli subgroups isolated from water samples revealed higher frequencies of subgroups A1 and B23 in rivers impacted by human pollution sources, while subgroups D1 and D2 were associated with pristine sites, and subgroup B1 with domesticated animal sources, suggesting their use as a first screening for pollution source identification. A simple classification is also proposed based on phylogenetic subgroup distribution using the w-clique metric, enabling differentiation of polluted and unpolluted sites.

A Rapid And Simple Capillary Electrophoresis Method For Indirect Determination Of The Biocide 2,2-dibromo-3-nitrilo-propionamide (dbnpa) In Cooling Waters.

A capillary zone electrophoresis (CE) method was developed for the determination of the biocide 2,2-dibromo-3-nitrilo-propionamide (DBNPA) in water used in cooling systems. The biocide is indirectly determined by CE measurement of the concentration of bromide ions produced by the reaction between the DBNPA and bisulfite. The relationship between the bromide peak areas and the DBNPA concentrations showed a good linearity and a coefficient of determination (R(2)) of 0.9997 in the evaluated concentration range of 0-75 μmol L(-1). The detection and quantification limits for DBNPA were 0.23 and 0.75 μmol L(-1), respectively. The proposed CE method was successfully applied for the analysis of samples of tap water and cooling water spiked with DBNPA. The intra-day and inter-day (intermediary) precisions were lower than 2.8 and 6.2%, respectively. The DBNPA concentrations measured by the CE method were compared to the values obtained by a spectrophotometric method and were found to agree well.

As relações de gênero em uma escola de futebol : quando o jogo é possível? = Genders relations at a football school : when the game happen?

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Desenvolvimento de ferramentas de análise de desempenho de atletas em 3 diferentes modalidades : Handebol, Provas Combinadas e Salto com Vara

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Pedagogia do esporte : pressupostos para uma teoria da avaliação da aprendizagem = Sport pedagogy: presuppositions for a learning assessment theory

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Seleções olimpicas de basquetebol feminino do Brasil (2000 e 2004) : correlação entre variaveis tecnicas e fisicas

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física