The foundations of the rule of law

Formal conceptions of the rule of law are popular among contemporary legal philosophers. Nonetheless, the coherence of accounts of the rule of law committed to these conceptions is sometimes fractured by elements harkening back to substantive conceptions of the rule of law. I suggest that this may be because at its origins the ideal of the rule of law was substantive through and through. I also argue that those origins are older than is generally supposed. Most authors tend to trace the ideas of the rule of law and natural law back to classical Greece, but I show that they are already recognisable and intertwined as far back as Homer. Because the founding moment of the tradition of western intellectual reflection on the rule of law placed concerns about substantive justice at the centre of the rule of law ideal, it may be hard for this ideal to entirely shrug off its substantive content. It may be undesirable, too, given the rhetorical power of appeals to the rule of law. The rule of law means something quite radical in Homer; this meaning may provide a source of normative inspiration for contemporary reflections about the rule of law.

Repensando a relação entre estado, direito e desenvolvimento: os limites do paradigma rule of law e a relevância das alternativas institucionais

Assumindo a primazia da abordagem institucionalista na agenda contemporânea do desenvolvimento, este artigo procurará discutir alguns de seus limites, descritivos e normativos, no que tange, em especial, ao sistema financeiro. Particularmente, procurar-se-á sugerir que os programas de difusão do rule of law têm se constituído em um paradigma estreito do papel exercido pelo direito, segundo a qual cabe ao ambiente jurídico cumprir, apenas e tão somente, a função de garantidor dos interesses de investidores privados, entendidos como atores centrais de um modelo de financiamento baseado em transações de mercado. O texto sugere que o paradigma rule of law, como estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento, tem dificuldade em lidar com a existência de alternativas institucionais de organização econômica e financeira, para além de um modelo de mercado baseado em atores atomizados e carentes de segurança jurídica. Um exemplo disso, que escapa do instrumental tradicional, é o modelo brasileiro de financiamento, que, apesar de ter vivenciado inúmeras reformas institucionais, dedicadas a elevar o nível de proteção de investidores, ainda concentra em um banco de desenvolvimento – o BNDES – grande parte do financiamento de longo prazo do país. O artigo assume, portanto, que, sim, o direito e as instituições, de fato, importam para o desenvolvimento, mas há uma variedade de possibilidades e funções a serem exercidas pelos arranjos institucionais e ferramentas jurídicas – muito além do que supõem os programas de rule of law. Uma bem sucedida organização institucional baseada em um banco de desenvolvimento é um exemplo disso.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

A model of the rule of law

Economic development requires some limits on what those in power can do | the rule of law | but how can restraints be imposed on the powerful when there is no-one above them? This paper studies equilibrium rules allocating power and resources established by selfinterested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.

Políticas de conteúdo local: crescimento econômico e rule of law

As chamadas Políticas de Conteúdo Local (“PCLs”) fazem parte de um grupo de políticas desenvolvimentistas adotadas em todo o mundo com o objetivo de maximizar os benefícios sociais e econômicos decorrentes de determinadas atividades econômicas. Neste trabalho, analisaram-se, principalmente, as PCLs relativas à extração e produção de petróleo e gás. O instituto é juridicamente polêmico, uma vez que, além de ser difícil de definir, é instrumentalizado por diversos atos normativos diferentes. Tal situação agrava-se com o fato de que o desenho de cada PCL pode sugerir ou impor diversas medidas de implementação diferentes, com impactos nas diferentes áreas do Direito. Considerando este cenário, aponta-se que o principal objetivo deste trabalho é a análise de transplantes ao nosso ordenamento jurídico de PCLs bem-sucedidas em ordenamentos jurídicos estrangeiros. Para isso, demonstrou-se, em um primeiro momento, que o instituto das PCLs deve ser reinterpretado à luz da Constituição vigente. Isso porque as PCLs foram criadas em uma época em que a escola desenvolvimentista principal era a keynesiana, que foi substituída atualmente pela escola do Rule of Law. Embora nosso ordenamento jurídico tenha acompanhado essa evolução (através de Emendas Constitucionais e adoção de determinadas leis), as PCLs não acompanharam e, por isso, precisam sofrer essa releitura. Nesse sentido, extraíram-se da Lei quatro elementos principais que as PCLs devem preencher para estar em consonância com o Rule of Law: (A) Benefícios aos Consumidores Finais; (B) Sustentabilidade; (C) Transetorialidade; e (D) Ampliação do Mercado de Trabalho. Em sequência, classificaram-se as diversas PCLs mapeadas, exemplificando cada uma. Ao longo da classificação, apontaram-se três critérios que facilitam a identificação das maiores dificuldades jurídicas em cada transplante: (A) Canal; (B) Natureza; e (C) Instrumento. Por fim, quatro PCLs estrangeiras bem-sucedidas foram escolhidas para uma análise mais aprofundada: a Kazakhstan Contract Agency, no Cazaquistão, a Petro Arctic Supplier Asssociation, na Noruega, o Australian Industry Participation Plan na Austrália e o Nigerian Oil & Gas Content Industry Development Act, na Nigéria. Para cada uma, é dedicada uma análise especial. As análises são seguidas pela Conclusão.

Nota sobre el Rule of Law y la ética de la virtud

Fil: Massini Correas, Carlos I.. Universidad de Mendoza

Rule of law e qualidade legislativa : evidências do Supremo Tribunal Federal / Leon Victor de Queiroz Barbosa, Ernani Carvalho, José Mário Wanderley Gomes Neto. --

Inclui notas explicativas, bibliográficas e bibliografia.

The European Union’s Rule of Law Promotion in its Neighbourhood: A Structural Foreign Policy Analysis. EU Diplomacy Paper 04/2013

The promotion of the rule of law has become an important dimension of the European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a complex and multifaceted notion and the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework of structural foreign policy (SFP) developed by Stephan Keukeleire. It aims to promote an original analytical perspective on the EU’s foreign policy but also to critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder of the TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy in the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.

Rule of law or rule of thumb? A new Copenhagen mechanism for the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 303, 20 November 2013

This Policy Brief synthesises the main research findings and policy recommendations presented in the CEPS e-book entitled The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law: Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism” (http://www.ceps.eu/book/triangular-relationship-between-fundamental-righ...). The authors examine the ways in which the European Union could strengthen and develop its competences in the assessment of member states’ fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law commitments. They argue that a strong political impetus is needed at Union level in order to set up a new supervisory “Copenhagen Mechanism” that would effectively and periodically evaluate member states’ compliance with democratic rule of law with fundamental rights on the basis of independent academic expertise, and by ensuring a high level of democratic accountability and judicial oversight at European levels. The Policy Brief also aims at summarising CEPS’ contribution to the upcoming Conference “Assises de la Justice: Shaping Justice Policies in Europe for the Years to Come” organised by the European Commission in Brussels on 21-22 November 2013.