The role of implicit contracts: Building public works in the 1840s in Portugal

Business History, Vol 50 No 2, p147-162

From cheating to teaching: a path for conversion of illegal gambling machines

Video poker machines, a former symbol of fraud and gambling in Brazil, are now being converted into computer-based educational tools for Brazilian public primary schools and also for governmental and non-governmental institutions dealing with communities of poverty and social exclusion, in an attempt to reduce poverty risks (decrease money spent on gambling) and promote social inclusion (increase access and motivation to education). Thousands of illegal gambling machines are seized by federal authorities, in Brazil, every year, and usually destroyed at the end of the criminal apprehension process. This paper describes a project developed by the University of Southern Santa Catarina, Brazil, responsible for the conversion process of gambling machines, and the social inclusion opportunities derived from it. All project members worked on a volunteer basis, seeking to promote social inclusion of Brazilian young boys and girls, namely through digital inclusion. So far, the project has been able to convert over 200 gambling machines and install them in over 40 public primary schools, thus directly benefiting more than 12,000 schoolchildren. The initial motivation behind this project was technology based, however the different options arising from the conversion process of the gambling machines have also motivated a rather innovative and unique experience in allowing schoolchildren and young people with special (educational) needs to access to computer-based pedagogical applications. The availability of these converted machines also helps to place Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the very daily educational environment of these children and youngsters, thus serving social and cultural inclusion aspects, by establishing a dialogue with the community and their technological expectations, and also directly contributing to their digital literacy.

Electricity markets modeling considering complex contracts and aggregators

All over the world, the liberalization of electricity markets, which follows different paradigms, has created new challenges for those involved in this sector. In order to respond to these challenges, electric power systems suffered a significant restructuring in its mode of operation and planning. This restructuring resulted in a considerable increase of the electric sector competitiveness. Particularly, the Ancillary Services (AS) market has been target of constant renovations in its operation mode as it is a targeted market for the trading of services, which have as main objective to ensure the operation of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and competitiveness. In this way, with the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources including distributed generation, demand response, storage units and electric vehicles, it is essential to develop new smarter and hierarchical methods of operation of electric power systems. As these resources are mostly connected to the distribution network, it is important to consider the introduction of this kind of resources in AS delivery in order to achieve greater reliability and cost efficiency of electrical power systems operation. The main contribution of this work is the design and development of mechanisms and methodologies of AS market and for energy and AS joint market, considering different management entities of transmission and distribution networks. Several models developed in this work consider the most common AS in the liberalized market environment: Regulation Down; Regulation Up; Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. The presented models consider different rules and ways of operation, such as the division of market by network areas, which allows the congestion management of interconnections between areas; or the ancillary service cascading process, which allows the replacement of AS of superior quality by lower quality of AS, ensuring a better economic performance of the market. A major contribution of this work is the development an innovative methodology of market clearing process to be used in the energy and AS joint market, able to ensure viable and feasible solutions in markets, where there are technical constraints in the transmission network involving its division into areas or regions. The proposed method is based on the determination of Bialek topological factors and considers the contribution of the dispatch for all services of increase of generation (energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserves) in network congestion. The use of Bialek factors in each iteration of the proposed methodology allows limiting the bids in the market while ensuring that the solution is feasible in any context of system operation. Another important contribution of this work is the model of the contribution of distributed energy resources in the ancillary services. In this way, a Virtual Power Player (VPP) is considered in order to aggregate, manage and interact with distributed energy resources. The VPP manages all the agents aggregated, being able to supply AS to the system operator, with the main purpose of participation in electricity market. In order to ensure their participation in the AS, the VPP should have a set of contracts with the agents that include a set of diversified and adapted rules to each kind of distributed resource. All methodologies developed and implemented in this work have been integrated into the MASCEM simulator, which is a simulator based on a multi-agent system that allows to study complex operation of electricity markets. In this way, the developed methodologies allow the simulator to cover more operation contexts of the present and future of the electricity market. In this way, this dissertation offers a huge contribution to the AS market simulation, based on models and mechanisms currently used in several real markets, as well as the introduction of innovative methodologies of market clearing process on the energy and AS joint market. This dissertation presents five case studies; each one consists of multiple scenarios. The first case study illustrates the application of AS market simulation considering several bids of market players. The energy and ancillary services joint market simulation is exposed in the second case study. In the third case study it is developed a comparison between the simulation of the joint market methodology, in which the player bids to the ancillary services is considered by network areas and a reference methodology. The fourth case study presents the simulation of joint market methodology based on Bialek topological distribution factors applied to transmission network with 7 buses managed by a TSO. The last case study presents a joint market model simulation which considers the aggregation of small players to a VPP, as well as complex contracts related to these entities. The case study comprises a distribution network with 33 buses managed by VPP, which comprises several kinds of distributed resources, such as photovoltaic, CHP, fuel cells, wind turbines, biomass, small hydro, municipal solid waste, demand response, and storage units.

