Usability and security of gaze-based graphical grid passwords

We present and analyze several gaze-based graphical password schemes based on recall and cued-recall of grid points; eye-trackers are used to record user's gazes, which can prevent shoulder-surfing and may be suitable for users with disabilities. Our 22-subject study observes that success rate and entry time for the grid-based schemes we consider are comparable to other gaze-based graphical password schemes. We propose the first password security metrics suitable for analysis of graphical grid passwords and provide an in-depth security analysis of user-generated passwords from our study, observing that, on several metrics, user-generated graphical grid passwords are substantially weaker than uniformly random passwords, despite our attempts at designing schemes to improve quality of user-generated passwords.

On the security of TLS renegotiation

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the most widely used security protocol on the Internet. It supports negotiation of a wide variety of cryptographic primitives through different cipher suites, various modes of client authentication, and additional features such as renegotiation. Despite its widespread use, only recently has the full TLS protocol been proven secure, and only the core cryptographic protocol with no additional features. These additional features have been the cause of several practical attacks on TLS. In 2009, Ray and Dispensa demonstrated how TLS renegotiation allows an attacker to splice together its own session with that of a victim, resulting in a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS-reliant applications such as HTTP. TLS was subsequently patched with two defence mechanisms for protection against this attack. We present the first formal treatment of renegotiation in secure channel establishment protocols. We add optional renegotiation to the authenticated and confidential channel establishment model of Jager et al., an adaptation of the Bellare--Rogaway authenticated key exchange model. We describe the attack of Ray and Dispensa on TLS within our model. We show generically that the proposed fixes for TLS offer good protection against renegotiation attacks, and give a simple new countermeasure that provides renegotiation security for TLS even in the face of stronger adversaries.

Cyber security of networked critical infrastructures [Guest Editorial]

A new era of cyber warfare has appeared on the horizon with the discovery and detection of Stuxnet. Allegedly planned, designed, and created by the United States and Israel, Stuxnet is considered the first known cyber weapon to attack an adversary state. Stuxnet's discovery put a lot of attention on the outdated and obsolete security of critical infrastructure. It became very apparent that electronic devices that are used to control and operate critical infrastructure like programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems lack very basic security and protection measures. Part of that is due to the fact that when these devices were designed, the idea of exposing them to the Internet was not in mind. However, now with this exposure, these devices and systems are considered easy prey to adversaries.

Does counting still count? Revisiting the security of counting based user authentication protocols against statistical attacks

At NDSS 2012, Yan et al. analyzed the security of several challenge-response type user authentication protocols against passive observers, and proposed a generic counting based statistical attack to recover the secret of some counting based protocols given a number of observed authentication sessions. Roughly speaking, the attack is based on the fact that secret (pass) objects appear in challenges with a different probability from non-secret (decoy) objects when the responses are taken into account. Although they mentioned that a protocol susceptible to this attack should minimize this difference, they did not give details as to how this can be achieved barring a few suggestions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by generalizing the attack with a much more comprehensive theoretical analysis. Our treatment is more quantitative which enables us to describe a method to theoretically estimate a lower bound on the number of sessions a protocol can be safely used against the attack. Our results include 1) two proposed fixes to make counting protocols practically safe against the attack at the cost of usability, 2) the observation that the attack can be used on non-counting based protocols too as long as challenge generation is contrived, 3) and two main design principles for user authentication protocols which can be considered as extensions of the principles from Yan et al. This detailed theoretical treatment can be used as a guideline during the design of counting based protocols to determine their susceptibility to this attack. The Foxtail protocol, one of the protocols analyzed by Yan et al., is used as a representative to illustrate our theoretical and experimental results.

On the (in)security of IDEA in various hashing modes

In this article, we study the security of the IDEA block cipher when it is used in various simple-length or double-length hashing modes. Even though this cipher is still considered as secure, we show that one should avoid its use as internal primitive for block cipher based hashing. In particular, we are able to generate instantaneously free-start collisions for most modes, and even semi-free-start collisions, pseudo-preimages or hash collisions in practical complexity. This work shows a practical example of the gap that exists between secret-key and known or chosen-key security for block ciphers. Moreover, we also settle the 20-year-old standing open question concerning the security of the Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM double-length compression functions, originally invented to be instantiated with IDEA. Our attacks have been verified experimentally and work even for strengthened versions of IDEA with any number of rounds.

On the security of PAS (predicate-based authentication service)

Recently a new human authentication scheme called PAS (predicate-based authentication service) was proposed, which does not require the assistance of any supplementary device. The main security claim of PAS is to resist passive adversaries who can observe the whole authentication session between the human user and the remote server. In this paper we show that PAS is insecure against both brute force attack and a probabilistic attack. In particular, we show that its security against brute force attack was strongly overestimated. Furthermore, we introduce a probabilistic attack, which can break part of the password even with a very small number of observed authentication sessions. Although the proposed attack cannot completely break the password, it can downgrade the PAS system to a much weaker system similar to common OTP (one-time password) systems.

On the provable security of an efficient RSA-based pseudorandom generator

Pseudorandom Generators (PRGs) based on the RSA inversion (one-wayness) problem have been extensively studied in the literature over the last 25 years. These generators have the attractive feature of provable pseudorandomness security assuming the hardness of the RSA inversion problem. However, despite extensive study, the most efficient provably secure RSA-based generators output asymptotically only at most O(logn) bits per multiply modulo an RSA modulus of bitlength n, and hence are too slow to be used in many practical applications. To bring theory closer to practice, we present a simple modification to the proof of security by Fischlin and Schnorr of an RSA-based PRG, which shows that one can obtain an RSA-based PRG which outputs Ω(n) bits per multiply and has provable pseudorandomness security assuming the hardness of a well-studied variant of the RSA inversion problem, where a constant fraction of the plaintext bits are given. Our result gives a positive answer to an open question posed by Gennaro (J. of Cryptology, 2005) regarding finding a PRG beating the rate O(logn) bits per multiply at the cost of a reasonable assumption on RSA inversion.

