As máscaras do narrador realista: uma leitura de Jacques le fataliste de Denis Diderot

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What are the metacognitive costs of young children's overconfidence?

Children typically hold very optimistic views of their own skills but so far, only a few studies have investigated possible correlates of the ability to predict performance accurately. Therefore, this study examined the role of individual differences in performance estimation accuracy as a global metacognitive index for different monitoring and control skills (item-level judgments of learning [JOLs] and confidence judgments [CJs]), metacognitive control processes (allocation of study time and control of answers), and executive functions (cognitive flexibility, inhibition, working memory) in 6-year-olds (N=93). The three groups of under estimators, realists and over estimators differed significantly in their monitoring and control abilities: the under estimators outperformed the over estimators by showing a higher discrimination in CJs between correct and incorrect recognition. Also, the under estimators scored higher on the adequate control of incorrectly recognized items. Regarding the interplay of monitoring and control processes, under estimators spent more time studying items with low JOLs, and relied more systematically on their monitoring when controlling their recognition compared to over estimators. At the same time, the three groups did not differ significantly from each other in their executive functions. Overall, results indicate that differences in performance estimation accuracy are systematically related to other global and item-level metacognitive monitoring and control abilities in children as young as six years of age, while no meaningful association between performance estimation accuracy and executive functions was found.

El efecto Duchamp

En una literatura en la que ha desaparecido el valor y los fantasmas perdieron consistencia, el lenguaje es un ready made de clichés. Algunas novelas actuales, sin embargo, han merecido el epíteto de verdaderas" (Jarkowski 2008) o "auténticas" (Lemus 2004). La magia ha regresado, y los narradores, aunque sus relatos sean inconclusos, indiferentes e incluso frívolos, interpelan al lector como los grandes realistas (Lukács 1971) porque el efecto de los textos es indicial. Señalan -con brutalidad o con delicia- el desfasaje entre lo que se dice y lo que se hace o lo que se deja de hacer. Nombran así, con palabras comunes y sin ninguna distancia, deseos singulares: los suyos y los nuestros (Aira 1988: 59)

El efecto Duchamp

En una literatura en la que ha desaparecido el valor y los fantasmas perdieron consistencia, el lenguaje es un ready made de clichés. Algunas novelas actuales, sin embargo, han merecido el epíteto de verdaderas" (Jarkowski 2008) o "auténticas" (Lemus 2004). La magia ha regresado, y los narradores, aunque sus relatos sean inconclusos, indiferentes e incluso frívolos, interpelan al lector como los grandes realistas (Lukács 1971) porque el efecto de los textos es indicial. Señalan -con brutalidad o con delicia- el desfasaje entre lo que se dice y lo que se hace o lo que se deja de hacer. Nombran así, con palabras comunes y sin ninguna distancia, deseos singulares: los suyos y los nuestros (Aira 1988: 59)

El efecto Duchamp

En una literatura en la que ha desaparecido el valor y los fantasmas perdieron consistencia, el lenguaje es un ready made de clichés. Algunas novelas actuales, sin embargo, han merecido el epíteto de verdaderas" (Jarkowski 2008) o "auténticas" (Lemus 2004). La magia ha regresado, y los narradores, aunque sus relatos sean inconclusos, indiferentes e incluso frívolos, interpelan al lector como los grandes realistas (Lukács 1971) porque el efecto de los textos es indicial. Señalan -con brutalidad o con delicia- el desfasaje entre lo que se dice y lo que se hace o lo que se deja de hacer. Nombran así, con palabras comunes y sin ninguna distancia, deseos singulares: los suyos y los nuestros (Aira 1988: 59)

Ambivalent Sovereignty

Ambivalent Sovereignty inquires into the subject of political realism. This subject, sovereign authority, appears to have a dual foundation. It appears divided against itself, but how can realism nonetheless observe legitimate modes of sovereignty emerge? Against the liberal idea that a "synthesis" of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive powers should be accomplished, within the world of international relations, realism gives meaning to a structural type of state power that is also constitutionally and legitimately dividing itself--against itself. Machiavelli but particularly also other realists such as Hannah Arendt, Max Weber, and Aristotle are being reinterpreted to demonstrate why each state's ultimate authority may symbiotically emerge from its self-divisions, rather than from one synthetic unity. Whereas liberal theorists, from Montesquieu to John Rawls and Alexander Wendt, err too far in assuming the presence of the state's monistic authority, the realist theorists further advance an answer to how sovereign states may begin to both recognize and include only the most-legitimate manifestations of their common dualist authority. Ambivalent Sovereignty is relevant in this sense as it transcends-and-yet-includes these common dualities: freedom/necessity; emergence/causation; self-organization/power structures.

