The families and friends of heavy drinkers: Caught in the cross-fire of policy change?

INTRODUCTION AND AIMS: Research highlights the need to better understand the impact of alcohol-related harm on families and communities. Scottish policy initiatives to reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm include the planned introduction of a minimum unit price for alcohol. We aimed to explore existing and proposed changes in alcohol policy, from the standpoint of heavy drinkers, through accounts of their involvement and repercussions for family and friends. DESIGN AND METHODS: Interviews were conducted with 20 heavy drinkers, recruited from hospital alcohol treatment centres in Scotland's two largest cities. Participants were part of a larger longitudinal mixed methods study. Interviews explored experiences of alcohol-related harm and the impact, or potential impact, of alcohol policy changes on drinking patterns, risk-taking, consumption and wellbeing. Data coded for 'family and friends' were thematically analysed using a constant comparison method. RESULTS: Family and friends were portrayed as important for aiding moderation and abstinence, but more often for sustaining continued heavy drinking. Heavy drinkers with complex needs and those living in deprived communities suggested that increased alcohol prices could exacerbate the detrimental effect on their health and social circumstances, and that of their family, should their consumption remain excessive. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Population level policy initiatives to reduce alcohol consumption, such as minimum unit pricing, will impact on the families and social networks of heavy drinkers in addition to the drinker. The most vulnerable may be affected disproportionately. Alcohol policy changes and evaluations need to consider consequences for drinkers, families and communities. [O'May F, Whittaker A, Black H, Gill J. The families and friends of heavy drinkers: Caught in the cross-fire of policy change?

Equity research – CTT Correios de Portugal, S.A.

Dissertação de Mestrado, Gestão Empresarial, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Algarve, 2016

Impact of a price-maker pumped storage hydro unit on the integration of wind energy in power systems

The increasing integration of larger amounts of wind energy into power systems raises important operational issues, such as the balance between power generation and demand. The pumped storage hydro (PSH) units are one possible solution to mitigate this problem, once they can store the excess of energy in the periods of higher generation and lower demand. However, the behaviour of a PSH unit may differ considerably from the expected in terms of wind power integration when it operates in a liberalized electricity market under a price-maker context. In this regard, this paper models and computes the optimal PSH weekly scheduling in a price-taker and price-maker scenarios, either when the PSH unit operates in standalone and integrated in a portfolio of other generation assets. Results show that the price-maker standalone PSH will integrate less wind power in comparison with the price-taker situation. Moreover, when the PSH unit is integrated in a portfolio with a base load power plant, the role of the price elasticity of demand may completely change the operational profile of the PSH unit. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A practical approach for profit-based unit commitment with emission limitations

This paper proposes a practical approach for profit-based unit commitment (PBUC) with emission limitations. Under deregulation, unit commitment has evolved from a minimum-cost optimisation problem to a profit-based optimisation problem. However, as a consequence of growing environmental concern, the impact of fossil-fuelled power plants must be considered, giving rise to emission limitations. The simultaneous address of the profit with the emission is taken into account in our practical approach by a multiobjective optimisation (MO) problem. Hence, trade-off Curves between profit and emission are obtained for different energy price profiles, in a way to aid decision-makers concerning emission allowance trading. Moreover, a new parameter is presented, ratio of change, and the corresponding gradient angle, enabling the proper selection of a compromise commitment for the units. A case study based on the standard IEEE 30-bus system is presented to illustrate the proficiency Of Our practical approach for the new competitive and environmentally constrained electricity supply industry.

How market power affects the behaviour of a pumped storage hydro unit in the day-ahead electricity market?

The integration of large amounts of wind energy in power systems raises important operation issues such as the balance between power demand and generation. The pumped storage hydro (PSH) units are seen as one solution for this issue, avoiding the need for wind power curtailments. However, the behavior of a PSH unit might differ considerably when it operates in a liberalized market with some degree of market power. In this regard, a new approach for the optimal daily scheduling of a PSH unit in the day-ahead electricity market was developed and presented in this paper, in which the market power is modeled by a residual inverse demand function with a variable elasticity. The results obtained show that increasing degrees of market power of the PSH unit correspond to decreasing levels of storage and, therefore, the capacity to integrate wind power is considerably reduced under these circumstances.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Estimating the Price of ROCs

