Sex allocation conflict in ants: when the queen rules.

Insect societies are paramount examples of cooperation, yet they also harbor internal conflicts whose resolution depends on the power of the opponents. The male-haploid, female-diploid sex-determining system of ants causes workers to be more related to sisters than to brothers, whereas queens are equally related to daughters and sons. Workers should thus allocate more resources to females than to males, while queens should favor an equal investment in each sex. Female-biased sex allocation and manipulation of the sex ratio during brood development suggest that workers prevail in many ant species. Here, we show that queens of Formica selysi strongly influenced colony sex allocation by biasing the sex ratio of their eggs. Most colonies specialized in the production of a single sex. Queens in female-specialist colonies laid a high proportion of diploid eggs, whereas queens in male-specialist colonies laid almost exclusively haploid eggs, which constrains worker manipulation. However, the change in sex ratio between the egg and pupae stages suggests that workers eliminated some male brood, and the population sex-investment ratio was between the queens' and workers' equilibria. Altogether, these data provide evidence for an ongoing conflict between queens and workers, with a prominent influence of queens as a result of their control of egg sex ratio.

Critical analysis of the allocation policy for liver transplantation in Brazil

Liver transplantation is now the standard treatment for end-stage liver disease. Given the shortage of liver donors and the progressively higher number of patients waiting for transplantation, improvements in patient selection and optimization of timing for transplantation are needed. Several solutions have been suggested, including increasing the donor pool; a fair policy for allocation, not permitting variables such as age, gender, and race, or third-party payer status to play any role; and knowledge of the natural history of each liver disease for which transplantation is offered. To observe ethical rules and distributive justice (guarantee to every citizen the same opportunity to get an organ), the "sickest first" policy must be used. Studies have demonstrated that death has no relationship with waiting time, but rather with the severity of liver disease at the time of inclusion. Thus, waiting time is no longer part of the United Network for Organ Sharing distribution criteria. Waiting time only differentiates between equally severely diseased patients. The authors have analyzed the waiting list mortality and 1-year survival for patients of the State of São Paulo, from July 1997 through January 2001. Only the chronological criterion was used. According to "Secretaria de Estado da Saúde de São Paulo" data, among all waiting list deaths, 82.2% occurred within the first year, and 37.6% within the first 3 months following inclusion. The allocation of livers based on waiting time is neither fair nor ethical, impairs distributive justice and human rights, and does not occur in any other part of the world.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Multilayer optimization in radio resource allocation for the packet transmission in wireless networks

In the last decade mobile wireless communications have witnessed an explosive growth in the user’s penetration rate and their widespread deployment around the globe. It is expected that this tendency will continue to increase with the convergence of fixed Internet wired networks with mobile ones and with the evolution to the full IP architecture paradigm. Therefore mobile wireless communications will be of paramount importance on the development of the information society of the near future. In particular a research topic of particular relevance in telecommunications nowadays is related to the design and implementation of mobile communication systems of 4th generation. 4G networks will be characterized by the support of multiple radio access technologies in a core network fully compliant with the Internet Protocol (all IP paradigm). Such networks will sustain the stringent quality of service (QoS) requirements and the expected high data rates from the type of multimedia applications to be available in the near future. The approach followed in the design and implementation of the mobile wireless networks of current generation (2G and 3G) has been the stratification of the architecture into a communication protocol model composed by a set of layers, in which each one encompasses some set of functionalities. In such protocol layered model, communications is only allowed between adjacent layers and through specific interface service points. This modular concept eases the implementation of new functionalities as the behaviour of each layer in the protocol stack is not affected by the others. However, the fact that lower layers in the protocol stack model do not utilize information available from upper layers, and vice versa, downgrades the performance achieved. This is particularly relevant if multiple antenna systems, in a MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) configuration, are implemented. MIMO schemes introduce another degree of freedom for radio resource allocation: the space domain. Contrary to the time and frequency domains, radio resources mapped into the spatial domain cannot be assumed as completely orthogonal, due to the amount of interference resulting from users transmitting in the same frequency sub-channel and/or time slots but in different spatial beams. Therefore, the availability of information regarding the state of radio resources, from lower to upper layers, is of fundamental importance in the prosecution of the levels of QoS expected from those multimedia applications. In order to match applications requirements and the constraints of the mobile radio channel, in the last few years researches have proposed a new paradigm for the layered architecture for communications: the cross-layer design framework. In a general way, the cross-layer design paradigm refers to a protocol design in which the dependence between protocol layers is actively exploited, by breaking out the stringent rules which restrict the communication only between adjacent layers in the original reference model, and allowing direct interaction among different layers of the stack. An efficient management of the set of available radio resources demand for the implementation of efficient and low complexity packet schedulers which prioritize user’s transmissions according to inputs provided from lower as well as upper layers in the protocol stack, fully compliant with the cross-layer design paradigm. Specifically, efficiently designed packet schedulers for 4G networks should result in the maximization of the capacity available, through the consideration of the limitations imposed by the mobile radio channel and comply with the set of QoS requirements from the application layer. IEEE 802.16e standard, also named as Mobile WiMAX, seems to comply with the specifications of 4G mobile networks. The scalable architecture, low cost implementation and high data throughput, enable efficient data multiplexing and low data latency, which are attributes essential to enable broadband data services. Also, the connection oriented approach of Its medium access layer is fully compliant with the quality of service demands from such applications. Therefore, Mobile WiMAX seems to be a promising 4G mobile wireless networks candidate. In this thesis it is proposed the investigation, design and implementation of packet scheduling algorithms for the efficient management of the set of available radio resources, in time, frequency and spatial domains of the Mobile WiMAX networks. The proposed algorithms combine input metrics from physical layer and QoS requirements from upper layers, according to the crosslayer design paradigm. Proposed schedulers are evaluated by means of system level simulations, conducted in a system level simulation platform implementing the physical and medium access control layers of the IEEE802.16e standard.

Resource-allocation capabilities of commercial project management software. An experimental analysis

When project managers determine schedules for resource-constrained projects, they commonly use commercial project management software packages. Which resource-allocation methods are implemented in these packages is proprietary information. The resource-allocation problem is in general computationally difficult to solve to optimality. Hence, the question arises if and how various project management software packages differ in quality with respect to their resource-allocation capabilities. None of the few existing papers on this subject uses a sizeable data set and recent versions of common software packages. We experimentally analyze the resource-allocation capabilities of Acos Plus.1, AdeptTracker Professional, CS Project Professional, Microsoft Office Project 2007, Primavera P6, Sciforma PS8, and Turbo Project Professional. Our analysis is based on 1560 instances of the precedence- and resource-constrained project scheduling problem RCPSP. The experiment shows that using the resource-allocation feature of these packages may lead to a project duration increase of almost 115% above the best known feasible schedule. The increase gets larger with increasing resource scarcity and with increasing number of activities. We investigate the impact of different complexity scenarios and priority rules on the project duration obtained by the software packages. We provide a decision table to support managers in selecting a software package and a priority rule.