Audit Tendering in the UK: A Review of Stakeholders’ Views

This study reports the results of a content analysis of the comment letters sent to the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), in response to its consultation document on the 2012 revisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code, concerning the proposal for mandatory audit tendering. The results indicate a general support for the FRC’s proposals with a number of key concerns related to audit quality, auditor independence and audit cost. There is also clear conflict of interests among some stakeholder groups such as audit firms and companies on one side and institutional investors on the other side. There is evidence of conflict of interest between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. Implications for future consultations and legislations are also discussed.

Structuring of internal control – a case study

The aim of this Master’s thesis is to find out how should internal control be structured in a Finnish retail company in order to fulfil the requirements set out in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code and to be value adding for the company as well as to analyse the added value that a structured and centrally led internal control can provide for the case company. The underlying fundamental theoretical framework of the study essentially stems from the theory of the firm; the agent-principal problem is the primary motivator for internal control. Regulatory requirements determine the thresholds that the internal control of a company must reach. The research was carried out as a case study and methodically the study is qualitative and the empirical data gathering was conducted by interviews and by participant observation. The data gathered (processes, controls etc.) is used to understand the control environment of the company and to assess the current state of internal control. Deficiencies and other points of development identified are then discussed.

Board composition and corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance

In many respects, Australian boards more closely approach normative best practice guidelines for corporate governance than boards in other Western countries. Do Australian firms then demonstrate a board demographic-organisational performance link that has not been found in other economies? We examine the relationships between board demographics and corporate performance in 348 of Australia's largest publicly listed companies and describe the attributes of these firms and their boards. We find that, after controlling for firm size, board size is positively correlated with firm value. We also find a positive relationship between the proportion of inside directors and the market-based measure of firm performance. We discuss the implications of these findings and compare our findings to prevailing research in the US and the UK.

When Corporate Governance crosses the firm borders: family firms in local productive systems

The family involvement in firms is observable is most economies around the world, although there are significant differences among these countries, not only regarding its predominance in these economies, but also in what refers to the levels of involvement of the family in business. This research aims at understanding the family-based firms’ management when compared to non family based, with particular regards to the forms of corporate governance. This analysis is based on case studies and on secondary data found in the literature to support the findings from the empirical research. The data was collected via face to face in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs from the furniture and the events organisation industries (where the family is predominantly present in the furniture but not on the events organisation industry) and with industry and regional business associations. The case studies used in this research allowed the comparison between the Portuguese firms when the family plays an important role in business and those in which the family is absent. It has been found that there are important differences in businesses in countries/industries/local productive systems in which the family is seen as a dominant institution in the society (where businesses are based on strong ties; there is a harmonious relationship between the family members; and the family is accepted locally and dominates the firm organization) and on situations in which the family plays a more marginal role in the society. In fact, the family brings special characteristics to the business, in terms of management, corporate governance, inter and intra firm relationships and succession. Our findings confirm other empirical studies’ results found in the literature. Thus, this article provides a discussion on the factors that play a role in the form of corporate governance structure in family firms highlighting the pros and cons of organising the firm around the family.

The price of honour: The corporate governance of Banco Espirito Santo

The Price of Honour is a case study, supported with teaching notes, which describes the events and circumstances surrounding the implosion of one of Portugal’s most systemically important banks - Banco Espírito Santo (BES). The case focuses on BES’s corporate governance and how the Espírito Santo family’s tight control of the bank led to its exploitation. Although the situation caught the attention of the bank’s supervisors, their untimely actions could not prevent BES’s financial health from crumbling only two months after a rights issue. With little leeway, the supervisors put forward a resolution which dramatically ended the bank’s centennial legacy.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.