Common Security and Defence in 2014: Revise and resubmit. CEPS Commentaries, 27 March 2014

The conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on defence sounded like a ‘revise and resubmit’ recommendation for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That outcome was not too disappointing in itself, because precise technical guidelines were provided to revamp Europe’s defence, with good prospects of real progress. But it was not too ambitious either, as a clear indication of Europe’s future role in global security was in effect postponed until 2015, thus requiring ‘resubmission’ at a later date. Furthermore, member states did not seem particularly committed to reaching a formal agreement on a common strategic narrative; a sign that the governance gap continues to affect CSDP. Giovanni Faleg asks whether the European Council on defence marked the twilight of CSDP, or whether we will now see a new phase of cooperation, characterised by escalating external pressures in the southern neighbourhood and a resurgent Russian threat in the east.

Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy. OSW Commentary no. 57, 2011-07-18

Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Germany’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its decision on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discussion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to cooperation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

Reviewing the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/04/November 2012

Summary. The ongoing review of the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures warrants attention. What passes as an update of an arcane and technical document masks a profoundly political debate concerning what the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be about. This policy brief summarises the main proposals and formulates a set of critical reflections. It calls for replacing the bureaucratic scheming with a more forthright political debate, and warns against sacrificing incompatible organisational cultures on the altar of the comprehensive approach. At a time when European security and prosperity trends are increasingly pointing downwards, the EEAS and the member states must look to the future and embrace, rather than resist, change.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

The Role of the European Union in the World. European Policy Brief No. 22, March 2014

Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.

The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted. Security Policy Brief No. 67, October 2015

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to produce a change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.

What contribution can International Relations make to the evolving global health agenda?

This article presents two approaches that have dominated International Relations in their approach to the international politics of health. The statist approach, which is primarily security-focused, seeks to link health initiatives to a foreign or defence policy remit. The globalist approach, in contrast, seeks to advance health not because of its intrinsic security value but because it advances the well-being and rights of individuals. This article charts the evolution of these approaches and demonstrates why both have the potential to shape our understanding of the evolving global health agenda. It examines how the statist and globalist perspectives have helped shape contemporary initiatives in global health governance and suggests that there is evidence of an emerging convergence between the two perspectives. This convergence is particularly clear in the articulation of a number of UN initiatives in this area—especially the One World, One Health Strategic Framework and the Oslo Ministerial Declaration (2007) which inspired the first UN General Assembly resolution on global health and foreign policy in 2009 and the UN Secretary-General's note ‘Global health and foreign policy: strategic opportunities and challenges'. What remains to be seen is whether this convergence will deliver on securing states’ interest long enough to promote the interests of the individuals who require global efforts to deliver local health improvements.

Irrelevant or Indispensable? ESDP, the ?War on Terror' and the Fallout from Iraq

Shepherd, Alistair, 'Irrelevant or Indispensable? ESDP, the ?War on Terror' and the Fallout from Iraq', International Politics (2006) 43(1) pp.71-92 RAE2008

Peruwiańskie siły samoobrony chłopskiej. Od konfliktu zbrojnego do transformacji pokojowej

Wydział Historyczny: Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej

As forças de tipo gendarmerie e as operações/missões de gestão de crises da União Europeia

The European Union has taken in recent years an increasingly important role in ensuring peace and stability in the international community, and the security and defence policy of the Union has become synonymous with crisis management. The Union has addressed the issue of crisis management through two sources: the military side and the civilian side, which consists in carrying out numerous crisis management operations and missions. This study discusses the role of the European Union in conducting crisis management operations and missions and how the gendarmerie forces contribute to the success of the same. It will discuss the evolution of the European Union's security policy and the concept of crisis management, and seek to demonstrate the added value of the commitment of gendarmerie forces in operations and missions of crisis management, particularly with regard to employment of the European Gendarmerie Force. On the other hand, it will study the planning process for crisis management of the European Union, featuring the entities and agencies involved in it, and presenting the products that result from this same process. The use of Gendarmerie forces in crisis management operations and missions has significant advantages. Its use is recommended to post - conflict scenarios, in complementarity with the armed forces, in order to overcome the "security gap" that mediates the transition from the state of conflict for the period of peace and reconstruction. Gendarmerie forces can also be engaged both in military crisis management operations and civilian crisis management missions.

Le discours miterrandien envers l'Allemagne de 1981 à 1991 : une rhétorique pour la grandeur et l'indépendance de la France