Electronic conveyancing in Australia: Is anyone concerned about security?

Three proof requirements as essential for a sustainable land registration system. These were proof of identity, proof of ownership, and authority to deal. Our attention in this paper is drawn to the latter two requirements and will ask whether the introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to proof of ownership and authority to deal. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is sustainable for another 160 years.

Electronic conveyancing in Australia : is anyone concerned about security?

We have previously suggested that three proof requirements are essential for a sustainable land registration system. These were proof of identity, proof of ownership and authority to deal. Our attention in this article is drawn to the security framework that surrounds these requirements. We will ask whether the introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to them. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is sustainable for another 160 years. We also canvass some more incremental suggestions that evolve out of what we currently do, as well as outlining some comparative externally sourced ideas as to how the transfer and ownership of land can be made safer for all citizens. Such a goal is imperative when land transfer and secure property ownership is a critical component of the economic infrastructure of a modern society.

Multi-ciphersuite security of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol

The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol is widely used to provide secure remote access to servers, making it among the most important security protocols on the Internet. We show that the signed-Diffie--Hellman SSH ciphersuites of the SSH protocol are secure: each is a secure authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol, the same security definition now used to describe the security of Transport Layer Security (TLS) ciphersuites. While the ACCE definition suffices to describe the security of individual ciphersuites, it does not cover the case where parties use the same long-term key with many different ciphersuites: it is common in practice for the server to use the same signing key with both finite field and elliptic curve Diffie--Hellman, for example. While TLS is vulnerable to attack in this case, we show that SSH is secure even when the same signing key is used across multiple ciphersuites. We introduce a new generic multi-ciphersuite composition framework to achieve this result in a black-box way.

On the Security of Two RFID Mutual Authentication Protocols

In this paper, the security of two recent RFID mutual authentication protocols are investigated. The first protocol is a scheme proposed by Huang et al. [7] and the second one by Huang, Lin and Li [6]. We show that these two protocols have several weaknesses. In Huang et al.’s scheme, an adversary can determine the 32-bit secret password with a probability of 2−2 , and in Huang-Lin-Li scheme, a passive adversary can recognize a target tag with a success probability of 1−2−4 and an active adversary can determine all 32 bits of Access password with success probability of 2−4 . The computational complexity of these attacks is negligible.

On Randomizing Hash Functions to Strengthen the Security of Digital Signatures

Halevi and Krawczyk proposed a message randomization algorithm called RMX as a front-end tool to the hash-then-sign digital signature schemes such as DSS and RSA in order to free their reliance on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. They have shown that to forge a RMX-hash-then-sign signature scheme, one has to solve a cryptanalytical task which is related to finding second preimages for the hash function. In this article, we will show how to use Dean’s method of finding expandable messages for finding a second preimage in the Merkle-Damgård hash function to existentially forge a signature scheme based on a t-bit RMX-hash function which uses the Davies-Meyer compression functions (e.g., MD4, MD5, SHA family) in 2 t/2 chosen messages plus 2 t/2 + 1 off-line operations of the compression function and similar amount of memory. This forgery attack also works on the signature schemes that use Davies-Meyer schemes and a variant of RMX published by NIST in its Draft Special Publication (SP) 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attack.

The effect of artisanal preservation methods on nutritional security of “Mukene” Rastrineobola argentea caught from Lakes Victoria and Kyoga in Uganda

The artisanal fish preservation methods in Uganda are characterized by extreme operating conditions. Consequently, vital nutritional components diminish in value and quantity which renders fish consumer nutritionally insecure. To establish the magnitude of nutritional loss, duplicate samples of Mukene Rastrineobola argentea were collected from Kiyindi landing site on L. Victoria and Moone landing site on L. Kyoga. Each set of duplicate samples was divided into five portions and kept on ice. For each preservation method a portion was processed into respective products at Food Bioscience and Agri-Business Laboratories aside from the control (fresh) sample. Both preserved and control samples were analysed for nutrient loss at Department of Chemistry, Makerere University using AOAC methods. The composition of fatty acids was determined by methanolysis gas chromatography and Mass spectrophotometry of the resultant methyl esters. The results indicate that nutrients of all preserved samples did not vary significantly from the control except for some fatty acids. The Eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) in fresh samples declined from 6.72% to 1.08% in deep-fried samples constituting 83.93% nutrient loss. The sum ratio w3:w6 as well as EPA: DHA (Docosahexaenoic) ratio in fried samples also varied significantly (p<0.5) lower than 0.668 and 0.20 for the average of either preservation methods and experts recommended ratio respectively. Further research has been recommended to ascertain the causative factor, since Mukene frying is being promoted in the Great lakes region as alternative method to sun-drying. In conclusion, regular consumers of fried Mukene do not benefit much from the nutritional and health attributes of Omega 3 and 6.

Improving the safety and security of the pharmaceutical supply chain

This paper discusses various techniques that may be used to combat counterfeiting in the pharmaceutical supply chain. These include the use of electronic pedigrees (to ensure the integrity of the supply chain), together with mass-serialization (to provide for a unique lifecycle history of each individual package) and authentication of the product (to check for any discrepancies in the various attributes of the product and its packaging are as intended for that individual package). Management of the pedigree process and product authentication is discussed in some detail, together with various other learnings from the Drug Security Network, including identification of some remaining vulnerabilities and suggestions for tightening these loopholes. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.