Oversight hearings on the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin and mint operations : hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, sixty-sixth Congress, first session, September 25 and 26, 1979.

"Serial 96-30."

Patterns of currency transactions and their relationship to narcotics traffic : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session on H.R. 5961 ... November 29, 1979.

"Serial no. 96-47."

Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1956; report to accompany H.R. 11947, a bill to extend and amend the Renegotiation Act of 1951.

Mode of access: Internet.

Establishment of a National Development Bank and related matters : hearings before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, on H.R. 638 ... March 9 and 10; April 13, 14, and 28; and June 22, 1983.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Oversight hearing on the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, November 18, 1981.

Mode of access: Internet.

To investigate the enforcement and effectiveness of the Bank Secrecy Act [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, July 13, 1982.

"Serial no. 97-70."

Establishment of a national development bank and related matters : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, on H.R. 14 ... September 15 and 28, 1982.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies thus increases, but the alliance endures. I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s demonstrates successful use of a strategy of delay that appeases a dissatisfied member.

Sistema de apoio à decisão para a classificação de risco em projectos de tecnologias de informação

O trabalho que a seguir se apresenta tem como objectivo descrever a criação de um modelo que sirva de suporte a um sistema de apoio à decisão sobre o risco inerente à execução de projectos na área das Tecnologias de Informação (TI) recorrendo a técnicas de mineração de dados. Durante o ciclo de vida de um projecto, existem inúmeros factores que contribuem para o seu sucesso ou insucesso. A responsabilidade de monitorizar, antever e mitigar esses factores recai sobre o Gestor de Projecto. A gestão de projectos é uma tarefa difícil e dispendiosa, consome muitos recursos, depende de numerosas variáveis e, muitas vezes, até da própria experiência do Gestor de Projecto. Ao ser confrontado com as previsões de duração e de esforço para a execução de uma determinada tarefa, o Gestor de Projecto, exceptuando a sua percepção e intuição pessoal, não tem um modo objectivo de medir a plausibilidade dos valores que lhe são apresentados pelo eventual executor da tarefa. As referidas previsões são fundamentais para a organização, pois sobre elas são tomadas as decisões de planeamento global estratégico corporativo, de execução, de adiamento, de cancelamento, de adjudicação, de renegociação de âmbito, de adjudicação externa, entre outros. Esta propensão para o desvio, quando detectada numa fase inicial, pode ajudar a gerir melhor o risco associado à Gestão de Projectos. O sucesso de cada projecto terminado foi qualificado tendo em conta a ponderação de três factores: o desvio ao orçamentado, o desvio ao planeado e o desvio ao especificado. Analisando os projectos decorridos, e correlacionando alguns dos seus atributos com o seu grau de sucesso o modelo classifica, qualitativamente, um novo projecto quanto ao seu risco. Neste contexto o risco representa o grau de afastamento do projecto ao sucesso. Recorrendo a algoritmos de mineração de dados, tais como, árvores de classificação e redes neuronais, descreve-se o desenvolvimento de um modelo que suporta um sistema de apoio à decisão baseado na classificação de novos projectos. Os modelos são o resultado de um extensivo conjunto de testes de validação onde se procuram e refinam os indicadores que melhor caracterizam os atributos de um projecto e que mais influenciam o risco. Como suporte tecnológico para o desenvolvimento e teste foi utilizada a ferramenta Weka 3. Uma boa utilização do modelo proposto possibilitará a criação de planos de contingência mais detalhados e uma gestão mais próxima para projectos que apresentem uma maior propensão para o risco. Assim, o resultado final pretende constituir mais uma ferramenta à disposição do Gestor de Projecto.

A Insolvência de Ambos os Cônjuges

Dissertação de Mestrado em Solicitaria

Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Inequality and a repeated joint project

Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.