Hybrid cluster state proposal for a quantum game

We propose an experimental implementation of a quantum game algorithm in a hybrid scheme combining the quantum circuit approach and the cluster state model. An economical cluster configuration is suggested to embody a quantum version of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Our proposal is shown to be within the experimental state of the art and can be realized with existing technology. The effects of relevant experimental imperfections are also carefully examined.

Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity

In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.

Formal theory building for the avalanche game: explaining counter-intuitive behaviour of a complex system using geometrical and human behavioural/physiological effects

In 'Avalanche', an object is lowered, players staying in contact throughout. Normally the task is easily accomplished. However, with larger groups counter-intuitive behaviours appear. The paper proposes a formal theory for the underlying causal mechanisms. The aim is to not only provide an explicit, testable hypothesis for the source of the observed modes of behaviour-but also to exemplify the contribution that formal theory building can make to understanding complex social phenomena. Mapping reveals the importance of geometry to the Avalanche game; each player has a pair of balancing loops, one involved in lowering the object, the other ensuring contact. For more players, sets of balancing loops interact and these can allow dominance by reinforcing loops, causing the system to chase upwards towards an ever-increasing goal. However, a series of other effects concerning human physiology and behaviour (HPB) is posited as playing a role. The hypothesis is therefore rigorously tested using simulation. For simplicity a 'One Degree of Freedom' case is examined, allowing all of the effects to be included whilst rendering the analysis more transparent. Formulation and experimentation with the model gives insight into the behaviours. Multi-dimensional rate/level analysis indicates that there is only a narrow region in which the system is able to move downwards. Model runs reproduce the single 'desired' mode of behaviour and all three of the observed 'problematic' ones. Sensitivity analysis gives further insight into the system's modes and their causes. Behaviour is seen to arise only when the geometric effects apply (number of players greater than degrees of freedom of object) in combination with a range of HPB effects. An analogy exists between the co-operative behaviour required here and various examples: conflicting strategic objectives in organizations; Prisoners' Dilemma and integrated bargaining situations. Additionally, the game may be relatable in more direct algebraic terms to situations involving companies in which the resulting behaviours are mediated by market regulations. Finally, comment is offered on the inadequacy of some forms of theory building and the case is made for formal theory building involving the use of models, analysis and plausible explanations to create deep understanding of social phenomena.

An experiment on subjective game valuations

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

How to avoid Copenhagen : An experimental economic approach to climate negotiations

This study got its origin in the failed climate negotiations in the Copenhagen 2009 summit. By conducting a public good game, with participants from China and Sweden, my study indicates that previous studies on public good games can predict the outcome of the game to a quit large extent even though most of my statistical tests came out statistically insignificant. My study also indicates that by framing the game as climate negotiations there were no statistical significant difference on the level of contributions in comparison to the unframed versions of the game. The awareness of the issues with emissions, global warming and other environmental problems are pretty high but even so when push comes to shove gains in the short run are prioritized to gains in the long run. There are however hypothetical willingness to come to term with the environmental issues. The results of the study indicate that the outcome of the Copenhagen summit can be avoidable but would need additional experiments made on cultural differences and behavior.

Game theory applications in natural resource management : review of evidence, problems and potential

Game theory is a rapidly advancing approach to structure and understand complex management problems in the natural resources sector in both the developed and developing countries. Many natural resource problems are complex due to common property and public goods characteristics. Despite these limitations many researchers have used game theory to analyze water shed management, irrigation water management, grazing land management, and managing other ecological resources. The prisoner’s dilemma game has been widely used. The work of Runge shows that collective action is feasible if a critical mass of people can cooperate. The use of game theory is hindered by lack of information, paucity of empirical applications and the lack of interest by policy makers who wish quick answers to critical policy issues. The potential still remains high for game theory to be productively used both in developing and developed countries.

AFRODITE: ambiente de simulação baseado em agentes com emoções

Este trabalho está relacionado às áreas de Sistemas Multiagentes, Simulação Computacional e Emoções. A partir do estudo destas áreas de pesquisa, foi proposto e desenvolvido um protótipo para um ambiente de simulação baseado em agentes com emoções. Os sistemas multiagentes têm sido utilizados nas mais diversas áreas de pesquisa, não apenas para a área acadêmica, mas também para fins comerciais. Isso ocorre devido a características importantes que estes possuem, como flexibilidade e cooperação. Estas características são úteis para um grande número de aplicações, como para simulação de situações reais, pois os modelos de simulação desenvolvidos utilizando a tecnologia de agentes são muito eficazes e versáteis no estudo dos mais diferentes problemas. Emoções vêm sendo estudadas há algum tempo, pois elas influenciam a tomada de decisão de todas as suas atividades. A tentativa de expressar emoções é algo complexo, dependendo de diversos fatores, tanto sociais como fisiológicos. Objetivando a abrangência das pesquisas na área de sistemas multiagentes, este trabalho propõe o desenvolvimento de um protótipo para um ambiente de simulação baseado em agentes com emoções, utilizando como base para a estruturação das emoções o modelo OCC. Este novo ambiente é chamado AFRODITE. De forma a melhor definir como o AFRODITE seria implementado, foram estudados quatro ambientes de simulação baseados em agentes existentes - SIEME, SWARM, SeSAm e SIMULA, e alguns aspectos destes foram utilizados na construção do novo ambiente. Para demonstrar como o AFRODITE é utilizado, três exemplos de aplicações de áreas de conhecimentos diferentes foram modelados: o IPD (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma), da área de Teoria dos Jogos; Simulação de Multidões, da área de Engenharia de Segurança; e Venda de aparelhos celulares com serviço WAP, da área de Telecomunicações. Através dos três exemplos modelados foi possível demonstrar que o ambiente proposto é de fácil utilização e que a tarefa de inserção de emoções nas regras de comportamento pode ser realizada pelo usuário de forma transparente.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Interface gráfica no contexto de teoria dos jogos sob a forma de Java Apples

