On the security of PAS (predicate-based authentication service)
Data(s) |
2009
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Resumo |
Recently a new human authentication scheme called PAS (predicate-based authentication service) was proposed, which does not require the assistance of any supplementary device. The main security claim of PAS is to resist passive adversaries who can observe the whole authentication session between the human user and the remote server. In this paper we show that PAS is insecure against both brute force attack and a probabilistic attack. In particular, we show that its security against brute force attack was strongly overestimated. Furthermore, we introduce a probabilistic attack, which can break part of the password even with a very small number of observed authentication sessions. Although the proposed attack cannot completely break the password, it can downgrade the PAS system to a much weaker system similar to common OTP (one-time password) systems. |
Identificador | |
Publicador |
IEEE |
Relação |
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5380509 DOI:10.1109/ACSAC.2009.27 Li, Shujun, Asghar, Hassan Jameel, Pieprzyk, Josef, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Schmitz, Roland, & Wang, Huaxiong (2009) On the security of PAS (predicate-based authentication service). In Proceedings of 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '09), IEEE, Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 209-218. http://purl.org/au-research/grants/ARC/DP0987734 NATIONAL RESEARCH FO/NRF-CRP2-2007-03 SINGAPORE MINISTRY O/T206B2204 UNIVERSITY OF KONSTA/Fellowship MQRES/International PhD Scholarship CACE/EU funding |
Direitos |
Copyright 2009 IEEE |
Fonte |
School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science; Science & Engineering Faculty |
Palavras-Chave | #PAS #Authentication #Matsumoto-Imai threat model #Attack #Security #Usability #OTP (one-time password) |
Tipo |
Conference Paper |