The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans : Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant’s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.

Don’t judge a superannuation default investment option by its name

With the massive decline in savings arising from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it is timely to review superannuation fund investment and disclosure strategies in the lead-up to the crisis. Accordingly, this study examines differences among superannuation funds’ default investment options in terms of naming and framing over three years from 2005 to 2007, as presented in product disclosure statements (PDSs). The findings indicate that default options are becoming more alike regardless of their name, and consequently, members may face increasing difficulties in distinguishing between balanced and growth-named default options when comparing them across superannuation funds. Comparability is also likely to be constrained by variations in the framing of default options presented in investment option menus in PDSs. These findings highlight the need for standardisation of default option definitions and disclosures to ensure descriptive accuracy, transparency and comparability.

Default judgment set aside without costs

A recent District Court case is believed to be the first in Queensland in which UCPR r 5 has been used to support the setting aside of a regularly entered default judgment without a costs order.

Default, deadlock and remedies

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of common default provisions and the range of common law and equitable remedies available to a joint venture partner in the event of default by a co-venturer. Because of the various joint venture vehicles such as trusts, corporations, partnerships and others, it is proposed to deal only generally with these questions.

Setting aside default judgment - whether judgment regularly or irregularly entered - service under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s109X(1) - requirements for affadavit of service

In Hill v Robertson Suspension Systems Pty Ltd [2009] QDC 165 McGill DCJ considered the procedural requirements for the service of originating process on a company, and for proving that service for the purpose of obtaining default judgment.The judge’s views adopt a strict and technical construction of the requirements for an affidavit of service under r 120(1)(b). Though clearly obiter, they may well affect the approach taken on applications to enter or set aside default judgments in the lower courts. Pending further judicial consideration of the issue, it is suggested the prudent course is to ensure that the deponent of an affidavit for service effected under s 109X(1)(a) of the Act deposes not only to the location of the registered office of the company but also, at a minimum, provides the source of that information.

Asset allocation policy, returns and expenses of superannuation funds : recent evidence based on default options

We examine the asset allocation, returns, and expenses of superannuation funds whose assets are mainly invested in default investment options between 2004 and 2012. A majority of these funds fail to earn returns commensurate with their strategic asset allocation policy. It appears that much of the variation of returns between the funds might be a result of their engaging in significant active management of assets. Our results indicate that returns from active management are negatively related to expenses. We also find strong evidence of economies of scale existing in these superannuation funds across different size categories.

Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed retirement plans?

The appropriateness of default investment options in participant-directed retirement plans like 401(k) has been in sharp focus given that most participants fail to nominate an investment option to direct their contributions. In United States (US), prior to the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, plan fiduciaries often selected a money market fund as the default option. Whilst this ‘low risk and low return’ investment option was considered to be a ‘safe’ choice by many fiduciaries who were fearful of litigation risk, it was heavily criticized for resulting in inadequate wealth at retirement, particularly when retirees were living much longer and facing inflation risk (see, for example, Viceira, 2008; Skinner, 2009)...

Default judgment - whether irregular - whether court has residual discretion not to set aside default judgment irregularly entered

In CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 399 McGill DCJ examined whether the court now has a discretion to set aside an irregularly entered default judgment.

Setting aside default judgment - whether applicant must file affidavit providing direct evidence of defence 'on the merits'

In Prus-Butwilowicz v Moxey [2002] QDC 166 the court examined the question whether an applicant for an order setting aside a default judgment was required to file an affidavit providing direct evidence of a defence 'on the merits' and whether the position had changed under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).

Obvious error in approach to default costs assessment

The decision of Henry J in Ginn & Anor v Ginn; ex parte Absolute Law Lawyers & Attorneys [2015] QSC 49 provides clarification of the approach to be taken on a default costs assessment under r708 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999

Credit Default Swaps and Insurance: Against the Potts Opinion

Little attention has been given to the possibility that CDS transactions might be construed as insurance contracts in English law. This article challenges the widespread “Potts opinion”, which states that CDSs are not insurance, because they do not require the protection buyer to sustain a loss or to have an insurable interest in the subject matter. CDSs often do provide protection against loss that the buyer is exposed to; loss indemnity is not a necessary characterisation of an insurance contract; insurable interest does not form part of the definition of insurance, but is an additional requirement of valid insurance; and what matters is the substance not the form of the contract. The situation in the US and Australia is also briefly considered.

Fiscal imbalances, inflation and sovereign default dynamics

Resumen: La cuestión central que este artículo busca responder es como la política monetaria puede afectar el comportamiento de equilibrio de primas por riesgo soberano y cesación de pagos. El artículo se basa en el modelo de “una-tasa-interés”. La deuda pública se hace riesgosa a causa de una política fiscal activa, como en Uribe (2006), reflejando la habilidad limitada de la autoridad fiscal para controlar el superávit primario. El problema de insolvencia es debido a una oleada de mala suerte (shocks negativos que afectan el superávit primario). Pero en contraste a los resultados de Uribe, a medida que aumenta el costo de la deuda soberana (que resulta de un excedente primario débil), la cesación de pagos se anticipa y es reflejada por una creciente prima de riesgo en el país y una probabilidad de cesación de pagos. La cesación de pagos se define como un incumplimiento de un acuerdo contractual y por ende la decisión es tomada por la autoridad fiscal. Mientras tanto, objetivos conflictivos entre la autoridad monetaria y fiscal juegan un rol importante en llevar a la autoridad fiscal a la cesación de pagos sobre sus pasivos. La característica de la política del gobierno necesaria para restaurar el equilibrio después de la cesación de pagos también es analizada.

Insula and striatum mediate the default bias.

Humans are creatures of routine and habit. When faced with situations in which a default option is available, people show a consistent tendency to stick with the default. Why this occurs is unclear. To elucidate its neural basis, we used a novel gambling task in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Behavioral results revealed that participants were more likely to choose the default card and felt enhanced emotional responses to outcomes after making the decision to switch. We show that increased tendency to switch away from the default during the decision phase was associated with decreased activity in the anterior insula; activation in this same area in reaction to "switching away from the default and losing" was positively related with experienced frustration. In contrast, decisions to choose the default engaged the ventral striatum, the same reward area as seen in winning. Our findings highlight aversive processes in the insula as underlying the default bias and suggest that choosing the default may be rewarding in itself.

A logic for default reasoning

The need to make default assumptions is frequently encountered in reasoning about incompletely specified worlds. Inferences sanctioned by default are best viewed as beliefs which may well be modified or rejected by subsequent observations. It is this property which leads to the non-monotonicity of any logic of defaults. In this paper we propose a logic for default reasoning. We then specialize our treatment to a very large class of commonly occuring defaults. For this class we develop a complete proof theory and show how to interface it with a top down resolution theorem prover. Finally, we provide criteria under which the revision of derived beliefs must be effected.