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Does group size matter? Cheating and cooperation in Brazilian school children

Cooperation between individuals is an important requisite for the maintenance of social relationships. The purpose of this study was to investigate cooperation in children in the school environment, where individuals could cooperate or not with their classmates in a public goods game. We investigated which of the following variables influenced cooperation in children: sex, group size, and information on the number of sessions. Group size was the only factor to significantly affect cooperation, with small-group children cooperating significantly more than those in large groups. Both sex and information had no effect on cooperation. We suggest that these results reflect the fact that, in small groups, individuals were more efficient in controlling and retaliating theirs peers than in large groups. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Complex Transition to Cooperative Behavior in a Structured Population Model

Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.

Evolutionary methods for self-organizing cooperation in peer-to-peer networks

The Peer-to-Peer network paradigm is drawing the attention of both final users and researchers for its features. P2P networks shift from the classic client-server approach to a high level of decentralization where there is no central control and all the nodes should be able not only to require services, but to provide them to other peers as well. While on one hand such high level of decentralization might lead to interesting properties like scalability and fault tolerance, on the other hand it implies many new problems to deal with. A key feature of many P2P systems is openness, meaning that everybody is potentially able to join a network with no need for subscription or payment systems. The combination of openness and lack of central control makes it feasible for a user to free-ride, that is to increase its own benefit by using services without allocating resources to satisfy other peers’ requests. One of the main goals when designing a P2P system is therefore to achieve cooperation between users. Given the nature of P2P systems based on simple local interactions of many peers having partial knowledge of the whole system, an interesting way to achieve desired properties on a system scale might consist in obtaining them as emergent properties of the many interactions occurring at local node level. Two methods are typically used to face the problem of cooperation in P2P networks: 1) engineering emergent properties when designing the protocol; 2) study the system as a game and apply Game Theory techniques, especially to find Nash Equilibria in the game and to reach them making the system stable against possible deviant behaviors. In this work we present an evolutionary framework to enforce cooperative behaviour in P2P networks that is alternative to both the methods mentioned above. Our approach is based on an evolutionary algorithm inspired by computational sociology and evolutionary game theory, consisting in having each peer periodically trying to copy another peer which is performing better. The proposed algorithms, called SLAC and SLACER, draw inspiration from tag systems originated in computational sociology, the main idea behind the algorithm consists in having low performance nodes copying high performance ones. The algorithm is run locally by every node and leads to an evolution of the network both from the topology and from the nodes’ strategy point of view. Initial tests with a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma application show how SLAC is able to bring the network to a state of high cooperation independently from the initial network conditions. Interesting results are obtained when studying the effect of cheating nodes on SLAC algorithm. In fact in some cases selfish nodes rationally exploiting the system for their own benefit can actually improve system performance from the cooperation formation point of view. The final step is to apply our results to more realistic scenarios. We put our efforts in studying and improving the BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent was chosen not only for its popularity but because it has many points in common with SLAC and SLACER algorithms, ranging from the game theoretical inspiration (tit-for-tat-like mechanism) to the swarms topology. We discovered fairness, meant as ratio between uploaded and downloaded data, to be a weakness of the original BitTorrent protocol and we drew inspiration from the knowledge of cooperation formation and maintenance mechanism derived from the development and analysis of SLAC and SLACER, to improve fairness and tackle freeriding and cheating in BitTorrent. We produced an extension of BitTorrent called BitFair that has been evaluated through simulation and has shown the abilities of enforcing fairness and tackling free-riding and cheating nodes.

Cooperation and competition in the air transport market: current scenario, possible evolutions and analytical tools

dall'avvento della liberalizzazione, aeroporti e vettori hanno vissuto cambiamenti. Il maggior miglioramneto nella gestione degli aeroporti è una gestione più commerciale ed efficiente. Le forme di regolazione economica e le caratteristiche della gestione manageriale sono state indagate. Dodici paesi sono stati scelti per indagare la situazione del trasporto aereo mondiale, fra questi sia paesi con un sistema maturo sia paesi emergenti. La distribuzione del traffico è stata analizzata con l'indice HHI per evidenziare aeroporti con concentrazione maggiore di 0,25 (in accordo con la normativa statunitense); il sistema aeroportuale è stato analizzato con l'indice di Gini e con l'indice di dominanza. Infine, la teoria dei giochi si è dimostrata un valido supporto per studiare il mercato del trasporto aereo anche con l'uso di giochi di tipo DP

Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a population dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high population densities with subsequent crashes and long low density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low densities. The results indicate that ecological dynamics are important for evolutionary shifts between adaptive peaks.