Ce mémoire tente de présenter la politique allemande de François Mitterrand de 1981 à 1991 à travers le discours public du président français. À cette fin, il présente la position du chef d’État socialiste sur le rôle de l’Allemagne dans la construction de l’unité européenne et dans la politique de défense et de sécurité française, ainsi que sur la question de la réunification allemande. Il tente ensuite de situer la politique allemande de François Mitterrand par rapport à celle du général de Gaulle, et de juger de la valeur du discours public du président français comme source primaire. L’hypothèse principale que nous soutenons est que le président socialiste tente, de 1981 à 1991, de s’appuyer sur la République fédérale d’Allemagne pour atteindre les objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance fixés pour la France par de Gaulle dans les années 1960. Nous croyons qu’il souhaite d’abord se rapprocher de la RFA pour que celle-ci l’aide à unifier politiquement, économiquement et militairement l’Europe autour du couple franco-allemand. Nous croyons également que Mitterrand veut s’assurer, au début des années 1980, que la RFA restera ancrée solidement au camp occidental et qu’elle ne glissera pas vers le neutralisme, ce qui doit, selon le président français, permettre à la France d’augmenter son niveau de protection face à l’URSS et accroître son indépendance face aux États-Unis. Enfin, nous croyons que le président socialiste ne tente pas d’empêcher la réunification de l’Allemagne, mais qu’il tente d’en ralentir le processus afin de pouvoir mettre en place l’unité européenne au sein de laquelle il souhaite exercer une influence sur l’Allemagne réunifiée, et à partir de laquelle il prévoit développer sa politique d’après-guerre froide. Ces initiatives doivent permettre à la France d’absorber les contrecoups de la réunification allemande et de sauvegarder ses intérêts nationaux. Dans l’ensemble, la politique allemande de François Mitterrand est en continuité avec la politique allemande développée par le général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1964. Les deux hommes cherchent ainsi à s’appuyer sur la RFA pour créer l’unité européenne afin que celle-ci serve de tremplin à la France pour qu’elle atteigne ses objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance. Enfin, nous croyons que le discours public du président socialiste peut être utilisé comme source primaire car il renferme une quantité importante d’information, mais son utilisation doit se faire avec précaution car comme tous les discours politiques, il vise d’abord et avant tout à convaincre l’opinion publique du bien fondé des politiques avancées.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Les processus décisionnels de l’intervention militaire au Canada (1990-2003) : une approche réaliste néoclassique

La décision d’intervenir militairement ou non dans un conflit est certainement l’une des plus importantes qu’un État puisse prendre. Ces décisions sont coûteuses et très prégnantes tant au plan financier, politique que social. La recherche exposée vise à analyser les processus décisionnels canadiens en matière d’intervention militaire lors de la guerre du Golfe, la guerre en Afghanistan ainsi que la guerre en Irak. Le Canada est un cas très intéressant à étudier, car malgré son statut de puissance moyenne, il a pris part à sept conflits armés depuis 1867. Cette recherche tentera donc de déterminer ce qui motive le Canada à investir des ressources financières et humaines dans certains conflits, alors qu’il choisit de ne pas s’impliquer dans d’autres. Certaines théories des relations internationales affirment que la politique de défense des États est guidée par le désir de maximiser leur puissance sur la scène internationale. D’autres théories mettent plutôt l’accent sur les valeurs des États, ou bien sur leur intégration dans des institutions internationales. Ces différentes hypothèses soulèvent l’importance des facteurs internes et externes, mais ne permettent pas de savoir lesquels priment. Ainsi, grâce à un modèle de prise de décision réaliste néoclassique, synthétisant ces deux types de facteurs, il est possible de déterminer lesquels des éléments internes (contraintes de politique interne, perception des dirigeants) ou externes (position relative du Canada dans le système international) prédominent lors de la décision d’entrer ou non en guerre.

Incidencia de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática en las relaciones diplomáticas Colombo-Ecuatorianas desde Agosto de 2002 a Marzo de 2008

Las relaciones entre Colombia y Ecuador se han mantenido en una dinámica histórica de cooperación y conflicto donde se ha buscado mantener unos lazos de vecindad y convivencia en calma. La proximidad geográfica y además un marco histórico-cultural similar, ha llevado a la generación de fuertes alianzas socio-económicas entre las poblaciones fronterizas, de tal manera que se ha desarrollado una integración binacional compleja. Esta relación en la última década ha mantenido una incapacidad institucional binacional para solucionar los problemas transfronterizos, pues la política de vecindad se encontraba determinada por la situación interna de cada país y la injerencia de las dinámicas continentales. La coyuntura interna de los Estados direccionó sus políticas, Ecuador estaba envuelto en una inestabilidad política, generada por continuos cambios de gobierno, lo cual hacía cambiar su posición frente a las relaciones con Colombia en cortos lapsos de tiempo, de tal forma que se desestabilizaban los proyectos conjuntos. Por otro lado Colombia dada la problemática del conflicto interno basó su agenda en el tema de la seguridad puesto que éste flagelo agudizaba los problemas socio-políticos, de tal forma que el Estado colombiano se vio enfrentado a una crisis interna que encontró una salida a través de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática instaurada por el Presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez en el 2002,la cual trajo consigo un método de lucha basado en la seguridad con acciones dirigidas a garantizar el control del territorio y la defensa de la soberanía nacional, combatiendo el problema de las drogas, el crimen organizado, el terrorismo y las migraciones por desplazamiento forzoso; mediante la generación de lazos de solidaridad que unieron a la población colombiana en torno a la solución del problema. Ésta política ha trabajado en la seguridad a nivel interno y de defensa nacional, pues dada la magnitud de la amenaza se hizo necesario fortalecer el apoyo internacional con énfasis en los países fronterizos. De ahí que Colombia haya hecho un llamado a la comunidad internacional para desarrollar un trabajo coordinado que impida la implicación de redes del terrorismo internacional en las actividades de los grupos armados ilegales colombianos. La ampliación del conflicto colombiano ha afectado a Ecuador, el cual se ha visto perturbado negativamente por la lucha interna colombiana a partir de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática.