A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Lojalitet i licensavtal

Loyalty in Licensing Agreements The purpose of the dissertation is to analyse the impact of the principle of loyalty on licensing agreements from the viewpoint of Finnish law using the traditional legal method (Rechtsdogmatik) combined with empirical data in the form of licensing agreements. The need for good licensing agreements is crucial. One should avoid mechanical and stereotyped agreements in favour of more conscious and goal-oriented ones. When the parties' will and goals have been made clear, the drafting technique should be chosen accordingly. The importance of the principle of loyalty in the interpretation of licensing agreements varies according to their degree of relationality. This is a concept originating in the relational contract theory, more precisely Ian Macneil's spectrum of contracts, where contracts can be placed on an axis according to their degree of relationality. In the dissertation different factors are used to conclude whether the licensing agreement at hand is to be placed on the axis closer to the transactional pole or closer to the relational pole. A conclusion of the dissertation is that few licensing agreements can be placed so close to the transactional pole, that the principle of loyalty lacks importance altogether. The impact of the principle of loyalty the main focus of which is on fostering the contracting parties to behave in accordance with best practices, not for example on altering contract terms is analysed in different situations where the parties' interests typically collide. These situations are discussed from the point of view of three patent and knowhow licensing agreements that differ as to their degree of relationality. A balance needs to be struck between freedom of contract and relational needs. Especially when interpreting more modern licensing agreements, one should not focus on the written document alone, as is often recommended in the literature on Nordic intellectual property law. Neither is the principle of caveat emptor a proper starting point. Moreover, where the parties are of equal bargaining power, one should not assume that the grants in licensing agreements are to be interpreted narrowly. Focus in the interpretation should instead be on the entirety of the circumstances.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策

针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点,建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明;分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系.通过仿真实验,分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world

Contemporary globalization has been marked by significant shifts in the organization and governance of global industries. In the 1970s and 1980s, one such shift was characterized by the emergence of buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains. In the early 2000s, a more differentiated typology of governance structures was introduced, which focused on new types of coordination in global value chains (GVCs). Today the organization of the global economy is entering another phase, with transformations that are reshaping the governance structures of both GVCs and global capitalism at various levels: (1) the end of the Washington Consensus and the rise of contending centers of economic and political power; (2) a combination of geographic consolidation and value chain concentration in the global supply base, which, in some cases, is shifting bargaining power from lead firms in GVCs to large suppliers in developing economies; (3) new patterns of strategic coordination among value chain actors; (4) a shift in the end markets of many GVCs accelerated by the economic crisis of 2008-09, which is redefining regional geographies of investment and trade; and (5) a diffusion of the GVC approach to major international donor agencies, which is prompting a reformulation of established development paradigms. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Foreign Direct Investment and Country Risk::Is There Evidence of 'Malign Investment in the Former Soviet States'

This paper examines the relationship between concepts of MNE bargaining power and broader concepts of political power. It notes that the analysis of MNE bargaining power presents a number of puzzles from the perspective of political theory. These puzzles arise, in part, from the fact that the overlap between traditional concepts of MNE bargaining power and broader concepts of political power is only a partial one. Despite these problems, it is suggested that political- theory-based approaches can add realism to our understanding of bargaining power.

Estratégia de centralização de compras e minimização de custos estudo de caso do Grupo Pinto & Cruz

Trabalho de Projeto apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto, para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação de Doutora Alcina Dias

How to promote and enhance communication between a big retailer's after-sales department and its suppliers

W is the biggest electronic goods retailer in Portugal accounting with almost fifty percent of market share in its area. During the last years, many small W suppliers had to close their doors, and many others are in huge troubles. Among the reason for this situation, the huge bargaining power of W in the relationship seems crucial. The focus of the directed research will be in the after sales department where I did an internship from September 2014 to January 2015.

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

The Food Crisis: Implications for Labor

Food prices have gone up to prohibitive levels for many of the world’s poor. The vast majority of those who are hungry in the world today are working in agriculture, either as small landholders or as waged agricultural workers. The majority of the food producers have not benefited from rising prices. Apparently, the bargaining power of many producers, just as that of the end consumers, has been weakened vis-à-vis the buyers and retailers of agricultural produce. This powerlessness is also in the face of governments that fail to provide an appropriate infrastructure for smallholders and social protection. The first part of the book provides an introduction to the immediate and structural causes of the food crisis. The second part contains contributions that not only highlight the plight of rural labour but also develop tools for measuring the decent work deficit. The last part emphasizes income security as a major precondition for food security. It looks at the experiences of Brazil and India with the extension of social protection for the poor.

Work and economic security in the 21st century

In recent decades there has been a transformation of two central concepts of modernity – labour and the household. Ela Bhatt – the founder of the Self-Employed Women’s Association of India (SEWA), has made an important contribution to this transformation. Through the emergence of unions such as SEWA, the notion of who represents labour is being broadened; the marginalised are finding an institutional voice. Increasingly, the household is being recognised as a site of both production and reproduction. SEWA is not a traditional trade union that aims, through collective bargaining with an employer, to improve its members’ wages and working conditions as sellers of their labour power. Instead, it aims to empower women economically in the informal economy by bringing them into the mainstream economy as owners of their labour. The union dimension of SEWA builds their collective power through struggle; the cooperative dimension translates their bargaining power into the economic and social development of its members and their community. Besides, Bhatt’s approach to the self-employed was a direct challenge to the ILO’s tripartism when it was established in the early seventies. The first part of the paper provides a short biography of Ela Bhatt, describes the origins of SEWA, analyses a ‘classification struggle’ over how and who is to define what a worker is. In the second part the author considers SEWAs innovative organizing strategy and is rethinking modernity in the labour context. In the conclusion the paper discusses the lessons that can be learnt from Ela Bhatt.

Core Labor Rights

The working paper’s main objective is to explore the extent to which non-compliance to international labor rights is caused by global competition. From the perspective of institutional economics, compliance with core labor rights is beneficial for sustainable development. Nonetheless, violations of these rights occur on a massive scale. The violators usually blame competitive pressures. A number of studies have come to the conclusion that non-compliance does not provide for a competitive edge, thereby denying any economic rationale for non-compliance. While we sympathize with this conclusion, we find that these studies suffer from faulty assumptions in the design of their regression analyses. The assumption of perfect markets devoid of power relations is particularly unrealistic. While workers' rights promise long-term benefits, they may incur short-term production cost increases. On the supply side, the production sites with the highest amount of labor rights violations are characterized by a near perfect competitive situation. The demand side, however, is dominated by an oligopoly of brand name companies and large retailers. Facing a large pool of suppliers, these companies enjoy more bargaining power. Developing countries, the hosts to most of these suppliers, are therefore limited in their ability to raise labor standards on their own. This competitive situation, however, is the very reason why labor rights have to be negotiated internationally. Our exploration starts with an outline of the institutionalist argument of the benefits of core labor rights. Second, we briefly examine some cross-country empirical studies on the impact of trade liberalization (as a proxy for competitive pressures). Third, we develop our own argument which differentiates the impact of trade liberalization along the axes of labor- and capital-intensive production as well as low and medium skill production. Finally, we present evidence from a study on the impact of trade liberalization in Indonesia on the garment industry as an example of a low skill, laborintensive industry on the one hand, and the automobile as an example for a medium skill, capital-intensive industry on the other hand. Because the garment industry’s workforce consists mainly of women, we also discuss the gender dimension of trade liberalization.