El mito contrarrevolucionario de la «Restauración»

Durante la guerra de la independencia los sectores ultra-realistas construyeron la imagen de que el mundo anterior había sido atacado en sus bases y destruidos los elementos que lo sustentaban. Una amplia publicística fue creciendo en este contexto. Sin embargo, ante el inminente regreso del rey en 1814, vieron la oportunidad de recuperar el poder perdido y cambiaron de estrategia. El mito de la recuperación del orden perdido mediante la restauración de los Borbones va a ser el instrumento del que los realistas se valdrán para negar la magnitud de los cambios vividos durante aquellos años. El presente artículo intenta explicar la importancia que tuvo la construcción del mito de la restauración para sustentar el golpe contrarrevolucionario de mayo de 1814.

The new realism: coöperative studies in philosophy by Edwin B. Holt,

Introduction.--The emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology, by W. T. Marvin.--A realistic theory of independence, by R. B. Perry.--A defense of analysis, by E. G. Spaulding.--A realistic theory of truth and error, by W. P. Montague.--The place of illusory experience in a realistic world, by E. B. Holt.--Some realistic implications of biology, by W. B. Pitkin.--Appendix: Program and first platform of six realists (reprinted from the J. of phil., psychol., etc., 1910, 7, 393) Montague on Holt; Holt on Montague; Pitkin on Montague and Holt.

The madness that is the world:young activists' emotional reasoning and their participation in a local Occupy movement

The focus of this paper is young people’s participation in the Occupy protest movement that emerged in the early autumn of 2011. Its concern is with the emotional dimensions of this and in particular the significance of emotions to the reasoning of young people who came to commit significant time and energy to the movement. Its starting point is the critique of emotions as narrowly subjective, whereby the passions that events like Occupy arouse are treated as beyond the scope of human reason. The rightful rejection of this reductionist argument has given rise to an interest in under- standings of the emotional content of social and political protest as normatively con- stituted, but this paper seeks a different perspective by arguing that the emotions of Occupy activists can be regarded as a reasonable force. It does so by discussing find- ings from long-term qualitative research with a Local Occupy movement somewhere in England and Wales. Using the arguments of social realists, the paper explores this data to examine why things matter sufficiently for young people to care about them and how the emotional force that this involves constitutes an indispensable source of reason in young activists’ decisions to become involved in Local Occupy.

Agency as vulnerability:accounting for children's movement to the streets of Accra

This paper considers the agency of children moving to the streets of Accra, Ghana's capital city. A much used but largely unexamined concept, agency is nevertheless commonly deployed in childhood studies as a means to stress the capacity of children to choose to do things. In the literature on street and working children, and a cognate area of study concerned with children's independent migration, this has involved accounts of children's agency made meaningful by reference to theories of rational choice or to the normative force of childhood. It is our argument that both approaches leave unanswered important questions and to counter these omissions we draw upon the arguments of social realists and, in particular, the stress they place on vulnerability as the basis for human agency. We develop this argument further by reference to our research with street children. By drawing upon the children's accounts of leaving their households and heading for Accra's streets, it is our contention that these children do frame their departures as matters of individual choice and self-determination, and that in doing so they speak of a considerable capacity for action. Nevertheless, a deeper reading of their testimonies also points to the children's understandings of their own vulnerability. By examining what we see as their inability to be dependent upon family and kin, we stress the importance of the children's perceptions of their vulnerability, frailty and need as the basis for a fuller understanding of their agency in leaving their households. © 2013 The Author. The Sociological Review © 2013 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review.

What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.

L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.