Interactive semantics

Much research pursues machine intelligence through better representation of semantics. What is semantics? People in different areas view semantics from different facets although it accompanies interaction through civilization. Some researchers believe that humans have some innate structure in mind for processing semantics. Then, what the structure is like? Some argue that humans evolve a structure for processing semantics through constant learning. Then, how the process is like? Humans have invented various symbol systems to represent semantics. Can semantics be accurately represented? Turing machines are good at processing symbols according to algorithms designed by humans, but they are limited in ability to process semantics and to do active interaction. Super computers and high-speed networks do not help solve this issue as they do not have any semantic worldview and cannot reflect themselves. Can future cyber-society have some semantic images that enable machines and individuals (humans and agents) to reflect themselves and interact with each other with knowing social situation through time? This paper concerns these issues in the context of studying an interactive semantics for the future cyber-society. It firstly distinguishes social semantics from natural semantics, and then explores the interactive semantics in the category of social semantics. Interactive semantics consists of an interactive system and its semantic image, which co-evolve and influence each other. The semantic worldview and interactive semantic base are proposed as the semantic basis of interaction. The process of building and explaining semantic image can be based on an evolving structure incorporating adaptive multi-dimensional classification space and self-organized semantic link network. A semantic lens is proposed to enhance the potential of the structure and help individuals build and retrieve semantic images from different facets, abstraction levels and scales through time.

A Hierarchical Architecture with Parallel Comunication for Implementing P Systems

Membrane systems are computational equivalent to Turing machines. However, its distributed and massively parallel nature obtain polynomial solutions opposite to traditional non-polynomial ones. Nowadays, developed investigation for implementing membrane systems has not yet reached the massively parallel character of this computational model. Better published approaches have achieved a distributed architecture denominated “partially parallel evolution with partially parallel communication” where several membranes are allocated at each processor, proxys are used to communicate with membranes allocated at different processors and a policy of access control to the communications is mandatory. With these approaches, it is obtained processors parallelism in the application of evolution rules and in the internal communication among membranes allocated inside each processor. Even though, external communications share a common communication line, needed for the communication among membranes arranged in different processors, are sequential. In this work, we present a new hierarchical architecture that reaches external communication parallelism among processors and substantially increases parallelization in the application of evolution rules and internal communications. Consequently, necessary time for each evolution step is reduced. With all of that, this new distributed hierarchical architecture is near to the massively parallel character required by the model.

Synthetic molecular machines for active self-assembly : prototype algorithms, designs, and experimental study

Computer science and electrical engineering have been the great success story of the twentieth century. The neat modularity and mapping of a language onto circuits has led to robots on Mars, desktop computers and smartphones. But these devices are not yet able to do some of the things that life takes for granted: repair a scratch, reproduce, regenerate, or grow exponentially fast–all while remaining functional.

This thesis explores and develops algorithms, molecular implementations, and theoretical proofs in the context of “active self-assembly” of molecular systems. The long-term vision of active self-assembly is the theoretical and physical implementation of materials that are composed of reconfigurable units with the programmability and adaptability of biology’s numerous molecular machines. En route to this goal, we must first find a way to overcome the memory limitations of molecular systems, and to discover the limits of complexity that can be achieved with individual molecules.

One of the main thrusts in molecular programming is to use computer science as a tool for figuring out what can be achieved. While molecular systems that are Turing-complete have been demonstrated [Winfree, 1996], these systems still cannot achieve some of the feats biology has achieved.

One might think that because a system is Turing-complete, capable of computing “anything,” that it can do any arbitrary task. But while it can simulate any digital computational problem, there are many behaviors that are not “computations” in a classical sense, and cannot be directly implemented. Examples include exponential growth and molecular motion relative to a surface.

Passive self-assembly systems cannot implement these behaviors because (a) molecular motion relative to a surface requires a source of fuel that is external to the system, and (b) passive systems are too slow to assemble exponentially-fast-growing structures. We call these behaviors “energetically incomplete” programmable behaviors. This class of behaviors includes any behavior where a passive physical system simply does not have enough physical energy to perform the specified tasks in the requisite amount of time.

As we will demonstrate and prove, a sufficiently expressive implementation of an “active” molecular self-assembly approach can achieve these behaviors. Using an external source of fuel solves part of the the problem, so the system is not “energetically incomplete.” But the programmable system also needs to have sufficient expressive power to achieve the specified behaviors. Perhaps surprisingly, some of these systems do not even require Turing completeness to be sufficiently expressive.