The UK government introduced the Renewable Obligation (RO), a system of tradable quotas, to encourage the installation of renewable electricity capacity. Each unit of generation from renewables created a renewable obligation certificate (ROC). Electricity generators must either; earn ROCs through their own production, purchase ROCs in the market or pay the buy-out price to comply with the quota set by the RO. A unique aspect of this regulation is that all entities holding ROCs receive a share of the buy-out fund (the sum of all compliance purchases using the buy-out price). This set-up ensures that the difference between the market price for ROCs and the buy-out price should equal the expected share of the buy-out fund, as regulated entities arbitrage these two compliance options. The expected share of the buy-out fund depends on whether enough renewable generation is available to meet the quota. This analysis tests whether variables associated with renewable generation or electricity demand are correlated with, and thus can help predict, the price of ROCs.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Northern Ireland

In 2009, the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group (SARG) at Sheffield University developed the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version 2.0 (SAPM) to appraise the potential impact of alcohol policies, including different levels of MUP, for the population of England. In 2013, SARG were commissioned by the DHSSPS and the Department for Social Development to adapt the Sheffield Model to NI in order to appraise the potential impact of a range of alcohol pricing policies. The present report represents the results of this work. Estimates from the Northern Ireland (NI) adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model - version 3 - (SAPM3) suggest: 1. Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) policies would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, alcohol related harms (including alcohol-related deaths, hospitalisations, crimes and workplace absences) and the costs associated with those harms. 2. A ban on below-cost selling (implemented as a ban on selling alcohol for below the cost of duty plus the VAT payable on that duty) would have a negligible impact on alcohol consumption or related harms. 3. A ban on price-based promotions in the off-trade, either alone or in tandem with an MUP policy would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, related harms and associated costs. 4. MUP and promotion ban policies would only have a small impact on moderate drinkers at all levels of income. Somewhat larger impacts would be experienced by increasing risk drinkers, with the most substantial effects being experienced by high risk drinkers. 5. MUP and promotion ban policies would have larger impacts on those in poverty, particularly high risk drinkers, than those not in poverty. However, those in poverty also experience larger relative gains in health and are estimated to marginally reduce their spending due to their reduced drinking under the majority of policies åÊ

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Effects of unit - based pricing on the waste collection demand : a meta - regression analysis

We perform a meta - analysis of 21 studies that estimate the elasticity of the price of waste collection demand upon waste quantities, a prior literature review having revealed that the price elasticity differs markedly. Based on a meta - regression with a total of 65 observations, we find no indication that municipal data give higher estimates for price elasticities than those associated with household data. Furthermore, there is no evidence that treating prices as exogenous underestimates the price elasticity. We find that much of the variation can be explained by sample size, the use of a weight - based as opposed to a volume - based pricing system, and the pricing of compostable waste. We also show that price elasticities determined in the USA and point estimations of elasticities are more elastic, but these effects are not robust to the changing of model specifications. Finally, our tests show that there is no evidence of publication bias while there is some evidence of the existence of genuine empirical effect.

Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?

This paper reports graphical and statistical evidence that the inflation targeting regimes in Canada and the UK - but not in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden - actually resemble price-level targeting. In particular, the price level closely tracks the path implied by the inflation target, and the time-series predictions of the "bygones-are-bygones" version of inflation targeting are rejected by the data in favor of those implied by price-level targeting. These results indicate heterogeneity in the actual application of inflation targeting across countries and, for Canada and the UK, imply that the characterization of inflation targeting as a policy where shocks are accommodated is at odds with the data. Moreover, up to extent that their current policies already resemble price-level targeting, the welfare gains of replacing inflation with (explicit) price-level targeting are likely to be small.

Purchasing power parity: the choice of price index

Looking closely at the PPP argument, it states that the currencies purchasing power should not change when comparing the same basket goods across countries, and these goods should all be tradable. Hence, if PPP is valid at all, it should be captured by the relative price indices that best Öts these two features. We ran a horse race among six di§erent price indices available from the IMF database to see which one would yield higher PPP evidence, and, therefore, better Öt the two features. We used RER proxies measured as the ratio of export unit values, wholesale prices, value added deáators, unit labor costs, normalized unit labor costs and consumer prices, for a sample of 16 industrial countries, with quarterly data from 1975 to 2002. PPP was tested using both the ADF and the DFGLS unit root test of the RER series. The RER measured as WPI ratios was the one for which PPP evidence was found for the larger number of countries: six out of sixteen when we use DF-GLS test with demeaned series. The worst measure of all was the RER based on the ratio of foreign CPIs and domestic WPI. No evidence of PPP at all was found for this measure.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.