First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Resale price maintenance : economic theories and empirical evidence /

Mode of access: Internet.

Business under the new price laws; a study of the economic and legal problems arising out of the Robinson-Patman Act and the various fair trade and unfair practices laws,

"Table of cases": p. [441]-447.

Trade practice and price law, federal,

Includes index.

Budget-aware role based access control

The suitability of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is being challenged in dynamic environments like healthcare. In an RBAC system, a user's legitimate access may be denied if their need has not been anticipated by the security administrator at the time of policy specification. Alternatively, even when the policy is correctly specified an authorised user may accidentally or intentionally misuse the granted permission. The heart of the challenge is the intrinsic unpredictability of users' operational needs as well as their incentives to misuse permissions. In this paper we propose a novel Budget-aware Role Based Access Control (B-RBAC) model that extends RBAC with the explicit notion of budget and cost, where users are assigned a limited budget through which they pay for the cost of permissions they need. We propose a model where the value of resources are explicitly defined and an RBAC policy is used as a reference point to discriminate the price of access permissions, as opposed to representing hard and fast rules for making access decisions. This approach has several desirable properties. It enables users to acquire unassigned permissions if they deem them necessary. However, users misuse capability is always bounded by their allocated budget and is further adjustable through the discrimination of permission prices. Finally, it provides a uniform mechanism for the detection and prevention of misuses.

Submission to House Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications inquiry into IT Pricing

The strategies of price discrimination engaged in by a number of international publishers, coupled with a lack of competition and restrictions on the ability of consumers to engage in arbitrage, is likely to undermine the legitimacy of copyright law in Australia. By increasing prices beyond a reasonable and fair level, these strategies also undermine the goal of copyright law to enhance access to cultural goods. Enhancing access – and therefore lowering prices – is crucial to enhancing Australia's innovative capacity and the ability of Australians to experience, learn, act, and grow through cultural works. We recommend that the committee investigates the following options: 1. Repeal parallel importation restrictions; 2. Fundamentally reconsider the operation of anti-circumvention law in the context of digital distribution models; 3. Prohibit and render unenforceable contractual restrictions on parallel importation; 4. Introduce a right of digital resale in Australia.

The only way to fix copyright is to make it fair

Everyone knows there’s a problem with copyright. Artists get paid very little for their work, and legitimate consumers aren’t getting a very fair deal either. Unfortunately, nobody agrees about how we should fix it. Speaking at the Australian Digital Alliance forum last Friday, the Attorney-General and Arts Minister George Brandis said we might have to ask Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to police copyright, in order to deal with “piracy”. In 2012, the High Court in the iiNet case thought it wasn’t a good idea to make ISPs responsible for protecting the rights of third parties...

The game of clones and the Australia tax : divergent views about copyright business models and the willingness of Australian consumers to infringe

