Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory

We propose a new approach to clustering. Our idea is to map cluster formation to coalition formation in cooperative games, and to use the Shapley value of the patterns to identify clusters and cluster representatives. We show that the underlying game is convex and this leads to an efficient biobjective clustering algorithm that we call BiGC. The algorithm yields high-quality clustering with respect to average point-to-center distance (potential) as well as average intracluster point-to-point distance (scatter). We demonstrate the superiority of BiGC over state-of-the-art clustering algorithms (including the center based and the multiobjective techniques) through a detailed experimentation using standard cluster validity criteria on several benchmark data sets. We also show that BiGC satisfies key clustering properties such as order independence, scale invariance, and richness.

Blue Marlin, Makaira nigricans, Movements in the Western North Atlantic Ocean: Results of a Cooperative Game Fish Tagging Program, 1954-88

Blue marlin, Makaira nigricans, tag and recapture data are summarized for 1954-1988. During this period, 8,447 fish have been tagged and only 30 (0.35 percent) have been returned. Results of the tagging program indicate that blue marlin not only travel considerable distances (7,OOO km from the U. S. Virgin Islands to the Ivory Coast of West Africa), but have remained at large for up to 8 years. Seasonal movements, however, are difficult to determine accurately.

Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

The binding of synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs to human transthyretin: Molecular basis of cooperative and non-cooperative ligand recognition

Transthyretin (TTR) is a tetrameric beta-sheet-rich transporter protein directly involved in human amyloid diseases. Several classes of small molecules can bind to TTR delaying its amyloid fibril formation, thus being promising drug candidates to treat TTR amyloidoses. In the present study, we characterized the interactions of the synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs and thyroid hormone nuclear receptor TR beta-selecfive agonists GC-1 and GC-24 with the wild type and V30M variant of human transthyretin (TTR). To achieve this aim, we conducted in vitro TTR acid-mediated aggregation and isothermal titration calorimetry experiments and determined the TTR:GC-1 and TTR:GC-24 crystal structures. Our data indicate that both GC-1 and GC-24 bind to TTR in a non-cooperative manner and are good inhibitors of TTR aggregation, with dissociation constants for both hormone binding sites (HBS) in the low micromolar range. Analysis of the crystal structures of TTRwt:GC-1(24) complexes and their comparison with the TTRwt X-ray structure bound to its natural ligand thyroxine (T4) suggests, at the molecular level, the basis for the cooperative process displayed by T4 and the non-cooperative process provoked by both GC-1 and GC-24 during binding to TTR. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Reactive Control for Transmission Overload Relief Based on Sensitivity Analysis and Cooperative Game Theory

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

A cooperative game theory analysis for transmission loss allocation

This paper presents an analysis and discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of the cost of losses to generators and demands in transmission systems. We construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the Core. Other solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value, the Bilateral Shapley Value and the Kernel are also explored. Our main objective is to illustrate why is not possible to find an optimal solution for allocating the cost of losses to the users of a network. Results and relevant conclusions are presented for a 4-bus system and a 14-bus system. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tracking a non-cooperative target using a Doppler radar wireless sensor network

Tracking or target localization is used in a wide range of important tasks from knowing when your flight will arrive to ensuring your mail is received on time. Tracking provides the location of resources enabling solutions to complex logistical problems. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) create new opportunities when applied to tracking, such as more flexible deployment and real-time information. When radar is used as the sensing element in a tracking WSN better results can be obtained; because radar has a comparatively larger range both in distance and angle to other sensors commonly used in WSNs. This allows for less nodes deployed covering larger areas, saving money. In this report I implement a tracking WSN platform similar to what was developed by Lim, Wang, and Terzis. This consists of several sensor nodes each with a radar, a sink node connected to a host PC, and a Matlab© program to fuse sensor data. I have re-implemented their experiment with my WSN platform for tracking a non-cooperative target to verify their results and also run simulations to compare. The results of these tests are discussed and some future improvements are proposed.

Existence Theorems for Non-Cooperative Elliptic Systems

2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 35J65, 35K60, 35B05, 35R05.

Cooperation in supply chains: A cooperative game theoretic analysis = Együttműködés ellátási láncokban: Egy kooperatív játékelméleti elemzés

A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-Karlin típusú modellben lineáris készletezési és konvex termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a fontosabb költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban. = In this paper we apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze supply chains. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the Arrow-Karlin model with linear-convex cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by transferable utility cooperative game theory tools.

Cooperation in an HMMS-type supply chain: A management application of cooperative game theory = Kooperáció egy HMMS-típusú ellátási láncban: A kooperatív játékelmélet egy menedzsment alkalmazása

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. = A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási pozíció mellett.

Intercepting maneuvering target with specified impact angle by modified SDRE technique

A guidance law derived by modifying state dependent Riccati equation technique, to enable the imposition of a predetermined terminal intercept angle to a maneuvering target, is presented in this paper. The interceptor is assumed to have no knowledge about the type of maneuver the target is executing. The problem is cast in a non-cooperative game theoretic form. The guidance law obtained is dependent on the LOS angular rotational rate and on the impact angle error. Theoretical conditions which guarantee existence of solutions under this method have been derived. It is shown that imposing the impact angle constraint calls for an increase in the gains of the guidance law considerably, subsequently requiring a higher maneuverability advantage of the interceptor. The performance of the proposed guidance law is studied using a non-linear two dimensional simulation of the relative kinematics, assuming first order dynamics for the interceptor and target.

Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria

27 p.