Rudiments of geography, on a new plan : designed to assist the memory by comparison and classification, with numerous engravings of manners, customs, and curiosities accompanied with an atlas, exhibiting the prevailing religions, froms of government, degrees of civilization, and the comparative size of towns, rivers, and mountains /

Mode of access: Internet.

Contemporary issues in the government and administration of Latin American megacities

This paper is the first to systematically analyze and compare the structures of city governance and administration for seven major cities in Latin America, four of which are megacities (population of over 10 million), and three others are large national capitals. U.S. and U. K. models of city administration are reviewed as baseline models against which differences in Latin American may be explored. Structures of Government in Latin America show several important features and trends: 1) the lack of metropolitan (cross jurisdictional) authority; 2) the existence of strong mayors and weak councils"; 3) high levels of partisanship; 4) overlapping rather than interlocking bureaucracies; 5) pressures towards the privatization of city services, but continuing tension over the desirability of public versus private control; 6) greater fiscal responsibility and autonomy; and 7), a continuing marginalization of public participation in megacity governance.In spite of these features, many cities throughout the region (regardless of whether they are megacity size or national capitals), are actively intensifying their efforts to develop more effective, accountable and democratic governance structures.

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Determinants of the Portuguese government bond yield spread

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Size effects on the magnetoelectric response on PVDF/Vitrovac 4040 laminate composites

Tri-layered and bi-layered magnetoelectric (ME) flexible composite structures of varying geometries and sizes consisting on magnetostrictive Vitrovac and piezoelectric poly(vinylidene fluoride) (PVDF) layers were fabricated by direct bonding. From the ME measurements it was determined that tri-layered composites structures (magnetostrictive-piezoelectric-magnetostrictive type), show a higher ME response (75 V.cm-1.Oe-1) than the bi-layer structure (66 V.cm 1.Oe-1). The ME voltage coefficient decreased with increasing longitudinal size aspect ratio between PVDF and Vitrovac layers (from 1.1 to 4.3), being observed a maximum ME voltage coefficient of 66 V.cm-1.Oe-1. It was also observed that the composite with the lowest transversal aspect ratio between PVDF and Vitrovac layers resulted in better ME performance than the structures with higher transversal size aspect ratios. It was further determined an intimate relation between the Vitrovac PVDF Area Area ratio and the ME response of the composites. When such ratio values approach 1, the ME response is the largest. Additionally the ME output value and magnetic field response was controlled by changing the number of Vitrovac layers, which allows the development of magnetic sensors and energy harvesting devices.

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.

The Key party in the catalan government

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Full-Size Off-Highway Vehicle Registration Program, December 30, 2003

Report submitted by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Iowa Department of Transportation to the General Assembly as required by Senate File 458, section 152, passed by the 2003 General Assembly and signed May 30, 2003.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Forest fires: Evaluation of government intervention measures

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between government measures, volunteer participation, climate variables and forest fires. A number of studies have related forest fires to causes of ignition, to fire history in one area, to the type of vegetation and weathercharacteristics or to community institutions, but there is little research on the relation between fire production and government prevention and extinction measures from a policy evaluation perspective.An observational approach is first applied to select forest fires in the north east of Spain. Taking a selection of fires with a certain size, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to find significant relations between policy instruments under the control of the government and the number of hectares burn in each case, controlling at the same time the effect of weather conditions and other context variables. The paper brings evidence on the effects of simultaneity and the relevance of recurring to army soldiers in specific days with extraordinary high simultaneity. The analysis also brings light on the effectiveness of twopreventive policies and of helicopters for extinction tasks.

Strategies for economic development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: a comparative study of the foreign economic policy strategies adopted by the Manley government in Jamaica and the Williams government in Trinidad and Tobago

This thesis compares the foreign economic poUcy dimension of the development strategies adopted by the governments of two Commonwealth caribbean countries: The Hardey government In Jamaica, and the· Williams government in Trlnidad and T ooago, The foreign economic policIes adopted by these governments appeared, on the surface~ to be markedly dissimilar. The Jamakan strategv on the one hand, emphasised self-reliance and national autonomy; and featured the espousal of radical oonaHgnment together with attempts to re-deftne the terms of the Islands externaa economIc relaUoos. The Trinidadian strategy 00 the other hand, featured Uberal externaUy-oriented growth poUctes, and close relatjoos with Western governments and financial institutions. Th1s study attempts to identify the explanatory factors that account for the apparent dlssimUarUy 1n the foreign economic policies of these two govemnents. The study is based on a comparison of how the structural bases of an underdeveloped ecooomYg and the foreign penetration and vulnerabUUy to external pressures asSOCiated wUh dependence, shape and influence foreign economic poUcy strategy. The framework views fore1gn ecooom1c strategy as an adaptive response on the part of the decision makers of a state to the coostralnts and opportunities provided by a particular situation. The · situat i 00' in this case being the events, conditions, structures and processes, associated wUh dependente and underdevelopment. The results indicate that the similarities and dissimHarities in the foreign economic policies of the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad were a reflecUon of the simHarities and dissimilarities in their respective situations. The conclusion derived suggests that If the foreign pol1cy field as an arena of choice, Is indeed one of opportunities and constraints for each and every state, then poHcy makers of smaU, weak, hlghW penetrated and vulnerable states enter thlS arena with constraints outweighing opportunities. This places effective limits 00 their decisional latitude and the range of policy options avaUable. Policy makers thus have to decide critical issues with few estabUshed precedents, in the face of domestic social and political cleavages, as wen as serious foreign pressures. This is a reflection not only of the trappings of dependence, but also of the Umned capabilities arising from the sman size of the state, and the Impact of the resource-gap In an underdeveloped economy. The Trinidadian strategy 1s UlustraUve of a development strategy made viable through a combination of a fortuitous circumstance, a confluence of the interests of influential groups» and accurate perception on the part of poUcy makers. These factors enabled policy makers to minimise some of the constraints of dependence. The faUure of Manlets strategy on the other hand, 15 iHustraUve of the problems involved tn the adoption of poUcles that work against the interest of internal and external political and economic forces. It is also tUustraUve of the consequences of the faUure 00 the part of policy makers to clarify goals, and to reconcile the values of rapid economic growth with increased self-reliance and national autonomy. These values tend to be mutuany Incompatible given the existing patterns of relations in the jnternational economy.