Holism and structural realism

We first introduce structural realism as a position in the metaphysics of science, pointing out the way in which this position replaces intrinsic properties with relations so that it amounts to a holistic in contrast to an atomistic metaphysics. We argue in favour of a moderate version of structural realism that puts objects and relations on the same ontological footing and assess the general philosophical arguments for this position. The second section shows how structural realism gains support from quantum physics. The third section explains how structural realism can be applied to the metaphysics of space-time.

Holism and structural realism

We first introduce structural realism as a position in the metaphysics of science, pointing out the way in which this position replaces intrinsic properties with relations so that it amounts to a holistic in contrast to an atomistic metaphysics. We argue in favour of a moderate version of structural realism that puts objects and relations on the same ontological footing and assess the general philosophical arguments for this position. The second section shows how structural realism gains support from quantum physics. The third section explains how structural realism can be applied to the metaphysics of space-time.

Visual realism enhances realistic response in an immersive virtual environment

Participants in an immersive virtual environment interact with the scene from an egocentric point of view that is, where there bodies appear to be located rather than from outside as if looking through a window. People interact through normal body movements, such as head-turning,reaching, and bending, and within the tracking limitations move through the environment or effect changes within it in natural ways.

Causal Warrant for Realism about Particle Physics

While scientific realism generally assumes that successful scientific explanations yield information about reality, realists also have to admit that not all information acquired in this way is equally well warranted. Some versions of scientific realism do this by saying that explanatory posits with which we have established some kind of causal contact are better warranted than those that merely appear in theoretical hypotheses. I first explicate this distinction by considering some general criteria that permit us to distinguish causal warrant from theoretical warrant. I then apply these criteria to a specific case from particle physics, claiming that scientific realism has to incorporate the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant if it is to be an adequate stance in the philosophy of particle physics.

Visual realism enhances realistic response in an immersive virtual environment

Participants in an immersive virtual environment interact with the scene from an egocentric point of view that is, where there bodies appear to be located rather than from outside as if looking through a window. People interact through normal body movements, such as head-turning,reaching, and bending, and within the tracking limitations move through the environment or effect changes within it in natural ways.

Visual realism enhances realistic response in an immersive virtual environment - Part2

Does realistic lighting in an immersive virtual reality application enhance presence, where participants feel that they are in the scene and behave correspondingly? Our previous study indicated that presence is more likely with real-time ray tracing compared with ray casting, but we could not separate the effects of overall quality of illumination from the dynamic effects of real-time shadows and reflections. Here we describe an experiment where 20 people experienced a scene rendered with global or local illumination. However, in both conditions there were dynamically changing shadows and reflections. We found that the quality of illumination did not impact presence, so that the earlier result must have been due to dynamic shadows and reflections. However, global illumination resulted in greater plausibility - participants were more likely to respond as if the virtual events were real. We conclude that global illumination does impact the responses of participants and is worth the effort.

Dialogue in the crisis of representation : realism and antirealism in the context of the conversation between theologians and quantum physicists in Göttingen 1949-1961

The aim of this study is to analyse the content of the interdisciplinary conversations in Göttingen between 1949 and 1961. The task is to compare models for describing reality presented by quantum physicists and theologians. Descriptions of reality indifferent disciplines are conditioned by the development of the concept of reality in philosophy, physics and theology. Our basic problem is stated in the question: How is it possible for the intramental image to match the external object?Cartesian knowledge presupposes clear and distinct ideas in the mind prior to observation resulting in a true correspondence between the observed object and the cogitative observing subject. The Kantian synthesis between rationalism and empiricism emphasises an extended character of representation. The human mind is not a passive receiver of external information, but is actively construing intramental representations of external reality in the epistemological process. Heidegger's aim was to reach a more primordial mode of understanding reality than what is possible in the Cartesian Subject-Object distinction. In Heidegger's philosophy, ontology as being-in-the-world is prior to knowledge concerning being. Ontology can be grasped only in the totality of being (Dasein), not only as an object of reflection and perception. According to Bohr, quantum mechanics introduces an irreducible loss in representation, which classically understood is a deficiency in knowledge. The conflicting aspects (particle and wave pictures) in our comprehension of physical reality, cannot be completely accommodated into an entire and coherent model of reality. What Bohr rejects is not realism, but the classical Einsteinian version of it. By the use of complementary descriptions, Bohr tries to save a fundamentally realistic position. The fundamental question in Barthian theology is the problem of God as an object of theological discourse. Dialectics is Barth¿s way to express knowledge of God avoiding a speculative theology and a human-centred religious self-consciousness. In Barthian theology, the human capacity for knowledge, independently of revelation, is insufficient to comprehend the being of God. Our knowledge of God is real knowledge in revelation and our words are made to correspond with the divine reality in an analogy of faith. The point of the Bultmannian demythologising programme was to claim the real existence of God beyond our faculties. We cannot simply define God as a human ideal of existence or a focus of values. The theological programme of Bultmann emphasised the notion that we can talk meaningfully of God only insofar as we have existential experience of his intervention. Common to all these twentieth century philosophical, physical and theological positions, is a form of anti-Cartesianism. Consequently, in regard to their epistemology, they can be labelled antirealist. This common insight also made it possible to find a common meeting point between the different disciplines. In this study, the different standpoints from all three areas and the conversations in Göttingen are analysed in the frameworkof realism/antirealism. One of the first tasks in the Göttingen conversations was to analyse the nature of the likeness between the complementary structures inquantum physics introduced by Niels Bohr and the dialectical forms in the Barthian doctrine of God. The reaction against epistemological Cartesianism, metaphysics of substance and deterministic description of reality was the common point of departure for theologians and physicists in the Göttingen discussions. In his complementarity, Bohr anticipated the crossing of traditional epistemic boundaries and the generalisation of epistemological strategies by introducing interpretative procedures across various disciplines.

Models, truth and realism: assessing Bas van Fraassen's views on scientific representation

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen's views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism (or at least homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called "semantic" or "model-theoretic" construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen's pragmatic - and antirealist - "dissolution" of the "loss of reality objection" loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them.

The inadequate dominance of realism : an analysis of the U.S. war on terror /

There has been and will continue to be substantial debate over how the international system can best be characterized. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the international system can best be characterized by the essential features of realism, but the use of realist policy prescriptions are inadequate when applied independently to deal with the threat of terrorism as it exists today. In order to demonstrate this an examination of realism in the international system, U.S. foreign policy, and case analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq will be undertaken to demonstrate that although realist policy prescriptions do have a role in dealing with modem transnational security threats, these prescriptions on their own are inadequate when dealing with terrorism.