Práticas de observação e análise de jogo

A Observação e Análise é uma área em crescimento nos últimos anos. Hoje em dia, a presença de um departamento de Observação e Análise nos clubes é visto como essencial uma vez que, no futebol de alto rendimento, os jogos estão cada vez mais equilibrados, sendo decididos muitas vezes por pormenores. Neste sentido existe uma maior necessidade de inclusão de equipas técnicas multidisciplinares com o objetivo de melhorar o rendimento da equipa e alcançar o sucesso. As equipas de topo devem controlar ao máximo todos os fatores que influenciam o rendimento dos jogadores e, a Observação e Análise de jogo é um deles. Este relatório surge no âmbito do estágio realizado no Sport Lisboa e Benfica, mais concretamente no departamento de Observação e Análise do Benfica LAB, na época desportiva 2014/2015. Encontra-se dividido em três partes fundamentais. A Área 1 (Prática Profissional) foca-se na exposição detalhada das formações específicas que nos foram proporcionadas bem como todas as tarefas operacionais e complementares realizadas ao longo do estágio, subjacentes a um departamento de Observação e Análise. A segunda parte é referente à Área 2 (Inovação e Investigação) – desenvolvimento de um estudo de investigação que carateriza as ações técnico-táticas individuais do Sport Lisboa e Benfica por posição (posto específico) com o objetivo de averiguar diferenças significativas entre épocas desportivas. Concluiu-se a existência de diferenças significativas. As posições que apresentaram o maior número de diferenças entre épocas desportivas foram as posições médio defensivo e primeiro avançado. Finalmente, a última parte deste relatório centra-se na Área 3 (Relação com a Comunidade). São explicados detalhadamente todos os procedimentos da organização e dinamização de um evento vocacionado para a formação de agentes que intervém direta ou indiretamente na Observação e Análise de Jogo.

Performing design analysis: game design creativity and the theatre of the impressed

We report and reflect upon the early stages of a research project that endeavours to establish a culture of critical design thinking in a tertiary game design course. We first discuss the current state of the Australian game industry and consider some perceived issues in game design courses and graduate outcomes. The second sec-tion presents our response to these issues: a project in progress which uses techniques originally exploited by Augusto Boal in his work, Theatre of the Oppressed. We appropriate Boal’s method to promote critical design thinking in a games design class. Finally, we reflect on the project and the ontology of design thinking from the perspective of Bruce Archer’s call to reframe design as a ‘third academic art’.

Identifying and forecasting the reverse salient in video game consoles: A performance gap ratio comparative analysis

This study uses the reverse salient methodology to contrast subsystems in video game consoles in order to discover, characterize, and forecast the most significant technology gap. We build on the current methodologies (Performance Gap and Time Gap) for measuring the magnitude of Reverse Salience, by showing the effectiveness of Performance Gap Ratio (PGR). The three subject subsystems in this analysis are the CPU Score, GPU core frequency, and video memory bandwidth. CPU Score is a metric developed for this project, which is the product of the core frequency, number of parallel cores, and instruction size. We measure the Performance Gap of each subsystem against concurrently available PC hardware on the market. Using PGR, we normalize the evolution of these technologies for comparative analysis. The results indicate that while CPU performance has historically been the Reverse Salient, video memory bandwidth has taken over as the quickest growing technology gap in the current generation. Finally, we create a technology forecasting model that shows how much the video RAM bandwidth gap will grow through 2019 should the current trend continue. This analysis can assist console developers in assigning resources to the next generation of platforms, which will ultimately result in longer hardware life cycles.

Location of Pathogenic Bacteria during Persistent Infections: Insights from an Analysis Using Game Theory

Bacterial persistent infections are responsible for a significant amount of the human morbidity and mortality. Unlike acute bacterial infections, it is very difficult to treat persistent bacterial infections (e.g. tuberculosis). Knowledge about the location of pathogenic bacteria during persistent infection will help to treat such conditions by designing novel drugs which can reach such locations. In this study, events of bacterial persistent infections were analyzed using game theory. A game was defined where the pathogen and the host are the two players with a conflict of interest. Criteria for the establishment of Nash equilibrium were calculated for this game. This theoretical model, which is very simple and heuristic, predicts that during persistent infections pathogenic bacteria stay in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host. The result of this study implies that a bacterium should be able to survive in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host in order to cause persistent infections. This explains why persistent infections are more often caused by intracellular pathogens like Mycobacterium and Salmonella. Moreover, this prediction is in consistence with the results of previous experimental studies.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

A Game-Theoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies

This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken by the bilingual minority. We emphasize that language rights are important, but the survival of the minority language B depends mainly on the actual use bilinguals make of B. The purpose of the present chapter is to study some of the factors affecting the bilingual speakers language choice behaviour. Our view is that languages with their speech communities compete for speakers just as fi rms compete for market share. Thus, the con ict among the minority languages in these societies does not take the rough expressions such as those studied in Desmet et al. (2012). Here the con flict is more subtle. We model highly plausible language choice situations by means of choice procedures and non-cooperative games, each with different types of information. We then study the determinants of the bilinguals ' strategic behaviour with regard to language. We observe that the bilinguals' use of B is shaped, essentially, by linguistic conventions and social norms that are developed in situations of language contact.

A simple game-theoretic analysis of peering and transit contracting among Internet service providers

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of two Internet service providers (ISPs), drawn from a larger set consisting of Tiers-1 and -2 ISPs, who choose between peering and transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of interconnection taking into account traffic imbalances. The analysis suggests that if the traffic flows and the costs of interconnection are fairly shared, the provider's peer, otherwise they choose transit. Moreover, the joint profits are maximized under the transit arrangement. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.