Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies' ratings

This study estimates default probabilities of 124 emerging countries from 1981 to 2002 as a function of a set of macroeconomic and political variables. The estimated probabilities are then compared with the default rates implied by sovereign credit ratings of three major international credit rating agencies (CRAs) – Moody's Investor's Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings. Sovereign debt default probabilities are used by investors in pricing sovereign bonds and loans as well as in determining country risk exposure. The study finds that CRAs usually underestimate the risk of sovereign debt as the sovereign credit ratings from rating agencies are usually too optimistic.

Foreign perception of sovereign risk : an event study of the colombian armed conflict

Este paper estudia la relación entre algunos de los eventos más importantes del conflicto colombiano con la percepción extranjera de riesgo soberano, medido por los Credit Default Swaps (CDS) de los bonos del Gobierno Colombiano. Usando dos metodologías relativamente recientes, yo estimo el efecto causal de los eventos de conflicto ampliamente cubierto por los medios internacionales. En primer lugar construyo un grupo de control sintético que funciona como contra factual de la serie real de los CDS colombianos pero en ausencia de eventos de conflicto. Segundo, estimo el efecto acumulado del evento bajo la metodología de retornos anormales acumulados. Los resultados sugieren que los efectos de los eventos de conflicto sobre la percepción extranjera de riesgo soberano dependen de las especificaciones de cada evento.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Terms of trade, macroeconomic dynamics and default decisions

A evidência empírica aponta que Termos de Troca é uma variável relevante tanto para dinâmica macroeconômica como para o risco de default em países emergentes. No entanto, a literatura de dívida soberana baseada nos trabalhos de Eaton e Gerzovitz (1981) e Arellano (2008) ainda não explorou de forma adequada as conecções entre a dinâmica de termos de troca e incentivos ao default. Nós contribuímos nessa área, introduzindo volatilidade de Termos de Troca no modelo proposto por Mendoza e Yue (2012), no qual as decisões de dívida soberana são vinculadas à um modelo de equilíbrio geral para a economia doméstica. Nós encontramos que uma economia exposta à volatilidade dos termos de troca consegue produzir uma variabilidade do consumo que supera significativamente a variabilidade do produto, característica que constitui um fato estilizado chave de business cycles de países emergentes. Nossos exercícios também mostram que decisões de default são geradas por mudanças bruscas nos termos de troca, mas não necessariamente estão vinculados à estados ruins da economia.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Az államcsőd költségei régen és ma (Costs of sovereign defaults now and long ago)

Az államoknak nyújtott hitelekre gyakran gondolunk biztonságos befektetésként, lehetetlen vagy legalábbis valószerűtlen kimenetelként kezelve az államcsőd lehetőségét. Pedig államcsődök azóta vannak, amióta szuverén államok hitelt vesznek fel, és még csak nem is ritka eseményekről van szó. Amikor egy-egy válság vagy csődesemény felhívja erre a figyelmünket, a leggyakrabban elhangzó kérdés az, hogy miért következett be a csőd. Ebben a tanulmányban a szerző ennél furcsább kérdésre hívja fel a figyelmet: mi késztet egy hitelt felvevő államot arra, hogy visszafizesse hiteleit, vagyis miért nem megy csődbe? Ez rögtön felvet egy további, talán még meglepőbb problémát: miért kap egyáltalán egy szuverén állam hitelt? Ezekre a kérdésekre már régóta tudni véljük a választ: azért, mert az államcsődnek költségei vannak. A lehetséges költségek és a hozzájuk kapcsolódó empirikus kutatások értelmezésével és rendszerezésével, az ellentmondások feltárásával azonban a szerző felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy bár elképzeléseink vannak és lehetnek, valójában nem ismerjük a törlesztést kikényszerítő és így az államadósságok létezését biztosító mechanizmusokat. Talán éppen azért nem, mert az államcsőd lehetséges politikai, gazdasági következményei - azaz költségei - idővel legalább annyira változnak, mint öltözködési, étkezési és közlekedési szokásaink. ____ Loans to sovereign states are often referred to as safe investments, treating default as an impossible or at least improbable event. Yet sovereign defaults have been arising ever since countries borrowed money. They are not rare at all. When a debt crisis or default event draws attention to the problem, the commonest question put is why defaults occur. This paper stresses the need to ask a less common question as well: why sovereign states repay loans, why they do not default. Consequent on that is why rational lenders give money to countries. The answer to these questions seems to be because defaults are costly. The paper reviews and systematizes possible cost types and explores inconsistencies in the related literature, to show that the mechanisms supporting the existence of sovereign debts are not precisely known. One reason why costs of defaults are challenging to study may be that the possible political and economic consequences of defaults change over time.

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans : Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant’s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.

Don’t judge a superannuation default investment option by its name

With the massive decline in savings arising from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it is timely to review superannuation fund investment and disclosure strategies in the lead-up to the crisis. Accordingly, this study examines differences among superannuation funds’ default investment options in terms of naming and framing over three years from 2005 to 2007, as presented in product disclosure statements (PDSs). The findings indicate that default options are becoming more alike regardless of their name, and consequently, members may face increasing difficulties in distinguishing between balanced and growth-named default options when comparing them across superannuation funds. Comparability is also likely to be constrained by variations in the framing of default options presented in investment option menus in PDSs. These findings highlight the need for standardisation of default option definitions and disclosures to ensure descriptive accuracy, transparency and comparability.

Default judgment set aside without costs

A recent District Court case is believed to be the first in Queensland in which UCPR r 5 has been used to support the setting aside of a regularly entered default judgment without a costs order.

Default, deadlock and remedies

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of common default provisions and the range of common law and equitable remedies available to a joint venture partner in the event of default by a co-venturer. Because of the various joint venture vehicles such as trusts, corporations, partnerships and others, it is proposed to deal only generally with these questions.