General revenue sharing: initial state & local data elements.

Cover title.

Renewal of general revenue sharing.

Mode of access: Internet.

General revenue sharing: final state & local data elements.

Cover title.

General revenue sharing: initial interstate data & allocations.

Mode of access: Internet.

Economic considerations for manpower revenue sharing /

Available from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va.

Predicting success or failure of tax -base revenue sharing attempts: A comparative analysis

To promote regional or mutual improvement, numerous interjurisdictional efforts to share tax bases have been attempted. Most of these efforts fail to be consummated. Motivations to share revenues include: narrowing fiscal disparities, enhancing regional cooperation and economic development, rationalizing land-use, and minimizing revenue losses caused by competition to attract and keep businesses. Various researchers have developed theories to aid understanding of why interjurisdictional cooperation efforts succeed or fail. Walter Rosenbaum and Gladys Kammerer studied two contemporaneous Florida local-government consolidation attempts. Boyd Messinger subsequently tested their Theory of Successful Consolidation on nine consolidation attempts. Paul Peterson's dual theories on Modern Federalism posit that all governmental levels attempt to further economic development and that politicians act in ways that either further their futures or cement job security. Actions related to the latter theory often interfere with the former. Samuel Nunn and Mark Rosentraub sought to learn how interjurisdictional cooperation evolves. Through multiple case studies they developed a model framing interjurisdictional cooperation in four dimensions. ^ This dissertation investigates the ability of the above theories to help predict success or failure of regional tax-base revenue sharing attempts. A research plan was formed that used five sequenced steps to gather data, analyze it, and conclude if hypotheses concerning the application of these theories were valid. The primary analytical tools were: multiple case studies, cross-case analysis, and pattern matching. Data was gathered from historical records, questionnaires, and interviews. ^ The results of this research indicate that Rosenbaum-Kammerer theory can be a predictor of success or failure in implementing tax-base revenue sharing if it is amended as suggested by Messinger and further modified by a recommendation in this dissertation. Peterson's Functional and Legislative theories considered together were able to predict revenue sharing proposal outcomes. Many of the indicators of interjurisdictional cooperation forwarded in the Nunn-Rosentraub model appeared in the cases studied, but the model was not a reliable forecasting instrument. ^

Local government revenue from oil and gas production

Oil and gas production generates substantial revenue for state and local governments. This report examines revenue from oil and gas production flowing to local governments through four mechanisms: (i) state taxes or fees on oil and gas production; (ii) local property taxes on oil and gas property; (iii) leasing of state-owned land; and (iv) leasing of federally owned land. We examine every major oil- and gas-producing state and find that the share of oil and gas production value allocated to and collected by local governments ranges widely, from 0.5 percent to more than 9 percent due to numerous policy differences among states. School districts and trust funds endowing future school operations tend to see the highest share of revenue, followed by counties. Municipalities and other local governments with more limited geographic boundaries tend to receive smaller shares of oil and gas driven revenue. Some states utilize grant programs to allocate revenue to where impacts from the industry are greatest. Others send most revenue to state operating or trust funds, with little revenue earmarked specifically for local governments.

Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.

A economia política das transferências fiscais no Brasil: o Fundo de Participação dos Estados (FPE) contribuiu no processo de redução das disparidades regionais entre 1985 e 2009?

O compromisso político com a redução da desigualdade regional é antigo e reaparece, na história do Brasil, em todos os momentos de rediscussão do pacto federativo. Um dos instrumentos centrais de sustentação do federalismo fiscal é a partilha de receitas arrecadadas, de maneira centralizada, pela União. No Brasil, o Fundo de Participação dos Estados (FPE), criado em 1967, responde pela função de partilha, entre os estados, das receitas arrecadadas com impostos federais. O presente trabalho propõe um modelo de análise do FPE, tendo como objetivo avaliar seus impactos sobre a dinâmica de redução da desigualdade interestadual observada no período recente. Em verdade, busca-se avaliar se as expectativas dos atores políticos que engendraram a criação do fundo se confirmaram, isto é, se a partilha de receitas entre os estados foi eficaz para promover a redução das disparidades regionais no processo de desenvolvimento econômico ocorrido no Brasil.

Antirecession fiscal assistance to state and local governments.

Describes the antirecession fiscal assistance allocation process and lists each recipient government individually, showing the allocation and payment for each quarter with the unemployment rate data upon which the allocation is based.

Payment.

"This publication lists the payments made to government units as provided under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (P.L.92-512)."

Entitlement period allocations with prior period adjustments.

Title varies slightly.

Federal-state-local fiscal relations : report to the President and the Congress.

"September 1985."