Lobbying in Australia : child or sibling of public relations

It is accepted now that lobbying and public relations share a strong relationship. How did this come about? How did lobbying become a subset of the discipline of public relations and is it accepted as such – by its practitioners and those it serves? In lobbying’s attempts to define the practice it has sought a broader discipline for explanation. Many terms came into being because as Harrison observed ‘ it has been impossible to clearly define a lobbyist’ (2011, p865). Macnamara (2012) includes lobbying under a heading of public affairs and government relations. Sekuless subtitled his 1991 text Lobbying in the Nineties ‘the government relations game’.
This paper seeks to define lobbying and its practice in Australia. In so doing it looks specifically at professional and academic definition of the lobbying and its growth as a subset of PR.

Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

El cabildeo para el comercio internacional de América Latina y el Caribe en Washington, DC = Latin America and Caribbean lobbying for international trade in Washington, DC

Incluye Bibliografía

Dinamica, dimensione e strutture di rete dell'attività di lobbying negli Stati Uniti

Studio e analisi dell'evoluzione, dinamica e strutture di rete dell'attività di lobbying negli Stati Uniti

A Law and Economics Analysis of Lobbying Regulation Towards an optimal structure through the Cost Indicator Index

This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.

Tecniche di analisi statistica sull'attività di lobbying negli Stati Uniti usando il software R

La tesi fornisce una panoramica delle principali metodologie di analisi dei dati utilizzando il software open source R e l’ambiente di sviluppo integrato (IDE) RStudio. Viene effettuata un’analisi descrittiva e quantitativa dei dati GICS, tassonomia industriale che cataloga le principali aziende per il processo di gestione e ricerca degli asset di investimento. Sono stati studiati i principali settori del mercato USA considerando il fatturato, le spese per il lobbying e tre indici che misurano il grado di collegamento fra industrie. Su questi dati si sono svolte delle analisi quantitative e si sono tentati alcuni modelli nell’ambito della regressione lineare semplice e multipla. Tale studio ha il compito di verificare eventuali interazioni fra le variabili o pattern di comportamento strategico societario durante il periodo 2007 - 2012, anni di rinnovo e miglioramento delle regolamentazioni in materia di lobbying negli Stati Uniti. Più nello specifico vengono presi in esame tre settori: IT, Health Care e Industrial dove viene studiato l’andamento del reddito medio e la spesa media in attività di lobbying dei settori. I risultati ottenuti mostrano l’utilità dei pacchetti di R per l’analisi dei dati: vengono individuati alcuni andamenti che, se confermati da ulteriori e necessarie analisi, potrebbero essere interessanti per capire non solo i meccanismi impliciti nell’attività di lobbying ma anche comportamenti anomali legati a questa attività.

Studio dell'attività di lobbying da parte di Google Inc. a livello internazionale ed europeo

Tesi rivolta allo studio del comportamento di Google Inc. nel campo delle lobby, in America ed in Europa: quanto investe nell'attività di lobbying, quali leggi vuole far approvare, perché è interessata a quel disegno di legge, differenze tra lobby americane ed europee e difficoltà incontrate in Europa.

EU Copyright Law, Lobbying and Transparency of Policy-Making: The cases of sound recordings term extension and orphan works provisions

The objective of this paper is to discuss EU lobbying in the area of copyright. Legislation needs to regulate the legal position of various different stakeholders in a balanced manner. However, a number of EU copyright provisions brought into effect over recent years were highly controversial and have led to suggestions that powerful lobbying forces may have had some influence. This article investigates the effects of lobbying on copyright law-making in Europe. A specific comparative and multi-faceted analysis is provided of the legislative process for two recently adopted directives: 2011/77/EU which extends the term of protection of sound recordings and 2012/28/EU which introduces certain permitted uses of orphan works (some references are also made to the ACTA case). Firstly, a short presentation is given of the legal bases for the EU consultation process and lobbying. Next, an analysis is provided of the two cases, taking into consideration the policy-making procedures (with special focus on how the consultation process was handled), the legal solutions proposed and adopted and the various stakeholders’ claims. Lastly, it asks why some interest groups were successful and some others failed (the analysis identifies two types of factor for the effectiveness of lobbying: those resulting from stakeholders’ actions and those connected with the consultation process).