Building on a large variety of work by other scientists in the fields of DNA nanotechnology, chemistry and reconfigurable robotics, this thesis introduces several research contributions in the context of active self-assembly.

We show that simple primitives such as insertion and deletion are able to generate complex and interesting results such as the growth of a linear polymer in logarithmic time and the ability of a linear polymer to treadmill. To this end we developed a formal model for active-self assembly that is directly implementable with DNA molecules. We show that this model is computationally equivalent to a machine capable of producing strings that are stronger than regular languages and, at most, as strong as context-free grammars. This is a great advance in the theory of active self- assembly as prior models were either entirely theoretical or only implementable in the context of macro-scale robotics.

We developed a chain reaction method for the autonomous exponential growth of a linear DNA polymer. Our method is based on the insertion of molecules into the assembly, which generates two new insertion sites for every initial one employed. The building of a line in logarithmic time is a first step toward building a shape in logarithmic time. We demonstrate the first construction of a synthetic linear polymer that grows exponentially fast via insertion. We show that monomer molecules are converted into the polymer in logarithmic time via spectrofluorimetry and gel electrophoresis experiments. We also demonstrate the division of these polymers via the addition of a single DNA complex that competes with the insertion mechanism. This shows the growth of a population of polymers in logarithmic time. We characterize the DNA insertion mechanism that we utilize in Chapter 4. We experimentally demonstrate that we can control the kinetics of this re- action over at least seven orders of magnitude, by programming the sequences of DNA that initiate the reaction.

In addition, we review co-authored work on programming molecular robots using prescriptive landscapes of DNA origami; this was the first microscopic demonstration of programming a molec- ular robot to walk on a 2-dimensional surface. We developed a snapshot method for imaging these random walking molecular robots and a CAPTCHA-like analysis method for difficult-to-interpret imaging data.

Avatars and the «Imitation Game» – can machines smile?

Considering Alan Turing’s challenge in «Computing Machinery and Intelligence» (1950) – can machines play the «imitation game»? – it is proposed that the requirements of the Turing test are already implicitly being used for checking the credibility of virtual characters and avatars. Like characters, Avatars aim to visually express emotions (the exterior signs of the existence of feeling) and its creators have to resort to emotion codes. Traditional arts have profusely contributed for this field and, together with the science of anatomy, shaped the grounds for current Facial Action Coding System (FACS) and their databases. However, FACS researchers have to improve their «instruction tables» so that the machines will be able, in a near future, to be programmed to carry out the operation of recognizing human expressions (face and body) and classify them adequately. For the moment, the reproductions have to resort to the copy of real life expressions, and the presente smile of avatars comes from mirroring their human users.

Turing Test: Mindless Game?

The Turing Test, originally configured for a human to distinguish between an unseen man and unseen woman through a text-based conversational measure of gender, is the ultimate test for thinking. So conceived Alan Turing when he replaced the woman with a machine. His assertion, that once a machine deceived a human judge into believing that they were the human, then that machine should be attributed with intelligence. But is the Turing Test nothing more than a mindless game? We present results from recent Loebner Prizes, a platform for the Turing Test, and find that machines in the contest appear conversationally worse rather than better, from 2004 to 2006, showing a downward trend in highest scores awarded to them by human judges. Thus the machines are not thinking in the same way as a human intelligent entity would.

Hidden interlocutor misidentification in practical Turing Tests

Based on insufficient evidence, and inadequate research, Floridi and his students report inaccuracies and draw false conclusions in their Minds and Machines evaluation, which this paper aims to clarify. Acting as invited judges, Floridi et al. participated in nine, of the ninety-six, Turing tests staged in the finals of the 18th Loebner Prize for Artificial Intelligence in October 2008. From the transcripts it appears that they used power over solidarity as an interrogation technique. As a result, they were fooled on several occasions into believing that a machine was a human and that a human was a machine. Worse still, they did not realise their mistake. This resulted in a combined correct identification rate of less than 56%. In their paper they assumed that they had made correct identifications when they in fact had been incorrect.

