Igualitarismo, estructura básica y contextualismo rawlsiano

En este trabajo se analiza si es apropiado evaluar acciones individuales con los principios de justicia aplicables a las instituciones. Para lograr este objetivo, el artículo examina la teoría de la justicia rawlsiana y algunas de las principales objeciones en su contra. Los críticos niegan que los principios de justicia de esta teoría estén configurados para evaluar exclusivamente las instituciones sociales básicas. Es más: afirman que la justicia no sólo exige instituciones justas sino que además exige acciones individuales justas. La hipótesis de este trabajo afirma que principios aptos para ciertos contextos sociales no son adecuados para evaluar otro tipo de interacciones sociales. El argumento apela a una interpretación normativa de la noción de estructura básica, elemento clave para defender el carácter institucional de la justicia rawlsiana

Cumplimiento gubernamental y estilos de gobernar. Análisis de los gobiernos de los municipios semi-urbanos de Michoacán, México

Con la construcción y operación de indicadores se calcularon dos índices, uno para determinar el nivel de cumplimiento de los procesos elementales que tienen que realizar los gobiernos de los municipios semiurbanos de Michoacán, y otro para fi jar su estilo de gobernar. El índice de cumplimiento gubernamental muestra que estas municipalidades atienden parcialmente la mayoría de sus labores básicas. Su ejercicio prácticamente se da por inercia. El otro índice muestra que siguen trabajando con la visión tradicional de gobernar. Se trata de un estilo donde el protagonismo del alcalde es alto con nulas prácticas estables de participación social. Correlacionando ambos índices, se puede plantear -hasta cierto punto- que el bajo cumplimiento se debe al estilo de gobernar. Los índices además explican que la posición estratégica de semi-urbanidad no es aprovechada por el gobierno para promover otros estilos de gobernar en busca de mejorar su cumplimiento. Diversos grupos ciudadanos -en estos municipios- han formado gobiernos alternativos que sustituyen al gobierno formal, en otros se han constituido gobiernos paralelos.

The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation

Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well-known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.

La cooperación técnica y la transformación productiva con equidad = Technical cooperation and changing production patterns with social equity

Incluye Bibliografía

Institutionality, logistics and international cooperation for the economic and social development: The case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia

Includes bibliography.

The social construction of cooperation: exchange, identification and collective intentions within the organization

My aim is to develop a theory of cooperation within the organization and empirically test it. Drawing upon social exchange theory, social identity theory, the idea of collective intentions, and social constructivism, the main assumption of my work implies that both cooperation and the organization itself are continually shaped and restructured by actions, judgments, and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved. Therefore, I propose that the decision to cooperate, expressed say as an intention to cooperate, reflects and depends on a three step social process shaped by the interpretations of the actors involved. The first step entails an instrumental evaluation of cooperation in terms of social exchange. In the second step, this “social calculus” is translated into cognitive, emotional and evaluative reactions directed toward the organization. Finally, once the identification process is completed and membership awareness is established, I propose that individuals will start to think largely in terms of “We” instead of “I”. Self-goals are redefined at the collective level, and the outcomes for self, others, and the organization become practically interchangeable. I decided to apply my theory to an important cooperative problem in management research: knowledge exchange within organizations. Hence, I conducted a quantitative survey among the members of the virtual community, “www.borse.it” (n=108). Within this community, members freely decide to exchange their knowledge about the stock market among themselves. Because of the confirmatory requirements and the structural complexity of the theory proposed (i.e., the proposal that instrumental evaluations will induce social identity and this in turn will causes collective intentions), I use Structural Equation Modeling to test all hypotheses in this dissertation. The empirical survey-based study found support for the theory of cooperation proposed in this dissertation. The findings suggest that an appropriate conceptualization of the decision to exchange knowledge is one where collective intentions depend proximally on social identity (i.e., cognitive identification, affective commitment, and evaluative engagement) with the organization, and this identity depends on instrumental evaluations of cooperators (i.e., perceived value of the knowledge received, assessment of past reciprocity, expected reciprocity, and expected social outcomes of the exchange). Furthermore, I find that social identity fully mediates the effects of instrumental motives on collective intentions.

The coevolution of cooperation and dispersal in social groups and its implications for the emergence of multicellularity

Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.