Formal Contracts for Runtime Verification Support in the Ada Programming Language

Poster presented in The 28th GI/ITG International Conference on Architecture of Computing Systems (ARCS 2015). 24 to 26, Mar, 2015. Porto, Portugal.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-off is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-off rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.

Preventing atomicity violations with contracts

Concurrent programming is a difficult and error-prone task because the programmer must reason about multiple threads of execution and their possible interleavings. A concurrent program must synchronize the concurrent accesses to shared memory regions, but this is not enough to prevent all anomalies that can arise in a concurrent setting. The programmer can misidentify the scope of the regions of code that need to be atomic, resulting in atomicity violations and failing to ensure the correct behavior of the program. Executing a sequence of atomic operations may lead to incorrect results when these operations are co-related. In this case, the programmer may be required to enforce the sequential execution of those operations as a whole to avoid atomicity violations. This situation is specially common when the developer makes use of services from third-party packages or modules. This thesis proposes a methodology, based on the design by contract methodology, to specify which sequences of operations must be executed atomically. We developed an analysis that statically verifies that a client of a module is respecting its contract, allowing the programmer to identify the source of possible atomicity violations.

What hides behind the fixed-term contracts wage gap?

In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012 period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones, by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.

Contingent contracts

International businesses bring with them additional negotiation complexities and extra risks, thus calling for negotiation integrative solutions and additional legal protection. The recent economic crisis forced, companies, including SMEs, to look for international markets and face these additional complexities and issues. In the search for a practical and simplified solution, to serve less sophisticated companies, this paper brings insights from the negotiation literature to a specific legal issue. Specifically, I investigate the negotiation and use of contingent agreements as a tool for facilitating the negotiation process and managing risk in international deals. Looking into an international sale of goods from Portugal to Brazil, this paper proposes the structuring of two contingent contracts related to two category of products in order to demonstrate the potential benefits of some of its relevant features, specifically the creation of incentives and identification and allocation of future risks. In general, the structuring of contingent agreements is likely to provide positive results in mitigating the issues of lack of trust and dealing with the additional risks derived from international deals, therefore facilitating and improving the overall quality of the deal.

Modelo de Gestion Intersectorial para la formalización de villas, a partir de la revisión de normativa urbana, marco jurídico-político, y la innovación tecnológica de los recursos. Intersectorial management model for the formality of the illegal growth settles beginning from the revision of the urban norm, political - juridical, and the technological innovation of the resources.

El Proyecto que se presenta en esta convocatoria está relacionado con el diseño y desarrollo de procesos de gestión intersectorial para la reconversión formal del hábitat en asentamientos de crecimiento espontáneo e ilegal a partir de la la revisión de marcos legales y normativos respecto del derecho al uso de suelo urbano y la seguridad jurídica en la tenencia (regulación dominial) bajo un enfoque sustentable de los Derechos Humanos (DDHH) como así también a partir de la innovación tecnológica de los recursos para el mejoramiento habitacional en el marco de los aportes relacionados con la Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE) .La originalidad, en este caso, se basa en la exploración de nuevos procesos de gestión mixta en los que intervienen diversos actores: ESTADO, SOCIEDAD, EMPRESA y COMUNIDAD CIENTIFICA, configurando un circuito intersectorial de gestión, capacitación y producción de hábitat que respondan al fortalecimiento del desarrollo comunitario, entendido como desarrollo económico con inclusión social y urbana.Los objetivos están relacionados con el fortalecimiento de la producción integral del hábitat social procurando el desarrollo genuino de las comunidades a partir de la expansión de sus capacidades y sus derechos.El presente proyecto de investigación explorará la producción de hábitat y de ciudad informal procurando reconvertirla hacia un modelo de gestión sustentable (normativo y tecnológico), basado en la necesidad de producir ciudadanía digna a partir de la construcción formal de hábitat.La propuesta del proyecto supone la participación intersectorial en la planificación formal y en la toma de decisiones para una inclusión social y económica, en el marco de un modelo de desarrollo de génesis inclusor, constituyéndose en un avance de conocimientos del propio campo disciplinar (hábitat) como así también de otros campos afines a los mismos (jurídico- social - económico- productivo- político ).

Product-line specification and verification with feature-oriented contracts

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2015

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be ?nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we consider we ?nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.