Deception-detection and machine intelligence in practical Turing tests

Deception-detection is the crux of Turing’s experiment to examine machine thinking conveyed through a capacity to respond with sustained and satisfactory answers to unrestricted questions put by a human interrogator. However, in 60 years to the month since the publication of Computing Machinery and Intelligence little agreement exists for a canonical format for Turing’s textual game of imitation, deception and machine intelligence. This research raises from the trapped mine of philosophical claims, counter-claims and rebuttals Turing’s own distinct five minutes question-answer imitation game, which he envisioned practicalised in two different ways: a) A two-participant, interrogator-witness viva voce, b) A three-participant, comparison of a machine with a human both questioned simultaneously by a human interrogator. Using Loebner’s 18th Prize for Artificial Intelligence contest, and Colby et al.’s 1972 transcript analysis paradigm, this research practicalised Turing’s imitation game with over 400 human participants and 13 machines across three original experiments. Results show that, at the current state of technology, a deception rate of 8.33% was achieved by machines in 60 human-machine simultaneous comparison tests. Results also show more than 1 in 3 Reviewers succumbed to hidden interlocutor misidentification after reading transcripts from experiment 2. Deception-detection is essential to uncover the increasing number of malfeasant programmes, such as CyberLover, developed to steal identity and financially defraud users in chatrooms across the Internet. Practicalising Turing’s two tests can assist in understanding natural dialogue and mitigate the risk from cybercrime.

Not another look at the Turing Test!

Practical application of the Turing Test throws up all sorts of questions regarding the nature of intelligence in both machines and humans. For example - Can machines tell original jokes? What would this mean to a machine if it did so? It has been found that acting as an interrogator even top philosophers can be fooled into thinking a machine is human and/or a human is a machine - why is this? Is it that the machine is performing well or is it that the philosopher is performing badly? All these questions, and more, will be considered. Just what does the Turing test tell us about machines and humans? Actual transcripts will be considered with startling results.

Some implications of a sample of practical Turing tests

A series of imitation games involving 3-participant (simultaneous comparison of two hidden entities) and 2-participant (direct interrogation of a hidden entity) were conducted at Bletchley Park on the 100th anniversary of Alan Turing’s birth: 23 June 2012. From the ongoing analysis of over 150 games involving (expert and non-expert, males and females, adults and child) judges, machines and hidden humans (foils for the machines), we present six particular conversations that took place between human judges and a hidden entity that produced unexpected results. From this sample we focus on features of Turing’s machine intelligence test that the mathematician/code breaker did not consider in his examination for machine thinking: the subjective nature of attributing intelligence to another mind.

Human misidentification in Turing tests

This paper presents some important issues on misidentification of human interlocutors in text-based communication during practical Turing tests. The study here presents transcripts in which human judges succumbed to theconfederate effect, misidentifying hidden human foils for machines. An attempt is made to assess the reasons for this. The practical Turing tests in question were held on 23 June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. A selection of actual full transcripts from the tests is shown and an analysis is given in each case. As a result of these tests, conclusions are drawn with regard to the sort of strategies which can perhaps lead to erroneous conclusions when one is involved as an interrogator. Such results also serve to indicate conversational directions to avoid for those machine designers who wish to create a conversational entity that performs well on the Turing test.

Assumption of knowledge and the Chinese Room in Turing test interrogation

Whilst common sense knowledge has been well researched in terms of intelligence and (in particular) artificial intelligence, specific, factual knowledge also plays a critical part in practice. When it comes to testing for intelligence, testing for factual knowledge is, in every-day life, frequently used as a front line tool. This paper presents new results which were the outcome of a series of practical Turing tests held on 23rd June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. The focus of this paper is on the employment of specific knowledge testing by interrogators. Of interest are prejudiced assumptions made by interrogators as to what they believe should be widely known and subsequently the conclusions drawn if an entity does or does not appear to know a particular fact known to the interrogator. The paper is not at all about the performance of machines or hidden humans but rather the strategies based on assumptions of Turing test interrogators. Full, unedited transcripts from the tests are shown for the reader as working examples. As a result, it might be possible to draw critical conclusions with regard to the nature of human concepts of intelligence, in terms of the role played by specific, factual knowledge in our understanding of intelligence, whether this is exhibited by a human or a machine. This is specifically intended as a position paper, firstly by claiming that practicalising Turing's test is a useful exercise throwing light on how we humans think, and secondly, by taking a potentially controversial stance, because some interrogators adopt a solipsist questioning style of hidden entities with a view that it is a thinking intelligent human if it thinks like them and knows what they know. The paper is aimed at opening discussion with regard to the different aspects considered.