It is often said that Australia is a world leader in rates of copyright infringement for entertainment goods. In 2012, the hit television show, Game of Thrones, was the most downloaded television show over bitorrent, and estimates suggest that Australians accounted for a plurality of nearly 10% of the 3-4 million downloads each week. The season finale of 2013 was downloaded over a million times within 24 hours of its release, and again Australians were the largest block of illicit downloaders over BitTorrent, despite our relatively small population. This trend has led the former US Ambassador to Australia to implore Australians to stop 'stealing' digital content, and rightsholders to push for increasing sanctions on copyright infringers. The Australian Government is looking to respond by requiring Internet Service Providers to issue warnings and potentially punish consumers who are alleged by industry groups to have infringed copyright. This is the logical next step in deterring infringement, given that the operators of infringing networks (like The Pirate Bay, for example) are out of regulatory reach. This steady ratcheting up of the strength of copyright, however, comes at a significant cost to user privacy and autonomy, and while the decentralisation of enforcement reduces costs, it also reduces the due process safeguards provided by the judicial process. This article presents qualitative evidence that substantiates a common intuition: one of the major reasons that Australians seek out illicit downloads of content like Game of Thrones in such numbers is that it is more difficult to access legitimately in Australia. The geographically segmented way in which copyright is exploited at an international level has given rise to a ‘tyranny of digital distance’, where Australians have less access to copyright goods than consumers in other countries. Compared to consumers in the US and the EU, Australians pay more for digital goods, have less choice in distribution channels, are exposed to substantial delays in access, and are sometimes denied access completely. In this article we focus our analysis on premium film and television offerings, like Game of Thrones, and through semi-structured interviews, explore how choices in distribution impact on the willingness of Australian consumers to seek out infringing copies of copyright material. Game of Thrones provides an excellent case study through which to frame this analysis: it is both one of the least legally accessible television offerings and one of the most downloaded through filesharing networks of recent times. Our analysis shows that at the same time as rightsholder groups, particularly in the film and television industries, are lobbying for stronger laws to counter illicit distribution, the business practices of their member organisations are counter-productively increasing incentives for consumers to infringe. The lack of accessibility and high prices of copyright goods in Australia leads to substantial economic waste. The unmet consumer demand means that Australian consumers are harmed by lower access to information and entertainment goods than consumers in other jurisdictions. The higher rates of infringement that fulfils some of this unmet demand increases enforcement costs for copyright owners and imposes burdens either on our judicial system or on private entities – like ISPs – who may be tasked with enforcing the rights of third parties. Most worryingly, the lack of convenient and cheap legitimate digital distribution channels risks undermining public support for copyright law. Our research shows that consumers blame rightsholders for failing to meet market demand, and this encourages a social norm that infringing copyright, while illegal, is not morally wrongful. The implications are as simple as they are profound: Australia should not take steps to increase the strength of copyright law at this time. The interests of the public and those of rightsholders align better when there is effective competition in distribution channels and consumers can legitimately get access to content. While foreign rightsholders are seeking enhanced protection for their interests, increasing enforcement is likely to increase their ability to engage in lucrative geographical price-discrimination, particularly for premium content. This is only likely to increase the degree to which Australian consumers feel that their interests are not being met and, consequently, to further undermine the legitimacy of copyright law. If consumers are to respect copyright law, increasing sanctions for infringement without enhancing access and competition in legitimate distribution channels could be dangerously counter-productive. We suggest that rightsholders’ best strategy for addressing infringement in Australia at this time is to ensure that Australians can access copyright goods in a timely, affordable, convenient, and fair lawful manner.

Clash of the titans: Apple, Adobe, and Microsoft under fire at IT pricing inquiry

Today, an Australian parliamentary committee grilled the IT titans - Apple, Adobe, and Microsoft - on price discrimination against Australian consumers. The IT companies were evasive under questioning.

IT pricing: Copyright law, consumer rights, and competition policy. A submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications Inquiry into IT Pricing

For a hundred years, since Federation, Australian consumers have suffered the indignity and the tragedy of price discrimination. From the time of imperial publishing networks, Australia has been suffered from cultural colonialism. In respect of pricing of copyright works, Australian consumers have been gouged; ripped-off; and exploited. Digital technologies have not necessarily brought an end to such price discrimination. Australian consumers have been locked out by technological protection measures; subject to surveillance, privacy intrusions and security breaches; locked into walled gardens by digital rights management systems; and geo-blocked.

Essays on Platforms: Business Strategies, Regulation and Policy in Telecommunications, Media and Technology Industries

The growth of the information economy has been stellar in the last decade. General-purpose technologies such as the computer and the Internet have promoted productivity growth in a large number of industries. The effect on telecommunications, media and technology industries has been particularly strong. These industries include mobile telecommunications, printing and publishing, broadcasting, software, hardware and Internet services. There have been large structural changes, which have led to new questions on business strategies, regulation and policy. This thesis focuses on four such questions and answers them by extending the theoretical literature on platforms. The questions (with short answers) are: (i) Do we need to regulate how Internet service providers discriminate between content providers? (Yes.) (ii) What are the welfare effects of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements from advertisement-supported products?(Ambiguous, but those watching ads are worse off.) (iii) Why are some markets characterized by open platforms, extendable by third parties, and some by closed platforms, which are not extendable? (It is a trade-off between intensified competition for consumers and benefits from third parties) (iv) Do private platform providers allow third parties to access their platform when it is socially desirable? (No.)

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act

Documento de trabajo

Essais sur les logiciels libres : licences doubles, effets de réseau, et concurrence

This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be modified or duplicated by anyone. The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source firm's investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the market reduces the firm's investment in quality and increases the price of its software. Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm's incentive to invest in quality. The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling supporting product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the provision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist. Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from developers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product. This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source. The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm's lower price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users.